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ABSTRACT 
A VETERAN WELFARE STATE: VETERANS’ BENEFITS, COALITION POLITICS, 
AND SOCIAL POLICY CHANGE, 1943-1973 
 
SEPTEMBER 2014 
 
MELINDA RAE TARSI, B.A., WESTERN CONNECTICUT STATE UNIVERSITY 
 
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Directed by: Professor MARYANN BARAKSO 
 
America’s commitment to the reintegration of veterans via social policy is not a 
recent political development; since the end of World War II, federal and state government 
programs have been designed (and redesigned) to successfully transition former military 
personnel back into civilian life. Beginning with the 1944 Serviceman’s Readjustment 
Act (commonly known as the G.I. Bill), the federal government has taken the primary 
role in this reintegration initiative, investing billions of dollars into veterans’ benefit 
programs for education assistance, unemployment compensation, and job placement 
services. Even as the legislation has been renewed after military conflicts, veterans’ 
education benefits have remained an integral part of the American social policy landscape 
in the post-New Deal era, providing critical tuition assistance for service members 
returning to a civilian workforce. As much as we know about the positive effects on 
American politics and economy generated by the original G.I. Bill and its successors, 
what do we truly know about the way that the legislation has been developed, or how it 
fits in with the broader set of (less popular) social policies in American history? 
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I argue that veterans’ education benefits were supported by an unlikely political 
coalition (comprised of often diverging interests) that was tenuously united by the 
success of the 1944 G.I. Bill.  As a result of this coalition’s competing social policy 
goals, the development of veterans’ education benefits siphoned political momentum 
away from broad-based education aid policies after 1944. Drawing on Congressional 
records, hearing transcripts, and archival data from over a dozen national libraries and 
private collections, I highlight the strategies of this “veterans’ benefit coalition,” as well 
as the ways in which the coalition worked toward expanding veterans’ benefits at the 
expense of programs for the entire citizenry (dovetailing with conservative interests to 
limit the growth of the American welfare state). The inclusion of this veterans’ benefit 
coalition – and its spillover effects – in the broader narrative of American welfare state 
development is a critical contribution to understanding America’s “laggard” welfare 
system in a comparative context. 
 
KEYWORDS: veterans’ benefits; G.I. Bill; social policy 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION !
In June 2014, the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944 (commonly known as 
the G.I. Bill) turned 70 years old, ushering in the opportunity for reflection on the 
importance and popularity of the legislation whose hallmark feature was its college 
tuition benefits for returning World War II veterans. President Barack Obama remarked 
in an op-ed piece that, besides paying for college tuitions, “the GI Bill also transformed 
America.  With the careers it sparked, the homes it helped our veterans buy, and the 
prosperity it generated, it paid for itself several times over and helped lay the foundation 
for the largest middle class in history.”1 The G.I. Bill remains a popular fixture in 
American political rhetoric and politics more broadly, as the perceptions of the success of 
the program continue to inform current opinions. In a recent Gallup Poll, 78% of veterans 
reported satisfaction with the program of veterans’ education benefits in American 
policy, while only 16% identified themselves as dissatisfied. This outpouring of support 
for the program is interesting, though, because the same poll reported that 63% of today’s 
veterans have not used the most recent versions of the G.I. Bill benefits at all (and a full 
46% in the target 18-to-49 age group claim to have never used these benefits).2 Thus, 
even with a marginal current utilization rate, the G.I. Bill is lauded as a viable and 
successful social policy program.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Barack Obama, “Op-Ed by President Obama on the 70th Anniversary of the G.I. Bill.” Office of the Press 
Secretary, The White House, June 20, 2014. Accessed July 10, 2014. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2014/06/20/op-ed-president-obama-70th-anniversary-gi-bill.  
2 Gallup, “Most Veterans are Satisfied with G.I. Bill Education Benefits,” July 3, 2014. Accessed July 10, 
2014. http://www.gallup.com/poll/172082/veterans-satisfied-bill-education-benefits.aspx?ref=image.  
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The G.I. Bill’s distinction as the most popular, broad-based social welfare regime 
in American history – created and maintained during periods of flux in American welfare 
state development – creates two separate, but interrelated questions. First, who were the 
powerful architects of the G.I. Bill’s several reforms, and how were they able to 
concentrate support behind increasing federal spending in spite of countervailing political 
and economic forces? Secondly, and as an extension of the previous question, to what 
extent did the activities of veterans’ education benefit supporters affect the development 
of parallel broad-based social policies in development at the same time? The institution 
of veterans’ benefits – specifically those focused on economic reintegration through 
education, training, and unemployment compensation – presents an important case study 
in American politics, allowing us to examine policy change that has remained durable 
through various political and economic contexts. In addition, the political actors involved 
in advocating for increased veterans’ benefits – and their attendant strategies for 
influencing legislators and public opinion – provide an important glimpse into a powerful 
lobby that has persisted since the end of World War I. Perhaps most importantly, the 
institution of veterans’ benefits has had “spillover effects” into other areas of public 
policy, having a distinct influence on parallel universal social policies addressed at 
economic recovery and making American education and jobs competitive at the global 
level.  
The importance of this research question is twofold. First, in identifying the 
architects of the G.I. Bill system, this project illuminates the role of a coalition of 
political actors – as well as powerful members within that coalition – that were able to 
retain control over a particular policy area throughout a time of stark political and 
 3! !
economic change. Advocates of the G.I. Bill have been incredibly successful in 
maintaining the contours of the original program, as well as continuously expanding the 
generosity of its provisions in line with new economic realities. Understanding the 
unprecedented power of the coalition – as well as the changes it underwent over time – 
provides political scientists (and policymakers) with a useful case study for analyzing 
how disparate interests may achieve and maintain policy goals. Secondly, this research 
highlights how the veterans’ benefit coalition was able to shift American social policy 
development during its formative postwar years. Beyond implying a connection between 
the two policy spheres, I provide evidence that coalition members, still in service to either 
their support for or opposition to the New Deal regime, used veterans’ benefits as a 
means to attain their greater social welfare policy ends. The lasting impression of the 
veterans’ benefit coalition is not only a strong system of educational support for returning 
American veterans, but also a welfare state that – across several policy spheres – was 
reined in at critical moments through the coalition’s work. Supporters of the New Deal 
utilized the G.I. Bill in an effort to continue to realize Franklin Roosevelt’s vision of 
domestic economic intervention, while New Deal opponents saw a way to appease public 
pressure for more generous welfare policies with benefits aimed at a politically (and 
publicly) popular subset of the population. The study of the veterans’ benefit coalition is 
important, then, to understand not only coalition success, but also the full range of actors 
and political strategies employed to shape the contours of the laggard American welfare 
state. 
I argue that the set of political actors mobilized around veterans’ benefits (and 
education assistance in particular) was a relatively disparate and conflicted of actors with 
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clearly divergent interests across a range of social policies. This “veterans’ benefit 
coalition,” as I identify them, was a heterogeneous and fragmented group, yet one that 
was highly successful at developing, reforming, and ultimately institutionalizing 
veterans’ education benefits, even in the face of strong political pressure and efforts at 
retrenchment. Moreover, this coalition was able to have an influence on parallel social 
policy development, effectively creating “spillover” effects in areas of policy aimed at 
the broader American population. In contrast to the universal American welfare state 
(which is depicted as a laggard, especially relative to other industrialized countries), the 
veteran welfare state is well developed and comprehensive. Veterans’ benefits in their 
current incarnation developed alongside the patchwork construction of the universal 
welfare state from the New Deal era, through the Great Society initiative, and even 
during conservative retrenchment efforts. Although prominent secondary historical 
accounts suggest that the presence of a veteran welfare state is somehow related to 
legislation for general social welfare programs,3 there is still no focused analysis of the 
ways in which the development of veterans’ benefits and their universal counterparts 
interacted at key historical and political junctures. Political scientists have not yet fully 
explicated the extent to which the rise of the veteran benefit regime directly curtailed the 
emerging American welfare state in its infancy. Proponents of veterans’ benefits argued, 
ultimately successfully, that generous benefits for veterans obviated the need for broader 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Politics of Social Policy in the United States 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992); Edwin Amenta and Theda Skocpol, “Redefining the 
New Deal: World War II and the Development of Social Provision in the United States,” in The Politics of 
Social Policy in the United States, eds. Margaret Weir, Ann Shola Orloff, and Theda Skocpol (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988); Kathleen J. Frydl, The G.I. Bill (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009); Sar A. Levitan and Karen A. Cleary, Old Wars Remain Unfinished: The Veteran Benefits 
System (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973); Stephen R. Ortiz, Beyond the Bonus 
March and G.I. Bill: How Veteran Politics Shaped the New Deal Era. (New York: New York University 
Press, 2010). 
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social protections for the civilian citizenry. As they suggested, with veterans and their 
dependents constituting such a large portion of the population, it was unnecessary to 
construct or expand universal policies available to all citizens. Veterans’ interest in 
expanding veterans’ benefits dovetailed with the VA’s interest in expanding its budget 
and policy domain, and with Republicans’ and conservative Democrats' interest in 
rewarding military personnel and, more importantly, limiting the growth of the universal 
welfare state. 
In this project I analyze the political activity surrounding the development of the 
four major iterations of the G.I. Bill’s education and unemployment compensation 
provisions (in 1944, 1952, 1966, and 1972), drawing on evidence from legislative 
hearings and reports; mass periodicals and pressure group correspondence; archival 
materials from presidential, legislative, and interest group archives; and secondary 
historical accounts of the politics of veterans’ benefits (and social policy more broadly) 
during the time period. I pay special attention to the members of the veterans’ benefit 
coalition, who brought often diverging interests to bear in their advocacy of education 
benefits for veterans. This project explicates the composition of this unlikely alliance and 
the extent to which members’ competing interests affected not only the development of 
veterans’ education benefits, but also the parallel development of other educational and 
reintegration policies around the same time. Additionally, I contend that expanding the 
policy feedback model to include heterogeneity in both interest group composition and 
feedback effects (to account for “spillover” in other policy areas) would allow scholars a 
more complete perspective on the development of social policy – and the American 
welfare state writ large – in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. 
 6! !
 
The American Welfare State and Veterans’ Benefits in Comparative Perspective 
 The importance of the G.I. Bill to American social policy development is a 
prominent theme in work on American political history, but the broader contours of the 
American welfare program are more striking when compared against similar 
governmental regimes. America’s welfare state development in comparative perspective 
has revealed a substantial split between the US and other developed states, as the former 
has been characterized as a “laggard” welfare state when judged by the standards of 
Western European welfare systems.4 Scholars have identified various mechanisms for 
this stunted welfare growth, focusing on how both institutional and electoral factors have 
eroded the potential of the American welfare state. While veterans’ benefit policies may 
appear to be a separate policy sphere, they represent an important part of the full 
spectrum of the American welfare state; when benefits to veterans are accounted for, the 
American system becomes increasingly generous in comparison to its industrialized 
peers.5 American veteran benefits have long been a critical element of the regime of 
policies at work in domestic politics, and have only recently been recognized as 
important for not only driving the early versions of social policy,6 but also for a major 
component of its current formulation.7 While the current welfare state scholarship is 
instructive in understanding the complex “intercurrence”8 of various concurrent 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Gosta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1990). 
5 Christopher Howard, The Welfare State Nobody Knows: Debunking Myths about U.S. Social Policy 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007). 
6 Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers; Laura Jensen, Patriots, Settlers, and the Origins of American 
Social Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
7 Howard, The Welfare State Nobody Knows. 
8 For a full description of “intercurrence,” see Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek, The Search for 
American Political Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). I use the term here to 
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trajectories, it potentially obscures the important role that veterans’ benefits – and the 
politics surrounding their development – have played in shaping the contours of the 
current social policy landscape. The role of veterans’ benefits is greater than its bottom-
line contribution to federal expenditures; rather, the very political process of developing 
the veterans’ education benefit system itself influenced the way in which other programs 
would take shape. 
 There are several potential explanations for the laggard American welfare state 
that do not include a role for parallel policy development. The electoral incentives for a 
bounded welfare state, though most recently identified in the 1970s and 1980s,9 have 
their foundations in earlier contestations over the role of labor and capital in American 
politics. One reason for the stunted welfare state development has been business interests 
to self-regulate benefits policies – dovetailing with conservative interests to prevent the 
New Deal policies from instantiating a rampant increase in state size – and which has led 
to a regime of limited public intervention and increasingly more private economic 
security benefits.10 These combined efforts have led to an anemic public policy regime 
that relies increasingly on private benefits to supplant the state provisions for healthcare 
and pensions. Another important factor in US welfare development has been the electoral 
arrangements of parties that have obscured (intentionally or unintentionally) the attempts 
of labor to make inroads into national discussions about income security. Standing in 
stark contrast to Western European states, America’s increasingly powerless labor unions !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
generally describe the many “moving parts” of American welfare state development that, taken as a whole, 
have contributed to the kinds of shifts in political orders that Orren and Skowronek describe. 
9 Paul Pierson, Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher, and the Politics of Retrenchment 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
10 Jacob Hacker, The Divided Welfare State: The Battle over Public and Private Social Benefits in the 
United States (Cambridge: Cambridge Press, 2002). For an overview of the public and private dynamic 
beyond Hacker’s examples of healthcare and pensions, see also Christopher Howard, The Welfare State 
Nobody Knows. 
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were unable to participate in the coalition politics that drove concessions in social policy 
provisions in other industrialized states.11 The electoral changes in American politics 
have not only presented opportunities for change in social policies; as I explain further, 
they also created conditions that allowed veterans’ benefit politics to shape social policy 
development. 
 The institutional structure of the American welfare state has been changed by its 
initial forays into economic security policies, through both Civil War veterans’ benefits 
and early aid policies for working mothers. These policies created critical target groups of 
beneficiaries and also acted as prototype policies for broader schemes of state social 
policies.12 However, these initial institutional arrangements presented negative examples 
of welfare state arrangements; in the case of Civil War benefits especially, the provisions 
were laid bare to abuses of the patronage system and soon formed a bloated and corrupt 
system of selective entitlements. Institutions have been more than blueprints for state 
development, however; they have also formed less-recognized facets of the welfare state 
that contribute to its size (and, some would argue, relative wealth when these “hidden” 
elements are taken into account). One such example is the American tax system, the 
provisions of which supply homeowners, veterans, and others with substantial tax breaks 
and an effective expenditure system unlike those in other industrial countries.13 These 
institutional arrangements have allowed veterans’ benefits – as a jurisdictionally distinct, 
“parallel” welfare state – the political cover to develop alongside the American welfare 
state. While veterans’ benefits appear to be a discrete category of social policy, I argue !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Alexander Hicks, Social Democracy and Welfare Capitalism: A Century of Income Security Politics 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999). 
12 Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers. 
13 Christopher Howard, The Hidden Welfare State: Tax Expenditures and Social Policy in the United States 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997). 
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that their development had enduring effects on the social policies under development at 
the same time. Thus, institutional arrangements have not only limited the growth of the 
welfare state; they have also provided the “veteran welfare state” with the space and 
bureaucratic power necessary to become an important player in the politics of social 
policy. 
Of critical importance to many of these accounts of American welfare state 
development has been the theory of policy feedback, which has outlined the mechanisms 
by which initial changes in policies have reverberated through the rest of the social policy 
system over time. While existing research has provided important insights into the 
various factors contributing to American social policy development, it has currently 
underplayed the importance of veterans’ benefits in explaining the laggard status of the 
American welfare state. In the next section, I lay out the current explanations of veterans’ 
benefit influence offered by policy feedback theory, and offer two specifications to the 
model which will provide a more accurate perspective on the importance of veterans’ 
benefits to American social policy development. 
 
Policy Feedback and the Case of Veterans’ Education Benefits 
Policy feedback presents a compelling story of change in public policy literature, 
and although it finds its roots in the work of E.E. Schattschneider,14 it was not until the 
1990s that political scientists began systematically analyzing and applying the concept to 
the political system. Within policy feedback frameworks, policies are afforded agency 
insofar as they can change politics through influencing both political behavior (of 
individuals and groups), as well as the ways in which policy is created in the future. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 E.E. Schattschneider, Politics, Pressure, and the Tariff (New York: Prentice Hall, 1935). 
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Policy development does not occur in a vacuum; instead, it is contextualized within the 
political landscape shaped by policy development over time. Daniel Béland notes, “In the 
broadest sense…the concept of policy feedback refers to this impact of previously 
enacted policies on future political behavior and policy choices. In other words, policy 
feedback is a temporal concept that points to the fact that over time, policy can shape 
politics.”15 While the policy feedback model is useful for explaining repeated iterations 
of policy developments over time, I argue that some small – but critical – additions to the 
model can allow for a better incorporation of other concomitant factors (such as interest 
group composition and the types of feedback effects witnessed). By making these 
refinements to the policy feedback model – using the G.I. Bill development as illustration 
– political scientists may better explain instances of policy development in which 
seemingly divergent interests act in concert to achieve similar political ends. In the case 
of veterans’ benefits, their place in the social policy literature provides three major types 
of mechanisms of policy feedback, explaining interest group power,16 civic 
engagement,17 and changes in state capacities.18 While these mechanisms have been 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Daniel Béland, “Reconsidering Policy Feedback: How Policies Affect Politics,” Administration and 
Society 42:5 (2010): 570. Béland provides a brief survey of the policy feedback literature, but for general 
theory development, see: Paul Pierson, “When Effect Becomes Cause: Policy Feedback and Political 
Change,” World Politics 45:1 (1993): 599. For work on historical institutionalism and policy feedback, see: 
Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers; Orren and Skowronek, The Search for American 
Political Development; Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004). For work on how policies have affected issues of race and gender, 
see: Suzanne Mettler, Dividing Citizens: Gender and Federalism in New Deal Public Policy (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1998); Robert C. Lieberman, Shifting the Color Line: Race and the American 
Welfare State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998); Julia S. O’Connor, Ann Shola Orloff, 
and Sheila Shaver, States, Markets, Families: Gender Liberalism and Social Policy in Australia, Canada, 
Great Britain and the United States (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
16 Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers. 
17 Mettler, Soldiers to Citizens; Mettler, Suzanne. 2002. “Bringing the State Back in to Civic Engagement: 
Policy Feedback Effects of the G.I. Bill for World War II Citizens,” American Political Science Review 96: 
2 (2002); Suzanne Mettler and Eric Welch. 2004. “Civic Generation: Policy Feedback Effects of the G.I. 
Bill on Political Involvement over the Life Course,” British Journal of Political Science 34:3 (2004). 
18 Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers; Laura Jensen, Patriots, Settlers, and the Origins. 
 11! !
useful in explaining policy feedback effects through the 1944 G.I. Bill, additional 
specifications to the model will be useful for understanding the evolution of veterans’ 
benefits following the immediate post-WWII period. 
 
Policy Feedback, Interest Groups, and Coalition Politics 
 One of the most significant contributions that the veterans’ benefit literature has 
made to political science is the addition of a case study in how policy feedback can create 
strong and durable constituencies that may shape future iterations of the same (or similar) 
policies. The policy has a generative effect, acting as the catalyst for the formations of 
pressure groups (or alliances of existing groups), which then become political actors in 
their own rights. In his articulation of policy feedback, Paul Pierson notes that, “Policies 
provide both incentives and resources that may facilitate or inhibit the formation or 
expansion of particular groups. The incentives stem primarily from the major social 
consequences of specific government actions.”19 While policies can influence the 
establishment of well-funded pressure groups that can promote the maintenance (if not 
expansion of) the policy’s benefits, more recent literature augments this story by 
suggesting that program popularity can make even programs for the poor politically 
salient to the whole citizenry.20 
 The effect of policy feedback processes on interest group power is especially 
salient in the case of veterans’ benefits, as extant scholarship makes persuasive 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 Pierson, “When Effect Becomes Cause.”  
20 Paul Pierson, Dismantling the Welfare State?; see Christopher Howard, The Hidden Welfare State for a 
description of how Medicaid has gained popularity even though it is aimed at those of lower socioeconomic 
status. For more on Social Security, see Daniel Béland, Social Security: History and Politics from the New 
Deal to the Privatization Debate (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2005), as well as Pierson, 
Dismantling the Welfare State? and Jacob S. Hacker, The Divided Welfare State. 
 12! !
arguments for the power of veterans’ groups in not only successfully negotiating the 
political terrain in favor of more extensive benefits,21 but also in the effect of policies on 
generating new target groups whose levels of civic engagement are positively affected by 
these policies.22 However, the case of the veterans’ benefit coalition offers an opportunity 
to add a layer of nuance to the current theory concerning how interests groups utilize the 
leverage provided by policies to increase political power. 
 While existing theories of policy feedback focus on the roles of pressure 
organizations, these groups are often treated as discrete entities with homogenous 
political goals or mutually preferred methods for obtaining those goals. In the case of 
veterans’ benefits, for example, some accounts paint the major veterans’ groups – such as 
the American Legion, Veterans of Foreign Wars, and Disabled Veterans of America – 
with a broad stroke, portraying them as proponents of veterans’ benefit legislation across 
various categories and time periods. Such an account is not in line with some narratives 
that identify rifts between the veterans’ groups that go back to their origins and 
membership;23 similarly, the opposing interests of business leaders and union leaders 
were, at least at the outset, united on the need for veterans’ benefits in education and 
training in the original G.I. Bill, although for reasons that would attempt to undermine the 
opposing force’s political power among workers.24 The bipartisan support for increased 
veterans’ benefits, combined with veterans’ groups, business, and labor support for the 
legislation created a heterogeneous coalition of veterans’ benefit proponents whose 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers; for a discussion of veterans’ benefits before the modern 
administration of the post-Civil War era, see Jensen, Patriots, Settlers, and the Origins. 
22 Mettler, Soldiers to Citizens. 
23 Ortiz, Beyond the Bonus March. 
24 Jennifer Brooks, “Unexpected Foes: World War II Veterans and Labor in the Postwar South,” Labor: 
Studies of Working Class History in the Americas, 7 (2010). 
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strategic goals were contradictory to that of their fellow coalition members; nonetheless, 
the coalition members worked together in developing a relatively resilient institution at 
the federal level. 
Accounting for the dynamics of political coalitions – composed of both elite and 
non-elite actors, as Pierson notes – is critical for identifying the potentially countervailing 
forces that shape the design – or redesign – of a particular institution.25 While political 
actors form coalitions because it presents a way to maximize small groups’ interests with 
relatively minor cost,26 participation can at often times be expensive, especially for those 
members of the coalition who want their interests to receive the largest share of 
attention.27 The support of a broad coalition can signal to lawmakers that a particular 
legislative initiative is not only popular among invested groups, but that it enjoys broad-
based popular support as well; to this extent, lawmakers may use coalition diversity or 
breadth as a heuristic for the universal appeal of a particular policy proposal.28 
The downside of coalitions, however, is twofold. First, they are susceptible to the 
free-rider problem, as less invested members can enjoy the benefits of membership and 
advocacy resources that are supplied by other members of the coalition.29 Second, and 
more instructive for analyzing policy development over time, the fact that coalitions often 
arise in a conflict-drive political environment means that they remain susceptible to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 Paul Pierson, “Public Policies as Institutions,” in Rethinking Political Institutions: The Art of the State, 
eds. Ian Shapiro, Stephen Skowronek, and Daniel Galvin. (NY: New York University Press, 2006). 
26 Andrew B. Whitford, “The Structures of Interest Coalitions: Evidence from Environmental Litigation.” 
Business and Politics. 5 (2003): 45–64. 
27 Michael T. Heaney, “Reputation and Leadership inside Interest Group Coalitions.” Paper presented at the 
annual meetings of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL., 2004; James Q. Wilson, 
Political Organizations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973). 
28 John W. Kingdon, 1981. Congressmen’s Voting Decisions. 2nd edition (New York: Harper and Row, 
1981); Kevin Hula, “Rounding Up the Usual Suspects: Forging Interest Group Coalitions.” In Interest 
Group Politics, 4th ed., eds. Allan J. Cigler and Burdett A. Loomis. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1995). 
29 Marie, Hojnacki, “Organized Interests’ Advocacy Behavior in Alliances.” Political Research Quarterly. 
51 (1998): 437–59. 
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cross-pressures, especially when the members’ shared interest is not reflective of their 
primary individual interests.30  
I argue that the example of the veterans’ benefit coalition provides a unique case 
study to analyze how the composition of the interest group coalition that benefits from 
the enactment of a policy can be fractured over time. The bonds that hold an interest 
group coalition together may be negatively affected by the policy feedback process, as 
reforms to the legislation force schisms in interests to the forefront and may cause 
members of the coalition to break away once their individual interests are more important 
than the ones reflected in the legislation. While extant theories of policy feedback 
hypothesize a homogenous set of political actors that universally benefits from the 
extension of benefits to a target population, the model in its current state does not account 
for any type of actor arrangement in which the interests pursued are not universal. While 
homogenous political groups may indeed become strengthened by political victories 
during legislative development, it is the shared interest (manifested in the policy) that 
reinforces this type of interest group. When the political actors in question are a coalition 
– and one whose members have interests outside of veterans’ education benefits, as well 
as ones that come into direct conflict with any extension of government assistance – 
political scientists and policy scholars have yet to specify how the policy process 
necessarily strengthens the coalition. If anything, the duration of the policy process, 
combined with competing interests, may serve to devalue participation in the coalition 
and ultimately lead to coalition fracture or even member exit from the group. Such a 
change would destabilize the former support system for the policy regime, leaving it 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 Whitford, “The Structures of Interest Coalitions.” 
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without critical advocates or vulnerable to attempts at reform that could significantly alter 
the policy from its origins.31  
Thus, while the policy feedback model presupposes homogenous political actors 
that are reified through the enactment of a policy, research on political coalitions suggests 
that the veterans’ coalition diversity and diverging interests may leave it susceptible to 
coalition fracture (or even breakdown). From this juxtaposition, I make two interrelated – 
but theoretically discrete – contentions concerning the composition of the veterans’ 
benefit coalition: 
Contention 1: The veterans’ benefit coalition was heterogeneous, and composed of 
diverging political interests. 
 The veterans’ benefit coalition was comprised of disparate veterans’ 
organizations, labor unions, postsecondary institutions and their representatives, business 
lobbies, Democrat and Republican lawmakers, Presidential administrations, and the 
Veterans’ Administration. The sheer diversity in the types of political actors in the 
coalition is enough to suggest that their interests were not unified outside of the scope of 
veterans’ education benefits; however, their attendant ideological biases and constituent 
groups only further exacerbate the potential fault lines in the coalition. Integrating an 
analysis of coalition politics into the policy feedback model allows us to further specify 
the conditions under which legislative change could potentially strengthen the group (and 
induce further participation or compliance), as well as identify which differences could 
eventually be too much for the group to overcome. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 On the reform process, see Eric M. Patashnik, Reforms at Risk: What Happens after Major Policy 
Changes are Enacted (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008). 
 16! !
 Another important component of these coalition politics is the role that individual 
coalition members can take at varying points of policy development. While the coalition 
was heterogeneous throughout the postwar time period (and through the Vietnam era), 
this is not to say that its power was distributed equally among members of the group; 
rather, certain members of the coalition were able to leverage the influence of the 
coalition and harness its political influence in Congress even when the rest of the 
coalition members were not actively striving toward a particular end. The best examples 
of this phenomenon are individual legislators on the veterans’ committees of both the 
House and Senate. At varying points in G.I. Bill development, these legislators were able 
to mobilize support for increasing or diffusing veteran’s education benefits even with 
only tepid support from the veterans’ interest groups, VA, White House, or other 
coalition members. 
 The willingness of these legislators to move ahead on G.I. Bill benefits with or 
without the express support of the rest of the coalition invites the question: why would 
these particular legislators take the inherent risk to develop policies without the directive 
of the other coalition members, especially the increasingly powerful veterans’ lobby 
groups? While electoral incentives may explain initiative from legislators in particular 
districts,32 it is insufficient to provide insight into those representatives without 
significant military or veteran populations among their constituents. In concert with the 
potential electoral benefits is the broader issue of the way in which veterans’ benefits, up 
to WWII and beyond, have been constructed within American politics. From the notion 
of “deservingness” originated within the first set of Revolutionary War pensions through !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1974); 
R. Douglas Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990). 
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the WWI-era struggle over the adjusted compensation “bonus,”33 veterans’ benefits have 
become a valence issue as America moved from the post-WWII period into the Cold War 
era. The fact that veterans’ benefits are so universally popular make them, paradoxically, 
less open to public scrutiny or censure; moreover, the “deserving” veteran is contrasted 
with the “undeserving” welfare mother or criminal.34 Such widespread support for 
veterans’ benefits ensures that legislators can take reasonable risks on the behalf of the 
veteran population and be met with little resistance (even without the explicit consent of 
the veterans’ organizations or other veterans’ benefit coalition members). Lastly, the 
enduring legacy of the New Deal is, I argue, a compounding factor in explaining the 
actions of these legislators within the coalition. Whether seeking to extend New Deal 
policies for social welfare or limit them through offering veterans’ benefits to the 
population in trade for civilian benefits, the architects of the G.I. Bill program reveal 
through historical evidence that the specter of the New Deal was still alive and well in the 
decades following its inception. 
 Thus, an explanation of the heterogeneity of the veterans’ benefit coalition also 
entails a discussion of the motivations of those actors who do step forward within the 
group and attempt to advance legislation without the coalition’s urging. Taken together, 
the literature on coalitional development and the explanations for individual legislators’ 
policymaking attempts suggest that the coalition’s uneven distribution of power left 
certain members in more influential roles than others. Such a view also suggests that the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 For veterans’ benefits during the Revolutionary War, see Jensen, Patriots, Settlers, and the Origins; 
Laura Jensen, “Constructing and Entitling America’s Original Veterans,” in Deserving and Entitled: Social 
Constructions and Public Policy, eds. Anne L. Schneider and Helen M. Ingram (Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 2005). For an overview of veterans’ benefits in the interwar years, see Ortiz, 
Beyond the Bonus March. 
34 Anne L. Schneider and Helen Ingram, Policy Designs for Democracy (Lawrence, KS: University of 
Kansas Press, 1997), 5-6. 
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veterans’ organizations, while cast by legislators and presidents alike as holding the ear 
of certain members of Congress, may in fact have taken a backseat to the political 
ambitions of a select group of legislators during critical moments of policy development. 
 
Contention 2: The process of developing and reforming the G.I. Bill strained the 
alliances between and among members of the veterans’ benefit coalition. 
 The ideological and political divisions between members of the veterans’ benefit 
coalition could be superseded, at least in part, in pursuit of the original goal of postwar 
economic development in 1943-1944. The G.I. Bill and veterans’ education assistance 
did not, however, end after its original tenure, and instead was reformed and 
systematically amended in the following years. The process of legislative reform and the 
iterative nature of delineating educational benefits for veterans’ meant that the coalition’s 
members’ interests would be once again thrown into conflict as the veterans’ benefits 
regime grew. While the policy feedback model presumes that policy change will 
strengthen the policy’s proponents (through the increased resources of the policy’s target 
population), this effect is based on the assumption that the target population is necessarily 
also the constituent population of the interests groups.  
Put simply, the policy feedback model assumes that the interest groups will 
benefit because their members will be the ones reaping the benefits of the policy change. 
Given the disparate interests of the veterans’ benefit coalition – especially with respect to 
their support for broad-based social and economic programs – each coalition member 
would not necessarily benefit (or at least, not equally) from a strengthened veteran base. 
Therefore, between the strain of interests that can no longer be subordinated to the 
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universal goal of the coalition and the unequal benefits to groups based on their veteran 
membership, the policy feedback model may incorrectly assess the long-term reification 
of interest groups involved in the policy process. 
 
Policy Feedback, State Capacities, and Effects on Parallel Policies 
Changes in interest group influence, while an important element of the policy 
feedback literature, are not the only political changes that can be introduced by policies 
over time. Extant scholarship in political science, sociology, and history has addressed 
the important role that veterans’ benefits have had in American political development, 
and specifically in shifting state capacity and affecting the interactions between various 
institutions and actors across the different levels of government.  
Policies can help to expand the existing conception of not only what the state is, 
but also what it is capable of providing to its citizenry; policies can alter the landscape of 
bureaucratic politics such that certain agencies and elite actors can later capitalize upon 
this power for future political gain.35 The changes produced by policy developments can 
empower bureaucrats to take on the administration of new programs in the future, 
especially those that naturally stem from the creation of the current policy. Additionally, 
these shifts in the relationship between legislators, bureaucrats, and pressure groups can 
realign the way in which policies can lay the groundwork for future expansions of social 
policy in the future.36 
 The case of veterans’ benefits has been a critical one for explaining changes in 
state capacities. Beginning with soldiers in the Revolutionary War, the American state !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 See Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers; for an overview, see Béland, “Reconsidering Policy 
Feedback.” 
36 Pierson, Paul. "When Effect Becomes Cause."  
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(however fledgling it was at the time) was committed to making reparations to those 
citizens who had taken up arms in service of the nascent union. The first set of 
government entitlements can be attributed to these early systems of veteran benefits, 
because it represents the first instance in which the American government undertook a 
concerted effort to identify and reimburse a particular subset of the population for its 
service. Jensen argues, “As the original opponents of Revolutionary officers’ pensions 
predicted, selective entitlements fostered the concentration and purposeful application of 
central state capacity to privilege particular interest at the expense of more collective 
concerns.”37  
Similarly, the case of Civil War pensions is acknowledged as an early American 
welfare state that would ultimately shape future iterations of similar social policies. 
Skocpol contends that the early system of Civil War pensions for Union soldiers 
represented the country’s first large-scale attempt at creating social policy. While the 
decentralized nature of the benefits system laid it bare to the potential abuse of patronage 
politics, the Civil War pension system still acted as a prototype for the possibilities of 
American social policy. Though opponents saw the corruption that ravaged the Civil War 
pension system in its later years as the result of any attempt on the part of the state to bear 
economic risk, Skocpol argues that these benefits instilled an important ethic in American 
culture: namely, that of reparations for a deserving population of citizen-soldiers for 
whom protections should be offered (if not administered as the Civil War pension system 
had been).38 Similarly, The WWI era system of veterans’ benefits saw the distinct 
breakup of the former veterans’ benefit system, with the functions of the veterans’ benefit !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 Jensen, Patriots, Settlers, and the Origins, 235. 
38 Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers. 
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structure being split into jurisdictionally distinct bureaus in an attempt to put Progressive-
era ideals of objective bureaucracies into action.39 The experience of the G.I. Bill in 1944 
would soon overshadow this previous history as a milestone in American social policy 
development, and a marked change in the federal government’s reach into economic 
insurance for a large portion of the population. 
 While current policy feedback theories have been critical to understanding how 
welfare development occurred as an effect of entitlement programs (such as those for 
veterans), the connections between policies in different spheres are less studied.40  The 
ways in which policies may not only lay the groundwork for future iterations of similar 
policies, but may actually “spillover” into parallel areas (where their influence can be 
either a stimulant to a hindrance) is as yet understudied in both political science and 
public policy studies. While extant literature suggests that the creation of the original G.I. 
Bill may have stunted the development of other social welfare programs (in a “Second 
New Deal” attempt),41 less work exists on the extent to which the development of 
veterans’ benefit continued to affect the development of parallel programs after the mid-
1940s. Moreover, rather than thinking about the effects of policy development linearly, a 
focus on “spillover” could expand the boundaries of the feedback process to include 
contemporaneous changes in parallel fields.  
 Such an addition would allow the existing literature to account not only for 
expanding social programs as a result of prior explorations into policy development, but 
also for the ways in which policy development in one area may siphon momentum away 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39 William Pyle Dillingham, Federal Aid to Veterans, 1917-1941 (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida 
Press, 1952).  
40 Hacker, The Divided Welfare State. 
41 Amenta and Skocpol, “Redefining the New Deal”; Frydl, The G.I. Bill; Levitan and Cleary, Old Wars. 
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from that of similar areas. Thinking about public policy in “zero sum” terms, the 
development of policy in one area could potentially foreclose policy options in a related 
area during the same timeframe; alternatively, the “open window” of policy development 
could allow for policy entrepreneurs in related areas to utilize the concurrent policy 
development to their advantage.42  
 
Contention 3: Coalition politics caused both “spillover” and “spillback” into related 
areas of universal social policy development. 
 While the policy feedback model assumes that the feedback process is often a 
generative one (and frequently positive at that), the reform process may actually lay the 
groundwork for interactions with other policy fields.43 Policy entrepreneurs can utilize 
open policy “windows” to their advantage, exacting multiple and interrelated benefits 
from this fruitful period and achieving more of their individual agendas.44 Moreover, 
veterans’ benefit policies, with the express intent of generating economic growth for 
veterans and civilians alike, necessarily places them in a potentially transformative 
position with respect to parallel social policies. Coalition members’ influence can 
“spillover” into related areas, bringing similar provisions of veterans’ benefits into other 
policy areas where they can take hold.  
Conversely, members’ influence may actually stunt development in related areas 
of policy development, either by siphoning political momentum away from those policies 
(and toward veterans’ education assistance), or by obviating the need for broad-based 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (London: Longman Publishing Group, 
2002). 
43 Patashnik, Reforms at Risk. 
44 Kingdon, Congressmen’s Voting Decisions. 
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policies with the extension of veterans’ benefits. Borrowing from the literature on 
European integration,45 I use the term “spillback” to refer to efforts to prevent the 
liberalization of social policies aimed at addressing education and income security (the 
two areas in which veterans’ education benefits were proposed to assist returning service 
personnel). By introducing and subsequently reforming veterans’ education benefits, 
veterans’ benefit coalition members were able to directly or indirectly restrict the policy 
landscape for advocates of more expansive social policy benefits at the national level. 
Moreover, coalition members were successful at delineating veterans’ benefits as 
a discrete policy regime that, while it could influence other related policies, would remain 
nonetheless insulated from changes to the administration of other similar policies. The 
VA was able to retain its sole discretionary authority over veterans’ education benefits, 
without oversight from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (or later the 
Department of Education). The ability of the VA to resist pressures to share its 
administrative responsibilities with agencies ostensibly more capable to deal with 
particular policy programs suggests that powerful coalition support offset pressure from 
interest groups and legislators to make critical reforms to the way in which veterans’ 
benefits were handled. In addition, the VA’s protected status reveals that the agency may 
be more politically salient than it is normally credited with being. Therefore, influences 
from the veterans’ education benefit reform process could have effects for similar 
universal policies, though the developments of these policies for civilians did not have a 
parallel influence on veterans’ benefits. Accounting for these “spillover” and “spillback” 
effects in the policy feedback model provides a critical specification for the effects of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45 Ram!nas Vilpi"auskas, “Eurozone Crisis and European Integration: Functional Spillover, Political 
Spillback?” Journal of European Integration 35:3 (2013), 361-373. 
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revisions to public policies. Additionally, increasing the potential scope of policy 
influence to include parallel policy areas helps identify ways in which policy reform may 
be able to drive potentially contradictory changes in other policies in particular political 
contexts. 
  
Data and Methods 
Analyzing the development of veterans’ benefit programs requires a careful 
approach to the use of qualitative data; recent advances in qualitative methods help hone 
the analysis of historical materials into an approach that is both rigorous and theoretically 
sound. My approach is best defined as a “detailed historical narrative” form of process-
tracing, based on the typology of George and Bennett.46 Researchers focusing on 
intensive revisions to policy regimes have utilized this method of analysis to best address 
not only the differences in policy development over time, but to identify the causal 
mechanisms at work in particular stages of policy development.47  
 The basis for this type of historical analysis is often attributed to cross-national 
studies in comparative politics,48 though it can be equally useful for analysis intra-state 
change in policies. Hacker notes that scholars can disaggregate complex policy regimes 
to offer comparisons between policies that appear similar on face, but in reality feature 
significant variance that can be attributed to temporal elements (as well as the actions of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005). See Chapter 10 for a detailed discussion of process-tracing. 
47 For examples, see Hacker, The Divided Welfare State; Lieberman, Shifting the Color Line; and Daniel 
Carpenter, Forging Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive 
Agencies, 1862-1928.  
48 For overviews, see Alexander George, “Case Studies and Theory: The Method of Structured, Focused 
Comparison,” Diplomacy: New Approaches to History, Theory, and Policy, ed. Paul Lauren (New York: 
Free Press, 1979); George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development; for an application to the 
American case, see Hacker, Divided Welfare State, pgs. 65-66. 
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particular political agents). For example, his research compares the public and private 
elements of the American healthcare and retirement systems over time; while not offering 
cross-national comparisons, his analysis is framed as a comparison of the same policy 
regime at different stages (and thus, with significantly different features and institutional 
arrangements).49 Similarly, scholars of reform to existing policies take the original policy 
and post-reform policies as comparison points, and analyze the political mechanisms that 
affected the post-reform outcomes.50 
 Such an approach is particularly useful in modeling policy feedback cycles, 
wherein researchers are most concerned with the particular pathways through which 
initial policies affect politics at a later time.51 The major contribution of this method of 
“historically detailed process-tracing” is that it allows for a more refined filtering of the 
major elements driving institutional and policy change. This approach is in line with the 
method of “historical explanation” best exemplified by Roberts.52 While Roberts notes 
that historians may take alternative approaches to offering these types of detailed 
narratives, the driving concern of such an analysis should be what specific actions or 
events precipitated the event or change in question;53 in line with proponents of process-
tracing in political science, this type of historically-informed isolation of causal processes 
provides not only rich detail in potentially understudied political events, but also the 
potential alternate explanations for the effects under study. Process-tracing, then, is more 
concerned with answering the question of “why?” in policy change over time, than it is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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50 Patashnik, Reforms at Risk 
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53 Roberts, The Logic of Historical Explanation, as quoted in George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory 
Development, pg. 226. 
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with comprehensive narratives; though, when analyzing policy development, the 
temporal element remains of primary concern.  
In each of the subsequent chapters, I identify the causal pathways to each of the 
three effects that I hypothesize: the differentiation of the veterans’ benefit coalition; the 
degeneration of the coalition; and the side effects on parallel social policies during 
formative moments. Using the historical materials and secondary sources, I map out the 
process of legislative development for each of the first four G.I. Bills (and specifically 
their education benefit provisions). I indentify the key members of the veterans’ benefit 
coalition in their actions surrounding the bill’s development, as well as how this process 
(and the actions of this particular group) contributed to the cohesion and effectiveness of 
the veterans’ benefit coalition. In addition, I isolate the key changes in the veterans’ 
education benefit policy regime that allowed for the veterans’ benefit coalition to actually 
influence civilian social policy development – in ways that were either helpful or harmful 
to the expansion of those programs. 
To assess the changes in both the veterans’ benefit coalition and its affects on 
parallel policies, I utilize archival materials for any discussion of motivations, strategy, 
legislative intent, or statements about any of the other members of the veterans’ benefit 
coalition that can be used as evidence of activity within the coalition affecting benefit 
legislation. I supplement these archival materials with Congressional testimony and 
reports that focus on changes to these veterans’ programs, as well as secondary historical 
narratives concerning the political climate in which the changes to the benefits systems 
were taking place. Moreover, I also include an analysis of major news publications (via 
LexisNexis and proprietary archives of individual publications) to indicate the extent to 
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which media attention was following particular legislative developments, as well as to 
capture any statements made to the press or public by a member of the veterans’ benefit 
coalition. A complete table of archival sources can be found in Table 1 (below). 
Table 1: Archival Sources Utilized 
Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library 
Harry S. Truman Presidential Library 
Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library 
John F. Kennedy Presidential Library 
Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library 
Richard Nixon Presidential Library 
Presidential Archives 
Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library 
Edith Nourse Rogers Collection 
Champ Bennett Clark Collection 
William Springer Collection 
Olin Teague Collection 
Legislative Member Archives 
Elbert Thomas Collection 
Institutional Archives Legislative Studies Center, National Archives and 
Records Administration 
Personal Collections William Atherton Collection 
Congressional Testimony, 
Hearings, and Committee 
Correspondence 
Congressional Quarterly Database 
News Media Coverage New York Times archives; Boston Globe archives; 
LexisNexis database 
 
I focus on the first four iterations of the G.I. Bill following WWII, which were 
signed into law in 1944, 1952, 1966, and 1972. Each of these pieces of legislation dealt 
expressly with veterans’ education benefits as a result of military service, though various 
secondary programs were also often included alongside the education provisions in each. 
I constrain the timeframe from 1943-1973 for two key reasons. First, the first four 
iterations of the G.I. Bill are the most similar in their program structure (that is, a federal 
system of VA-administered payments for higher education); however, there is still 
variance across the cases in terms of program provisions and the concurrent social policy 
developments that were advancing alongside those of the veterans’ benefits. Selecting 
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cases which feature some varying characteristics will allow me to highlight the ways in 
which veterans’ benefit coalition influence directly led to the instances of variances 
between the pieces of legislation.54 
Second, the first four iterations of the G.I. Bill occurred during America’s 
Selective Service program, the official conscription regime. After the establishment of 
the all-volunteer force (AVF) in 1973, veteran’s benefits were indeed still offered, though 
their program structures shifted to voluntary contribution models (as in the 1984 
Montgomery G.I. Bill). Restricting my analysis to a pre-AVF military allows me to 
control for the variable of voluntary military service, which could have driven the 
veterans’ benefit coalition in different directions had their membership been concerned 
with programs for individuals who selected military service in an open labor market.  
 
Plan of the Project 
In Chapter 1, I begin with the genesis of modern-day reintegration programs: the 
1944 G.I. Bill. Immediately following WWII, veterans’ benefits (via the GI Bill) 
represented the most impressive social policy legislation in American history, designed to 
help returning veterans integrate back into the economy while simultaneously stabilizing 
an economy that was still in its recovery stages. Plans for demobilization that began 
before the end of the war (and were focused on broad-based social policies) quickly 
shifted to a focus on the effective integration of veterans back into the economy. This 
chapter identifies a veterans’ benefit coalition and why they were able to shift national 
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focus away from what conservative lawmakers touted as an unnecessary expansion of 
government (and “more of the same” as the New Deal era) to an exclusive focus on 
veterans; moreover, I suggest that the 1944 bill was as much a product of previous 
demands from veterans’ groups as it was a response to the demobilization needs of a 
post-WWII economy. The G.I. Bill was able to shift legislative attention away from 
broad-based education and unemployment insurance policies in exchange for offering a 
corrective for a demobilizing American economy (most notably, an influx of semi-trained 
labor), through coalition members’ influence over the National Resource Planning Board 
and Roosevelt’s acquiescence to veteran groups’ demands. 
Chapter 2 focuses on the benefits afforded to Korean War veterans as a product of 
the burgeoning national security state as well as the previous experiences with the 1944 
G.I. Bill. The Veterans’ Adjustment Act of 1952 featured fundamental changes to both 
education assistance and unemployment compensation, and creates a political debate 
about the size of the federal government and the organization of its agencies. The 
investigation of the Hoover Commission – and its plans to consolidate the veterans’ 
benefit program and combine it with other civilian federal programs – creates a potential 
point for policy change that is ultimately missed on the part of reformers, and helps 
illustrate the power of embedded veteran interests. Most importantly, though, the act 
ushers in major changes to the American higher education system, as it codifies the use of 
accreditation standards for federal education funding, and draws both public and private 
post-secondary schools into a heated debate about the market of higher education. The 
investigation of the previous G.I. Bill, as well as the fracture of the veterans’ benefit 
coalition over the 1952 legislation, creates a field of contestation over Korean War 
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veterans’ education benefits, as well as the reliance on educational training over broad-
based income security measures for domestic economic development. 
In Chapter 3, I focus on the Vietnam era and the effects of major definitional 
changes in “veterans” within existing veterans’ benefit legislation. In 1966, the U.S. 
undertakes a major shift in its conceptualization of veterans, including those military 
personnel who had served exclusively during peacetime under the category of veterans. 
This change follows on the heels of the Great Society initiatives and President Johnson’s 
attempts to radically reform the American social policy system. While the Veterans’ 
Readjustment and benefit Act of 1966 enables peacetime veterans to access federal 
benefits, conflict arises among the Johnson Administration, veterans’ groups, and key 
administrators who disapproved of the new policy as well as the reductions in veterans’ 
benefits. The fractures that had occurred during the development of the 1952 legislation 
continue to act as a wedge between various sets of conflicting members of the veterans’ 
benefit coalition; moreover, several members of the coalition begin to identify with the 
rising conservative backlash (and its attendant racial animus), driving the coalition into 
further conflict. 
The rise of conservatism and end of conscription is at the center of Chapter 4, 
which encompasses the period of 1967-1973. During this era, veterans’ benefits still 
increased under both Nixon and Ford, despite administrations’ pressure to hold benefits 
levels constant and make reductions to particular programs. Moreover, even though the 
Vietnam War G.I. Bill benefits were far less generous than those offered to WWII 
veterans, the access rate for these benefits among returning Vietnam veterans was higher 
than that of those who had fought in WWII. Even as Republican legislators pushed for 
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major cuts to the American welfare state, they remained supportive to the veterans’ 
benefit system, going to far as to depart from the White House’s position on the 
Readjustment Act of 1972. This chapter investigates how educational benefits regained 
some of their momentum – even as unemployment compensation came under fire – as 
well as how veterans’ benefits maintained a privileged spot among even some of the 
more vocal proponents of fiscal austerity measures at the federal level. The veterans’ 
benefit coalition remains loosely connected through its common goals, but its alliances 
are stressed further as the changing nature of war and society’s response upends the 
expected responses to veterans’ education benefits and the responsibility of the country 
toward former military personnel. 
The concluding chapter reflects on the case of veterans’ benefits and the lessons 
that it carries for scholars of institutional development, social policy (particularly in the 
areas of education and unemployment insurance), and American political development. I 
also reflect on programs that could be used as comparison cases, and how research on the 
G.I. Bill can help scholars in other policy fields explain changes to monumental policy 
legislation over time.  
The influence of veteran’s benefits on American social policy development 
carries important lessons for scholars of public policy and welfare state development; 
however, policymakers across different policy areas can also take heed from (or comfort 
in) the narrative of veterans’ benefit development and its influence on comparative social 
policies. The ways in which the heterogeneous veterans’ benefit coalition not only 
fractured under the strain of repeated veterans’ education benefit reforms, but was able to 
then affect other universal social policies’ development trajectories, suggests that 
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political coalitions may have more power than they realize, even when allied with their 
political adversaries. Moreover, such an account changes the traditional explanations for 
the rise and eventual stagnation of the American welfare state. Affording an explanatory 
role to the veterans’ benefit regime and its supporters helps explain the maintenance of a 
“veteran welfare state” in the face of efforts at retrenchment and austerity, as well as the 
connections between veterans’ benefits and parallel social policies. The story of the G.I. 
Bill, its supporters, and its influence on the American welfare state, all suggest a need to 
reevaluate our current models of social policy development and our current perceptions 
of the American welfare state’s development trajectory in the post-WWII era. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE 1944 G.I. BILL, AN UNLIKELY COALITION, AND THE ROOTS OF POLICY 
INFLUENCE !
 “Our greatest potential wealth is in the ability and resourcefulness of the young people 
who will be demobilized. The structure for their reallocation must be efficient and 
complete, but we know that no matter how vast may be the blueprints, how dynamic the 
execution of these plans, these young people will soon take this bomb-pocked world on 
their able shoulders and carry it far beyond any goal we may envision.”55 – Brigadier 
General Frank T. Hines, Administrator of Veterans Affairs, 1945 
 
 World War II marked the first American military conflict in which extensive 
economic and policy preparations for the postwar economy began before the conflict had 
ended (and when, to some extent, the outcome was not guaranteed). In assessing the 
realities of the American labor market and need for economic restructuring following the 
end of the conflict, President Franklin Roosevelt, legislators, bureaucrats, and policy 
entrepreneurs began the painstaking process of designing a set of policy prescriptions that 
had no prior model in either magnitude or intention. As policies for returning veterans 
took shape, the implications of this unprecedented social policy development were clear: 
a sweeping social welfare program like the G.I. Bill would fundamentally change the 
relationship between war and American society while establishing a new, discrete welfare 
system for the American veteran.56 Federal government funding for postsecondary 
education was the most visible feature of the landmark legislation, and the one that not 
only strained the relationships of veterans’ benefit supporters, but also have significant !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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implications for the American education system and post-New Deal social policy 
planning. 
 The need for preparing for some 16 million veterans to return to American society 
became apparent to lawmakers. The educational attainment of military personnel during 
WWII had vastly outpaced that of WWI, and shifted the emphasis of education assistance 
programs from high school completion programs and short courses to postsecondary 
education. At the end of WWI, only two of every ten service personnel had obtained 
education at higher than the grade school level; by 1944, that figure had swelled to seven 
in ten. Twice as many service members had high school educations upon entering the 
military in WWII than had in WWI, and officer educational attainments continued to 
outpace that of enlisted personnel.57 The increased levels of educational attainment 
among the service personnel returning from war in 1945 – some sixteen million of them – 
meant that the plans for comprehensive reintegration of former service members would 
necessarily focus on higher levels of postwar education.  
While the idea of supporting veterans’ educational goals seems ephemeral in 
retrospect, in reality it was part of a broader political construction that originated with 
plans to extend Keynesian economic policies into the Cold War era. These generous 
social benefits would never come to fruition, and their demise in nascent planning stages 
is often attributed to fear of government largesse or fatigue in a post-New Deal era, the 
role of the veterans’ benefit coalition and its divisive politics ultimately played a hand in 
contributing to removing an extensive income security program regime from the table in 
1944.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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The creation of the 1944 Servicemen’s Readjustment Act (or G.I. Bill) serves as 
the starting point for a complex interaction among varying political actors in society. As 
Roosevelt pressured executive committees and members of Congress to begin preparing 
for veteran reintegration before the end of the war, varying interests soon found 
themselves allied behind a similar policy goal. While these interests eventually coalesced 
behind the final version of the G.I. Bill, their disparate policy goals outside the realm of 
veterans’ benefits meant a constant tension within the coalition. Moreover, the coalition’s 
work to advance benefits for veterans was at the expense of broader education and 
unemployment compensation policies for the entire citizenry.  
 
Heterogeneity at the Beginning of the Veterans’ Benefit Coalition 
 The veterans’ benefit coalition – composed of actors and organizations from the 
federal government, veterans’ groups, business, and labor – was unintentionally created 
through the emerging needs of the postwar economy. As political actors and policy 
entrepreneurs grew attentive to the failure of New Deal-era proposals and the increasing 
pressure of the veteran population, various elements of the veterans’ benefit coalition 
were pulled into tacit engagement with one another in an effort to establish a generous 
education assistance program for returning military personnel. The various members of 
the coalition, though at first blush appearing to be synchronized in their policy interest of 
veterans’ education benefits, were in fact deeply divided on the necessity and propriety of 
a distinct system of benefits for veterans. Moreover, members of the coalition were to 
some extent pulled into the coalition in defense of their own proprietary goals and 
interests, and were not primarily concerned about demobilizing American service 
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personnel. The composition of the veterans’ benefit coalition by 1943 would have as 
much to do with the eventual structure of the G.I. Bill’s education assistance program as 
it would with each member’s navigation of the Roosevelt-era political climate (and the 
subsequent alterations to their political interests and methods of attaining their goals for 
their constituents).  
  
The Roosevelt Administration 
 After Hebert Hoover’s strict reaction to the Bonus Expeditionary Force and the 
veteran protesters seeking their adjusted compensation, the election of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt in 1932 signaled a potential political sea change for America’s veterans. No 
longer forced to contend with Hoover’s seemingly callous response to calls for 
government provisions, veterans turned out for Roosevelt in the general election and 
arguably aided significantly in his electoral victory.58 Roosevelt, for his apparent 
sympathy toward the Bonus March and for the struggling working classes, did not 
endorse a view of the veteran population that held it as distinct or somehow more 
deserving of assistance than the rest of the population. Known for contending that 
veterans should not enjoy a special set of social rights as a result of their military service, 
Roosevelt was not immediately supportive of expanding veterans’ benefits because he 
believed that a comprehensive set of social policies would benefit all citizens, veterans 
and non-veterans alike. He utilized his expansive executive order discretion to apply 
significant cuts to veterans’ benefits following the National Economy Act of 1933, 
reminding veterans that, “the regulations issued are but an integral part of our economy !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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program embracing every department and agency of the government to which every 
employee is making his or her contribution.”59 Although he later rolled some of these 
measures back when they appeared to be too draconian in their scope and effects, 
Roosevelt’s administration came under fire early in its tenure for what appeared to be a 
sharp change in its sympathy toward the veteran population. 
 Roosevelt’s attitude toward veterans’ benefits grew more amenable during 
America’s involvement in WWII, especially as plans for demobilization began in 1938. 
Roosevelt actually had an outline of a plan for returning military personnel, which he 
discussed in one his “fireside chats” aired on July 28, 1943. In his speech he called for a 
“mustering out” plan for former military personnel that addressed various issues of job 
training and unemployment compensation. The six points of his outlined initiative 
included “an opportunity for members of the armed services to get further education or 
trade training at the cost of their Government.”60 The Roosevelt Administration had made 
a rather significant change in its approach to dealing with the issue of returning veterans, 
one that had been jumpstarted by the political process of attempting to secure broad-
based demobilization programs for the entire citizenry. The Roosevelt Administration 
would enter into the legislative process having already had its ambitious goals subdued 
by the machinations of other members of the veterans’ benefit coalition. Indeed, the one 
agency in which the Roosevelt Administration had likely entrusted an undue amount of 
political potential (the National Resources Planning Board) would soon prove to be a 
source of disappointment. 
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 The importance of the executive branch to the veterans’ benefit coalition did not 
rest solely in the Oval Office: one of the most important elements of the executive branch 
in the G.I. Bill’s development started as a very unlikely source of political potential. The 
Natural Resources Planning Board began in 1939 as a centralized agency for the 
assessment of the postwar American economy. The Board’s original charter was focused 
on analyzing America’s strengths in natural resource production, and identifying the 
latent potential for production both at home and abroad. The board and the Federal 
Security Agency were two of the victories that Roosevelt won in his attempt at executive 
reorganization.61 The NRPB also acted as a safe-haven for some of Roosevelt’s 
staunchest supporters and New Deal allies, the most prominent of which was his uncle, 
Frederic Delano. While Delano had not garnered significant public attention in his role as 
chair of the National Planning Board under the Department of the Interior, his experience 
in business and planning did help shape the contours of the New Deal era work programs. 
Delano brought with him his vice chairman, political scientist Charles Merriam, whose 
credentials in public policy were also desirable for the NRPB’s slated goals.62 
 William Haber, a professor of economics at the University of Michigan, headed 
the Committee on Long-Range Work and Relief Policies. Administrators from the Farm 
Security Administration, American Public Welfare Association, Department of Labor, 
and Federal Security Agency, and VA administrator also contributed to the group’s 
research. The culmination of the NRPB’s efforts was Security, Work, and Relief Policies, 
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released in December 1941.63 By and large, the NRPB recommendations in 1941 focused 
on public works programs supplemented by educational assistance for young Americans; 
this as prior attempts at public works like the Civilian Conservation Corps and Works 
Progress Administration ended several months later in 1942.64 The NRPB 
recommendation that the full regime of all public aid policies fall under the 
administrative authority of one agency – effectively layering in more federal control over 
social policies and furthering government largesse – was immediately rebuked by 
Southern legislators.65 In its 1941 report, the NRPB did not include veterans’ benefits in 
their discussion of public aid at all; rather, the report focused solely on programs directed 
at the entire citizenry.66 
  Moreover, the NRPB recommendations that did not delineate between civilians 
and veterans (and instead recommended programs to benefit the entire postwar labor 
force) were in contrast to the growing emphasis placed on reintegrating military 
personnel as a necessary precondition to American economic recovery. Kathleen Frydl 
argues that, “in giving an early voice to postwar aims, the Board sounded as ambitious as 
it did detached from wartime demands. Such boldness had a welcome home in the United 
Kingdom, where the Nazi bombs raining over Britain had diminished the distinction 
between military personnel and civilians.”67 Charles Merriam, who sat on the Board from 
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its first iteration as the National Planning Board in 1933, expressed publicly that he 
believed the NRPB recommendations to have served as the basis for the UK’s Beveridge 
plan of postwar reconstruction. Although the Beveridge Plan was released prior to the 
NRPB’s report, Merriam noted that the ideas that were so harshly criticized in the 
American plan found support in the UK.68 The NRPB recommendations seemed to 
connect back to the beginnings of the slowly-dissolving programs of the New Deal era, 
and the plans were met with a complete lack of funding for federal work programs.69 
However, the NRPB soon changed its tack and turned its focus to the personnel 
aspect of demobilization, drafting a report on demobilization of the armed forces 
following the end of the war.70 Merriam argued that the NRPB’s reports served as the 
“basis” of the G.I. Bill that was “adopted enthusiastically by Congress.”71 Whereas 
previous reports had focused more on the general population, the NRPB’s 
recommendations soon narrowed on the sixteen million returning service personnel as the 
prime target for government assistance.72 Based on recommendations from the 
Conference on Post-War Adjustment of Personnel (chaired by Floyd Reeves, a professor 
of education and administration, then at the University of Chicago), the NRPB called for 
the full slate of unemployment compensation, vocational training and rehabilitation, and 
educational assistance that would later be featured in the G.I. Bill. The G.I. Bill was to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
68 Charles E. Merriam, "The National Resources Planning Board: A Chapter in American Planning 
Experience." American Political Science Review 38:06 (1944): 1075-1088. 1083. 
69 Amenta and Skocpol, “Redefining the New Deal,” 89. 
70 National Resources Planning Board, Conference on Postwork Readjustment of Civilian and Military 
Personnel (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1944). 
71 Merriam, "The National Resources Planning Board,” 1083-1084. 
72 Altschuler and Bumin, The G.I. Bill, 40-41. 
 41! !
help veterans in “picking up the broken threads of interrupted education,” and a means to 
help them successfully enter the labor force after their compulsory service.73 
Although the NRPB report initially represented the best chance for Roosevelt to 
extend his New Deal policies into the early 1940s, the inability of the board to 
successfully position work assistance programs as viable responses to the postwar 
economic planning debate only further hampered any hope that the New Deal coalition 
had in restoring the efforts of the “alphabet agencies” like the WPA. The NRPB 
recommendations would be one of the most important points at which coalition members 
were able to limit the field of viable policy options for postwar economic planning, even 
for a Congress that was ready to take decisive action. 
 
Congress 
 Although New Deal policies had thrown ideological divides into sharp relief 
during the prewar period, the need for reintegration policies brought both Republicans 
and Democrats to the table in Congress. At issue was how both sides would reconcile 
their competing perspectives on federal intervention, as well as the extent to which 
income security policies would feature prominently for a demobilized society. As with 
the broader veterans’ benefit coalition, the Congressional allies of veterans would come 
from opposing sides of the aisle, but with a common goal of providing educational 
benefits for returning military personnel. Their own personal agendas regarding the New 
Deal, combined with the widespread popularity of assisting veterans upon their return, 
made for similar policy goals among legislatures, even as their individual perspectives on 
social welfare policy differed widely.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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 One of the most critical figures in the House was Rep. John Rankin, a Mississippi 
Democrat whose racial animus was well-known his political dealings. Rankin chaired the 
House Committee on World War Veterans’ Legislation (the precursor to the modern-day 
Veterans’ Affairs Committee), and was known for being amenable to veterans’ benefit 
issues in general. However, his concern with a potential readjustment program lay 
squarely in the question of state control: how would a major federal economic 
intervention for returning veterans affect southern states’ autonomy?74  
Another important player in the House was Rep. Edith Nourse Rogers, a 
Massachusetts Republican who had worked with disabled veterans in the Red Cross. 
Although Rogers despised New Deal largesse and federal intervention, she was especially 
concerned with issues related to veterans (most notably healthcare concerns, although 
later her interests would extend to broader issues of reintegration).75 Thus, two of the 
most important advocates for veterans within the House were united against a major 
federal intervention in social policy, though for different reasons. Rankin’s concerns were 
focused on the potential national-level administration of a major social welfare program 
(even if it was directed only at a “deserving” subset of the population), while Rogers’ 
concerns were with reining in the potential for another New Deal era response to threats 
of large-scale unemployment and the need for skilled workers in a new labor market. 
The list of power players in the Senate regarding veterans’ legislation was more 
difficult to determine. Legislation concerning veterans’ benefits was split among the 
Finance and Labor and Public Works Committees in the Senate; without a devoted 
standing committee, different portions of veterans’ benefits were often assigned to either !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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committee. However, Elbert Thomas (D-UT) was on both the Military Affairs and 
Education and Labor Committees. Thomas was a former professor of political science at 
the University of Utah, and had been nominated by the Utah Democratic State 
Convention to challenge (and ultimately defeat) Reed Smoot in the 1932 election.76 A 
loyal supporter of Roosevelt and the New Deal initiatives, Thomas was also the chair of 
the Senate Committee on Education and Labor, and characterized by a calm and steady 
attitude that would stand in marked contrast to more bombastic legislative personalities 
(like Representative John Rankin).77  
Thus, while the House held conservative Democrats and Republicans prepared to 
assist veterans for reasons more amenable to conservative voters, the main driver in the 
Senate was a New Deal Democrat with prior experience in education policy and labor 
policy (having supported the establishment of the National Labor Relations Board). 
Despite their opposing agendas, these Congressional leaders figured prominently in the 
policy process surrounding the 1944 G.I. Bill. Moreover, the distinct differences between 
and among these legislators highlights the competing interests at work in the veterans’ 
benefit coalition. Legislators across the aisles would soon find themselves aligned with 
the powerful veterans’ organizations, which had their own agendas regarding how 
veterans should be treated upon their return, as well as how the federal and state 
governments should construct the policy regime to support these reintegration plans. 
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The Veterans’ Organizations 
As the plans for the postwar economic recovery programs began to take shape, the 
veterans’ groups were poised to make large demands of legislators and Roosevelt – and 
potentially achieve their goals. The ability of the groups to mobilize a large and relatively 
captive membership (some of which was cross-listed among more than one veterans’ 
group, depending on prior military service) was one element of their political power. The 
rest of it lay squarely within the American Legion’s legislative prowess, relative 
efficiency, and the dearth of truly competitive plans in late 1943 and early 1944. The 
veterans’ groups would soon emerge as one of the most important – if not the most 
critical – member of the veterans’ benefit coalition, and the ones whose policy proposals 
would eventually help drive a wedge in between many of the other members. 
The political strength of the veterans’ groups became most apparent during the 
interwar years, as veterans of WWI struggled to deal with the same economic pressures 
as the rest of the country and began to mobilize for adjusted compensation, or what 
popularly became known as a “bonus.” Though framed by opponents as an extra 
incentive for military service, the Legion, VFW, and other veterans groups framed the 
adjusted compensation as repayment for the opportunity cost of military service borne by 
WWI veterans. Veterans’ groups were able to mobilize alongside Progressive reformers – 
the same ones who earlier had decried the excesses and corrupt administration of the 
Civil War benefits system – and influence key Congressional supporters to push an 
adjusted compensation measure through the legislature. The Bonus March, in which 
veterans (mobilized by various veterans organizations) camped out in Washington D.C. 
in protest, only furthered to establish veterans as an important social and political group 
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within American society. The politics of the bonus were critical to the establishment and 
success of these organizations, as they further reinforced their political efficacy. The 
mobilization for the bonus was even able to bring together the more conservative Legion 
with other veterans’ groups in an alliance supporting further benefits for veterans.78 
The American Legion, founded by a group of officers who had served in the 
American Expeditionary Force, was established in 1919 with the expressed purpose of 
providing a vehicle for the mobilization of WWI military personnel: 
The American Legion was in no sense a ‘spontaneous expression 
of purpose by those millions of Americans who helped crush 
autocracy.’ On the contrary, it is evident that it was intended to 
circumvent any such spontaneous organization on the part of ex-
service men. An organization of ex-service men seemed inevitable 
at the close of the War. The morale of the American army after the 
armistice was unsatisfactory. A small group of high ranking 
military officers in the American Expeditionary Forces was called 
together to devise ways and means to overcome this lack of 
morale. The American Legion not only promised a means to 
improved morale through providing an avenue of wholesome 
diversion for ex-service men but it also provided an organization 
along lines acceptable to the prevailing leadership.79 
 
The Legion, then, was from its inception a more elite-driven organization than its fellow 
veterans’ groups, having been created by the officer class and representing some of the 
most powerful business leaders after their return from military conflict. Throughout its 
early years, the Legion continued to galvanize its membership around the issue of 
veterans’ benefits, using existing federal and state benefits as inroads to criticize 
government care of veterans and lobby for more generous benefits.80 The Legion would 
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emerge during the legislative battle over the G.I. Bill as one of the most powerful 
lobbying groups in the country, and would ultimately add construction of the G.I. Bill – 
as well as the passage of the veterans’ education assistance program – to its credits. 
 The membership of the American Legion in 1943 – at some 1,750,000 members – 
established it as the largest of the major veterans’ organizations. Content with Rankin’s 
leadership in the House, the Legion was willing to let the Committee on World War 
Veterans’ Legislation (the predecessor to the Committee on Veterans’ Affairs) handle the 
development of veterans’ benefits for returning service personnel.81  
Likewise, the smaller Veterans of Foreign Wars (at about 500,000 strong) was 
willing to place its faith in Rankin’s committee. VFW Commander in Chief Charles 
Schoeninger remarked in testimony before the committee that, “Enemies of veteran 
legislation have often accused this committee of being too far out in front of the Congress 
and the people in approving the obligation of public funds for veteran benefits.”82 At their 
national encampment in September 1943, the VFW had adopted a ten-point plan for the 
reintegration of World War II veterans into the American economy. Their second point 
included federal educational aid to honorably discharged military personnel who could 
not complete their education due to their military service. Interestingly enough, the VFW 
called for independence of the VA for medical, vocational, and disability programs for 
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veterans, but made no specific recommendation as to whether the agency should also be 
in charge of the education assistance program.83 
Veterans groups continued to remain politically salient through the debate 
surrounding the G.I. Bill as well, and were instrumental in the legislation’s creation and 
content. The process of developing the Bill would, however, throw their minor 
differences into harsh relief, as the groups’ membership bases and interests collided 
during the legislative process. Moreover, the groups’ politics – namely, those of the 
American Legion – would be the catalyst for major disagreements about how the 
veterans’ education assistance program would work on the ground. The veterans’ groups 
would ultimately side with conservative Democrats and Republicans – as well as business 
lobby groups – to help curtail the influence of pro-New Deal legislators and executive 
agencies (like the NRPB). Moreover, the groups would provide the necessary political 
muscle to maintain the VA’s sole discretionary authority and administration of the 
veterans’ benefit regime, even as calls for alternative administrative arrangements came 
from various actors and institutions. The veterans’ groups, then, were poised to be one of 
the most important – and divisive – members of the veterans’ benefit coalition as the G.I. 
Bill came into development. 
 
The Veterans’ Administration 
 As WWII drew to a close, the VA was facing its first demobilization crisis as a 
unified body. Following the pension corruption of the Civil War era, the VA had been 
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split into discrete agencies that dealt with pensions and war risk insurance separately 
through the end of World War I. By 1931, however, the Veterans’ Bureau had been 
reintegrated into a single unit, with the hopes that a unitary processing system would help 
allay much of the backlog and claim mismanagement that had plagued the administrators 
of the modest WWI veterans’ benefit programs.84  
Though recently reformed, the VA was not insulated against the New Deal-era 
governmental realignment. Roosevelt had attempted, in fact, to remove the centralized 
control of the VA to the proposed Department of Welfare in his original 1937 executive 
reorganization plan. However the failure of Roosevelt’s “packing” attempt and alienation 
of conservative Democrats from the party established a strong opposition to any further 
encroachment of executive power on the Roosevelt Administration’s behalf.85 
Additionally, the threat of the VA being transferred into a new Department of Welfare set 
the veterans’ organizations on the defensive, and they lobbied heavily against any 
proposed changes to the independence of the VA. 86 
The VA was able to maintain its independence by virtue of the veterans’ groups 
being so invested in the agency’s success (as their mouthpiece to not only the President, 
but Congress as well). In fact, by June 1943, Administrator Hines was seeking more 
influence for the Veterans’ Administration than what the White House was willing to 
offer. In a memo to Roosevelt, Bureau of the Budget Director Harold Smith noted that 
Hines was pressing for “full military status” for the VA, in line with the Departments of 
the Army and Navy. The Administration tried to placate Hines by offering to station !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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active-duty personnel at VA hospitals as workers (thereby allowing Hines a supervisory 
position over active military personnel), but Hines ignored the offer. Smith offered to 
Roosevelt to let Hines “take his problem to Congress without any commitment as to its 
relation to your program.”87 
 
Organized Labor 
Though under-referenced in the discussion about the G.I. Bill, the role of 
organized labor was an important one during the debate about postwar veterans’ benefits. 
While both labor unions and veterans’ groups looked ahead to swelling membership, both 
also had to be concerned about the changing political contexts in which they would soon 
have to exert power. While veterans’ groups concerned themselves with VA autonomy 
and securing a comprehensive set of benefits for their anticipated constituencies, 
organized labor had other concerns; namely, how would the unions utilize postwar 
veterans’ benefits to increase their influence in the American workforce, and could they 
leverage the new veteran population to their advantage in this initiative?  
Leadership within the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) recognized the 
growing importance of an alliance (or at least the semblance of one) with the returning 
veteran population; taking any position on veterans’ benefits that would appear to run 
counter to the liberalization of education and employment services would paint labor 
unions as “callous to the sacrifices and needs” of the returning service personnel.88 
Indeed, labor’s apparent antipathy toward the American war effort in the past – and the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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increasing reliance on the heuristic of military service as the only acceptable form of 
contribution to the wartime economic effort – placed it in a precarious position as 
national attention turned toward expanding the veterans’ benefit regime.  
To help establish the beneficial connection to the veteran population, CIO 
president Philip Murray and members of the executive committee formed the CIO 
Veterans Committee in 1943. The committee was especially concerned with 
disseminating information on employment guidelines to CIO affiliates, but would later 
become more vocal in Congressional testimony on the G.I. Bill.89 In addition, the 
utilization of white veterans from the South to campaign on behalf of the CIO’s Southern 
Organizing Committee (SOC), a membership and organizing drive (called “Operation 
Dixie”) designed to increase the CIO’s presence within Southern industry. As the SOC 
director Van Bittner noted, “at least if a young man had spent three or for years in the 
South Pacific, in Europe or in Asia…nobody could accuse him or them of attempting to 
destroy American because they happened to be members of the CIO organizing staff.”90 
The necessity behind securing veteran support lay at the heart of the strategy behind the 
CIO’s “Operation Dixie,” though the campaign was effectively stalled by 1946 as the 
more radical and communist elements were purged from the SOC and CIO more broadly. 
Though CIO leadership thought that an increased share of the veteran population could 
make up the difference of the purged radical element, the failure of Operation Dixie to 
establish the CIO’s presence in southern industrial sectors would eventually be tied (at 
least in part) to the inability of leadership to successfully mobilize the veteran workforce 
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in the South.91 This failure on the part of the CIO to gain membership (and moreover, 
credibility at the national level among a leery American public) was a direct result of the 
process of developing the G.I. Bill benefit program: a costly investment for the CIO and 
American labor more broadly. 
The American Federation of Labor (AFL) was differently situated as the process 
of veterans’ benefit reform gained national attention. AFL leadership was characterized 
as more conservative, or certainly less progressive when compared to that of the 
Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) especially after William Green succeeded 
Samuel Gompers in its leadership.92 Like the CIO, the AFL had begun an aggressive 
campaign to recruit new members in the South; however, unlike the CIO, the AFL was 
less concerned with racial segregation in areas and factories, and often turned a blind eye 
to discriminatory practices while it attempted to build membership.93 While the CIO 
struggled with the extent to which it could allow the practices of Southern states to divide 
its potential members, the AFL sidestepped questions of racial equality and continued 
increasing its membership base through aggressive campaigning. The AFL would soon 
find itself on the outskirts of social policy development as the government turned a blind 
eye to the domestic labor force and concentrated its attention on the returning service 
personnel – exactly as the veterans’ organizations and others in the veterans’ benefit 
coalition had planned. 
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The Coalition at the Outset  
 Overall, the veterans’ benefit coalition was comprised of several sets of political 
actors and institutions with a wide range of interests and ideological commitments 
entering the postwar planning phase. Though New Deal fatigue would indeed be a 
driving political factor throughout deliberations about how to address the demobilization 
of the American war effort, the internal politics of the veterans’ benefit coalition remains 
a critical explanation for the ensuing political debate over the 1944 G.I. Bill. The 
conflicted nature of the coalition, combined with its inability to converge on both the type 
of veterans’ benefits needed and the best method through which those benefits would be 
administered, established powerful fault lines within the coalition as 1939 drew to a 
close. The coming battle over the G.I. Bill would deepen the extant divides between 
members of the coalition, with many of the disagreements turning on the role that the VA 
would play in the administration of the benefits, as well as the ways in which the benefits 
could potentially aggravate racial animus in the southern states. It would ultimately be the 
process of creating the G.I. Bill that would allow certain members of the coalition to 
make major political gains, while sowing the seeds for explosive interactions for years to 
come. 
 
The Strain of Policy Development 
Although the veterans’ benefit coalition appeared to be working toward a unified 
goal, the legislative process surrounding the creation of the G.I. Bill soon exposed 
friction within the coalition. The various interests that were invested in the passage of 
veterans’ education benefits were still beholden to their respective constituencies, and as 
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such were restrained in their ability to potentially advocate for particular provisions 
within the legislation. The one member of the coalition that seemed to have a blank check 
from its membership to pursue the G.I. Bill was the American Legion. The role of the 
Legion especially would highlight the imbalance of power in the coalition, as the 
American Legion moved to center stage in bringing the bill to Congress. 
 Henry Colmery, a past National Commander of the Legion, would be one of the 
driving forces behind the legislation. A former lawyer and veteran, Colmery gained 
friendship with Representative Edith Nourse Rogers during a debate over appropriations 
for a veterans’ hospital.94 Colmery and fellow Legion member (and former Commander) 
John Stelle drafted the basis for the G.I. Bill during a Legion-enforced sequestration in 
December 1943 and January 1944, and whose connections to the World War Veterans’ 
Committee would help expedite the bill’s passage. The Legion drafted the “Bill of Rights 
for G.I. Joe and G.I. Jane,” a comprehensive piece of legislation that addressed education, 
medical benefits, disability and unemployment compensation, and various other types of 
government subsidies (such as housing and farm aid) for returning service personnel.95 
The Legion mobilized the recent psychological research emerging at the time, which 
suggested that veterans would be unable to successfully return to the workforce unless 
they received proper training; worse yet, these veterans might actually be more of a harm 
to society than a benefit.96 Framing the debate about reintegration in terms of a 
forthcoming crisis was one of the major ways in which the Legion was able to gain both 
popular and legislative attention. Similarly, the shift in rhetoric towards the “deserving” !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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postwar hero meant that military personnel would be lauded for their achievements while 
domestic workers who had taken part in the war effort (including union labor) would be 
relegated to inferior positions in the postwar society.97 
 The Legion’s framing had immediate consequences for the tenuous alliance 
among the veterans’ groups. The Disabled American Veterans (DAV) – which identified 
itself as the “smallest of the large organizations, but largest of the small organizations”98 
– immediately took a stand against the Legion’s framing of the need for postwar 
education. The DAV decried the method by which the Legion collapsed the issues of 
disabled veterans with able-bodied veterans, thereby markedly expanding the VA’s 
jurisdiction (not to mention its potential program oversight). By effectively framing all 
veterans as being in need of the same types of services that had heretofore been limited to 
those disabled through military service, the Legion exploded the concept of the 
“deserving veteran” and have legislators an inroad for expanding the veterans’ benefit 
regime far beyond its prior scope.99 
 Similarly, the VFW did not fall immediately in line with the Legion in supporting 
the omnibus legislation. The Legion was concerned that the education assistance benefits 
were too easily conflated with adjusted compensation, the official term for the “bonus” 
that had become so politically volatile just a few years’ prior.100 Moreover, the VFW 
claimed that the Legion bill’s “omnibus” quality did not render it a panacea for postwar 
economic revitalization, and that such legislation might actually negatively impact the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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disabled veterans already being serviced by the VA.101 The Legion’s initiative in drafting 
the veterans’ benefit legislation did not draw the veterans’ groups closer together; 
paradoxically, the common goal of securing better living and working conditions for 
former military personnel actually drive a wedge in the veterans’ benefit coalition. The 
individual group interests could not be subordinated to the common goal of omnibus 
legislation, and as such the fractures in the coalition began to emerge at the outset of the 
legislative battle over the bill. 
The veterans’ groups, during their debates both before Congress and in the media, 
began to worry about the ability of the VA to hold onto its administrative authority over 
the benefit regime. Although the Federal Security Agency was one of the few of 
Roosevelt’s political endeavors that narrowly escaped the crackdown against the 1937 
executive reorganization, it was still on thin political ice at the beginning of the 
legislative process surrounding the G.I. Bill. In September 1943, a column in the 
Washington Post that had speculated about the VA being absorbed into the FSA sparked 
an immediate reaction from the Legion. National Commander Roane Waring wrote to 
Roosevelt’s secretary Stephen Early in an attempt to verify the rumor, stating that the 
“expressed mandates of the American Legion down through its years of existence are 
directed to the independence of the Veterans’ Administration from any other agency, and 
to its responsibility to the President and Congress direct.”102 In a memo to Budget 
Director Harold Smith, Early referenced the Legion’s concerns and added, “I hop there is 
no truth to this rumor…to my opinion something should be said, particularly if the rumor 
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is without basis or fact. The Legion is entitled to this information, I believe.”103 Early 
reassured Waring that the VA would retain its independence apart from the FSA, and that 
there were no intentions to bring the VA under the umbrella of the FSA in the future.104 
The veterans’ groups, despite their in-fighting and disagreements about the ways in 
which the government should address veterans in the postwar era, seemed to understand 
that holding on to the VA’s influence in government – and its independence from other 
agencies – was the most potent force they had to affect political change.  
The House began hearings on the Legion Bill in January of 1944, and continued through 
March of the same year. Title II of the legislation focused on the education assistance for 
non-disabled veterans, and it was at this point that the Legion stressed the economic 
implications for the broader citizenry (and not just the returning service personnel). 
Testifying before Congress, Legion National Commander Warren Atherton stressed that 
there would be a “very, very great problem of fitting eleven or twelve million service 
men and women back into the economic structure of the country.”105 
Edith Rogers, a staunch Republican from Massachusetts who rallied against the 
largesse of New Deal programs, questioned the ability of the VA to handle to education 
assistance claims in addition to the predicted increase in medical and disability claims. 
Rogers asked Legion National Commander Warren Atherton (before the House World 
War Veterans Legislation Committee) if the VA could handle the program better than an 
alternative department. Atherton made the Legion’s previous preference clear when he !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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claimed that the VA would not only have the best experience in administering the 
education program, but that splitting up the education assistance program from the other 
veterans’ benefit policies would lead to confusion, mishandled claims, and even 
competition among the VA and other agencies “to try to handle more of this and more of 
that.”106 
Warren Atherton, the Commander of the Legion, railed against Rankin, who he 
claimed was stalling the report of the G.I. Bill out of committee due to his disdain for the 
unemployment compensation provisions of the bill. Atherton noted that others who had 
not served in the military during the war – both the “loyal war worker” and the “draft 
dodger” – would be able to lay claim to unemployment protections while the veteran 
could not find employment opportunities.107 
For the CIO – and labor unions in general – one of the most difficult areas to 
navigate was the racial animus of the Southern states and the resulting effects that these 
pro-segregation politics had upon labor’s ability to mobilize. While unions sought to 
capitalize on the resurgence of veterans back into the American labor market (and 
potentially a better trained and more educated labor force at that, due to the potential 
benefits of the G.I. Bill), the Jim Crow South presented intense obstacles for organizing 
at the local level. This difficulty in determining the best course of action for mobilizing 
Southern workers – combined with the opposition of business leaders  
Interestingly, by this point the Roosevelt Administration was well in line with the 
pervasive call for a generous education assistance program for veterans, though perhaps 
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was not ready to extend the timeframe as far as the veterans’ groups would have liked. 
After his July 1943 fireside chat laid out the general premise of the need to educate 
veterans, Roosevelt elaborated on his plans in a speech to Congress on October 27 of the 
same year. In his address, Roosevelt called for up to one year of college assistance for 
returning service personnel, with a “limited number” holding special aptitude receiving 
up to two or three years of education assistance.108 Interestingly, White House Special 
Counsel Samuel Rosenmann did not note the discrepancy between the more generous 
Legion bill and that offered by Roosevelt in his earlier speeches. In a memo to Roosevelt 
comparing the Administration’s preferred provisions and those contained in the G.I. Bill 
as passed, Rosenthal only noted that, “the president…recommended the enactment of 
legislation providing post-war educational opportunities for service personnel.”109 
However, in a memo to Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, Rosenmann noted that the Bill carried 
out Roosevelt’s recommendations “with a few exceptions.”110  
Rosenmann did not highlight the discrepancy between Roosevelt’s 
recommendation for the duration of benefits and those outlined by the Legion (and which 
eventually made it into the G.I. Bill), but it is important to note that Roosevelt’s original 
guidelines for the education assistance benefits were significantly expanded through the 
efforts of the Legion and its supporters. Far from being a way to recover lost time in 
postsecondary education or to take advantage of so-called “refresher” courses being 
developed for returning military personnel, the benefits as enacted by the G.I. Bill meant !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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a wholesale funding of college education was available for millions of American 
veterans. Such an extensive program was not originally outlined by the Roosevelt 
administration, and the White House did not appear willing to attempt to constrain the 
benefit package back to its original vision once the legislative battle had begun.  
In a letter to Senator Elbert Thomas, American Council on Education President 
George Zook noted that demobilization plans that included the higher education sector 
would indeed have comprehensive effects for the country’s economic development. Zook 
noted, “In a very real sense the problem is, therefore, not only one of helping those young 
people whose education has been interrupted or shortened by service in the armed forces, 
but also one of national interest.”111  
The American Council on Education had, in fact, been anticipating the integration 
of higher education aid into demobilization plans for some time. Although education 
assistance had not been a provision of prior programs for veterans following military 
conflicts, the Council was clearly anticipating that postsecondary schools would play a 
role in the forthcoming reintegration planning. In the summer of 1943, the Council 
solicited the opinions of its member institutions through a formal survey, and collected 
responses from over 230 colleges and universities (split evenly between private and 
public institutions). The consensus of the questionnaire results suggested that the 
Council’s membership were receptive to some program of federal aid at the individual 
level, and that (unremarkably) the postsecondary schools were reluctant to accommodate 
the influx of students using any type of institutional subsidies. The Council’s stated 
position was that it would support investment at the federal level in the veteran !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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reintegration effort through education assistance, but that it would prefer if state- and 
local-level accreditation procedures were in place to ensure that reputable institutions 
were in receipt of the funds.112 At the same time, the Council was also reporting to the 
NRPB an equally vague set of recommendations that placed the onus for postwar 
education training funds on the federal government, without specifying a particular 
method of administration or delineation of eligibility criteria. Moreover, the suggestions 
were based on a small program in the state of Wisconsin, which had awarded modest 
stipends to WWI veterans who were state residents and seeking education assistance after 
high school.113 
In October 1943, Senator Elbert Thomas (D-UT) introduced S. 1509, “The 
Servicemen’s Education and Training Act of 1943.” The bill called for postsecondary and 
vocational training aid for veterans who had served at least six months since the 
beginning of WWII, and included a modest subsidy of $50 per month to cover lodging 
and other expenses related to undertaking a college or vocational degree. Most notably, 
the bill was silent on the subject of administration of the veteran education assistance 
program, and did not refer to a specific agency in reference to implementation or 
oversight.114 The senator had been meeting with representatives from both the American 
Council on Education and certain postsecondary schools,115 and the bill represented the 
ideals of demobilization that were quickly taking hold at the national level. Thomas 
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introduced his legislation to the committee, and attempted to wrap up the hearing on the 
proposal by mid-December.116 
A backlash against the bill immediately followed, coming from a multitude of 
angles and which would eventually squelch the Thomas bill (to the satisfaction of both 
the veterans’ groups and some of the postsecondary institutions). Initially, some 
vocational schools and training facilities expressed concern over the Thomas bill’s lack 
of stipulation of agency control, claiming that it would effectively present Roosevelt with 
a “blank check” to the federal government, rather than leaving the power to administer 
the program in the hands of the states and localities (for which groups like the American 
Vocational Association and National Council of Chief State School Officers expressed a 
preference). Perhaps most importantly, the vocational and state schools were concerned 
that the Thomas bill would provide the leeway needed for Roosevelt to either create a 
new agency to administer the veterans’ education benefit program, or place power over 
the program in the hands of an agency with no experience in higher education program 
administration.117  
Though the Thomas bill was destined to come into direct conflict with the 
Rankin- and Legion-backed plan emerging from the House, the resistance on the part of 
educators to the Thomas bill foreshadowed coming conflicts about the administration of 
the education assistance program. As May began, the House entered into deliberations 
about the G.I. Bill and the question of administering veterans’ education benefits more 
broadly. The question of state administration loomed large as the hearing opened, and 
immediately drew a line in the House between two distinct groups: those who wanted the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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VA to administer a veterans’ education assistance program, and those who (for a variety 
of reasons) stood opposed to the agency having control over the policy program. Rankin 
argued on behalf of the VA, noting that he was “in favor of keeping the rights of the 
States and keeping as many bureaucrats out as possible.”118 
One veterans’ group that was not completely aligned with the stated goals of the 
fellow veterans’ organizations was that of the Disabled American Veterans. As the House 
continued deliberations on the legislation, DAV national director Millard Rice warned 
that the proposed legislation would “overload” the Veterans’ Administration. Because the 
agency would be vested with not only disability claims (as was the primary interest of the 
DAV), but also the education program (and associated programs for reintegration, Rice 
argued that the VA would not be able to keep abreast of the large influx of claims that 
would soon materialize. “The Veterans Administration,” Rice claimed presciently, 
“would shortly become a badly overloaded ‘administrative monstrosity.’”119 
The Legion would emerge with the major victory. Addressing fellow former 
members of the Legion, then-National Commander Warren Atherton claimed, “The 
Legion and Auxiliary have had very little recognition of the great service they rendered to 
the Nation and the Veterans of World War II, Korea and Vietnam, through the self-help 
provisions of the G.I. Bill. Few beneficiaries know who made it possible for them to start 
a new life.”120 
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Spillover, Spillback, and the Influence of Veterans’ Benefits on Social Policy 
The End of the New Deal Era Hope: A Focus on Veterans, Not Citizens 
The process of developing the G.I. Bill led to a new focus on the American 
veteran within both government and society. The Legion had consciously framed the 
veteran as a hero in need of increased attention and governmental support, and in doing 
so had created a privileged class of citizens as well as a more powerful lobbying 
coalition. A solicitor in the White House Office of Special Counsel noted in a memo to 
Roosevelt advisor Samuel Rosenmann that the G.I. Bill would help strengthen the ability 
of the veterans’ organizations (specifically the Legion, VFW, and DAV) to assist in the 
mustering-out process when military personnel returned home.121 The G.I. Bill would be 
the beginning of veterans’ groups’ influence in politics as they became an integral part of 
maintaining, administering, and reforming the veterans’ benefit regime through the 
autonomy offered by the VA. 
In a letter to White House Special Counsel Samuel Rosenmann, VA 
Administrator Frank Hines notes that Roosevelt’s approval of the G.I. Bill “rounds out 
the Government’s program, in so far as veterans’ benefits are concerned, for restoring out 
service men and women as nearly as possible to the status they would have occupied 
except for [military] service...”122 Indeed, the G.I. Bill stand in stark relief to the New 
Deal era programs which had focused on universal social benefits and large-scale income 
security initiatives. The G.I. Bill, though by appearances a piece of legislation narrowly 
targeted to benefit a subset of the population, took the place of broad-based policies for a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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postwar economy in the years following the end of the conflict. Despite the National 
Resource Planning Board’s recommendations for more work-assistance programs, or the 
campaigns by the labor unions to increase the presence of the American worker, the 
eventual outcome of demobilization planning was legislation constructed to 
simultaneously benefit sixteen million people while foreclosing parallel policies for the 
rest of the country. 
Roosevelt, as expected, garnered praise from the veteran population for the 
passage of the G.I. Bill which was, as Senator Bennett Champ Clark claimed, “received 
with acclaim and due appreciation not only by the veterans of all wars, but by the 
mothers and fathers and loved ones on the home front in the present conflict.”123 After 
returning from a country-wide tour, VA Administrator Frank Hines sent a memo to 
Roosevelt (via Roosevelt’s close friend and advisor, Edwin Watson) that he was 
“optimistic on the political prospects” because “the veterans…are all for the 
President.”124 The development of specified policies for veterans would serve to increase 
the education and social mobility of an entire generational cohort – one that would use its 
increased resources and civic skills to become heavily involved in politics and 
associational life.125 
 
Changes to Higher Education Policy 
Professors hypothesized that postwar higher education would actually be more 
efficient, due to universities’ needs to handle the exigencies of mobilization and the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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permeation of war’s effects into the classrooms. One educator argued that “the premium 
put on speed in training for war functions has resulted in the squeezing out of water and 
vapor from courses of study.”126 Post-secondary schools did in fact adapt to the onslaught 
of veterans, but not without a period of painful growth that threw into sharp contrast the 
higher education system’s inability to meet the needs of a large influx of students. As 
returning veterans crowded classrooms and dormitories, schools revamped curricula and 
focused on more “practical” or applied degrees tailored to a mature veteran student.127 
Wilbur Cohen – who would later become the Secretary of Health, Education, and 
Welfare, predicted that the veterans’ benefit regime would not only continue to be 
generous in comparison to that of other countries, but that the entitlements in the 
programs would continue to be liberalized as time went on.128 Indeed, the veterans’ 
education assistance program would become codified and renewed with each of 
America’s military engagements. It would be future iterations of the legislation that 
would create even more changes in American higher education, as the provision of 
payments directly to universities under the 1944 G.I. Bill would become a point of 
contestation for reformers in the early 1950s. 
 
The Rise of the Veterans’ Administration 
 Perhaps the most important effect of the G.I. Bill’s codification of a generous 
veterans’ benefit system is the durable shift in the role of the VA in American politics. 
From the debates about how to structure the education assistance program to the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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questions about state versus federal administration of all veterans’ benefits, the proposal 
to locate the power over veterans’ benefits into a singular agency moved to the forefront 
as the most politically viable option, if not the most logical for benefit administration.  
In a memo from Solicitor Edward Odom to White House Special Counsel Samuel 
Rosenmann, Odom notes that the administrative provisions of the legislation are, 
according to the House committee, “not intended to be the last word on the subject.”129 
 Indeed the VA’s standing was not completely ensured by the signing of the G.I. 
Bill, though the legislation and its attendant swell in policy provisions would soon elevate 
the VA to a major political player in the years to come. VA Administrator Frank Hines 
argued, ultimately unsuccessfully, for a seat at Cabinet meetings to Roosevelt. In 
declining to invite Hines to participate, Roosevelt said, “it would be unwise to further 
increase the number of persons attending the cabinet meetings. You know how those 
things go.”130 In coming reforms to the G.I. Bill, though, the VA would successfully 
guard against Congressional attempts to dismantle the agency and remove the 
administration of the veterans’ education assistance program out from its purview. The 
VA would eventually prove durable in not only its sphere of influence, but capable of 
utilizing a powerful lobbying network to maintain its policy regime. 
 
Conclusion 
 The G.I. Bill remains a critical moment for American social policy development, 
and for good reason: the watershed legislation ushered in sweeping changes to American 
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education and social mobility more broadly. However, the roots of the G.I. Bill are often 
understudied by political scientists, leaving an incomplete story that highlights the 
Legion’s mobilization or Roosevelt’s initial resistance, but little else. The fact is that the 
creation of the veterans’ benefit coalition which emerged before the 1944 G.I. Bill was an 
important political turning point, and one whose politics would affect veterans’ policies 
and related social welfare policies. 
 The heterogeneity of the coalition is notable, especially in light of the policy 
feedback model’s predictions concerning interests surrounding issue-specific policies. 
The disparate interests held together by a desire for generous readjustment assistance for 
military personnel highlighted the growing importance of the veterans’ lobby, the 
missteps of labor in attempting to grow its ranks (especially in the South), and the 
motivation of Congressional leaders to join the legislative process early to secure their 
particular interests with respect to program design and administration.  
 Beyond the differing perspectives and interests in the coalition, the process of 
policy development helped create further schisms between and among coalition 
members. The White House especially was forced to move away from broad-scale 
postwar planning and instead to focus much of its investment ability on programs for 
returning veterans. These changes caused Roosevelt to shift away from his earlier, more 
egalitarian view concerning the ability of veterans to claim benefits above and beyond 
what a civilian would be able to. Moreover, the process highlighted rifts within the 
veterans’ lobby, as the American Legion soon emerged as the most influential 
organization among the three major groups at the time. Lastly, the struggles across party 
lines would pit supporters and opponents of the New Deal against one another, with fears 
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of federal intervention in the economy and race relations driving conservatives towards a 
tacit acceptance of the legislation (but only within their preferred, state-level 
administrative design).  
 The legislative process driven by a fractured coalition would serve as the starting 
point for the next iteration of the G.I. Bill. The coalition members could not have known 
then that the way in which they shaped the contours of the veterans’ education benefit 
system would act as a catalyst for policies focused on the next American veteran cohort. 
Indeed, the 1944 G.I. Bill set the stage for a new version of the veterans’ benefit 
coalition, and a new political strategy for maintaining the generosity of the education 
benefit program – as well as the control of the program by the VA.
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CHAPTER 3 
 THE KOREA G.I. BILL, COALITION FRACTURE, AND ENDURING EFFECTS ON 
HIGHER EDUCATION 
 
 
  The case study of the 1944 G.I. Bill provides clear evidence of the existence and 
political power of the veterans’ benefit coalition, as well as its widespread political 
influence. Not only was the coalition able to band together in the face of questions about 
demobilization policy and the size of the federal government; it was also able to unite 
disparate political actors behind a common goal of education and training programs for 
returning service members. The coalition members were not only able to achieve the 
establishment of an unprecedented education program; they were able to do so in a way 
that protected their own interests in the process. Moreover, the spillover and spillback 
effects of the original G.I. Bill were the results of concentrated efforts on the part of 
coalition members to fundamentally alter the national focus in matters of economic 
stabilization after World War II. The original G.I. Bill did more than act as a critical 
vehicle for veteran reintegration following the war; it would establish veteran education 
benefits as a policy regime in American politics, and one that created conditions that 
shaped the next version of the legislation in 1952. The Korea G.I. Bill is a function of a 
complex set of interactions between the 1944 G.I. Bill’s established success, individual 
legislators’ actions, and a rift in the veterans’ benefit coalition that created the conditions 
necessary for a major shift in American higher education policy.  
 The 1944 G.I. Bill appeared to establish a precedent for future renewals of the 
legislation and the establishment of benefits for veterans of future American military 
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conflicts; in a newspaper interview, the Administrator of the Department of Veterans’ 
suggested that the Bill’s success refocused national attention on human readjustment after 
military conflict. The American people as a whole, he argued, benefitted from the 
establishment of the G.I. Bill’s education program because of the influx of trained and 
able professionals – across a variety of fields – that were now driving American 
economic advancement.131 The G.I. Bill was not only the culmination of an important 
political process, but would also serve as the starting point of cycle of benefit program 
revisions that would affect social policies in the future.  
The original legislation provides the starting point for investigating the way in 
which the policy process involved in creating similar legislation at a later point can 
fundamentally alter the political landscape at the time. The next iteration of the G.I. Bill 
in 1952, the Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act (or “Korea G.I. Bill”) would soon 
supplant the original version as the primary vehicle for the reintegration of American 
service members. The 1952 Bill was motivated not by the fear of demobilization that had 
marked the creation of the original Bill – the postwar prosperity had “frightened away the 
ghosts of the 1930s who haunted those responsible for the 1944 G.I. Bill”132 – but rather 
by the relative economic prosperity and perceived success of the original legislation. 
While the creation of the 1944 Bill helped establish the veterans’ benefit coalition as a 
cohesive actor in social policy, the 1952 Bill would soon test the bonds holding the 
coalition members together. Furthermore, the passage of the Korea G.I. Bill would 
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introduce changes to both the bureaucratic power structure and the higher education 
system that would indelibly alter both in the future. 
This chapter focuses on the development of the Korea G.I. Bill and the ways in 
which the political process surrounding the 1944 G.I. Bill conditioned the political 
outcomes following the Bill’s renewal in 1952. Using the policy feedback model outlined 
previously I examine the extent to which the veterans’ benefit coalition’s members’ 
interests remained politically at odds with one another, as well as what strain (if any) the 
bill’s renewal placed upon the coalition’s fragile bonds. The ways in which the political 
process surrounding the Korea G.I. Bill was able to negatively affect the veterans’ benefit 
coalition’s bond – as well as how the coalition, or what was left of it, was able to directly 
or indirectly influence parallel social policy development at the time – are indicative of 
the power of the policy feedback model. 
Specifically, I argue that the development of the Korea G.I. Bill, which came out 
of the backlash against – and subsequent investigations into – the original G.I. Bill set the 
stage for clashes among various members of the original veterans’ benefit coalition. 
Interestingly, the veterans’ lobby groups took a backseat in this legislative battle, 
allowing individual legislators to advance their respective versions of Korean War 
education benefits. The fact that the groups were not necessarily major players in the 
development of the 1952 legislation meant that Congressional members were able to craft 
the legislation according to their particular goals and party agendas. The reforms 
recommended by the House committee investigating the original G.I. Bill’s management 
included a major overhaul to the system of federal payments: giving the student-veteran 
tuition stipends directly, and doing away with the direct provision of tuition assistance 
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funds to the institutions. The idea behind this change was to remove the potential for 
abuse of the system on the part of education institutions that came under fire for various 
types of fraud and system abuse. This change soon rankled the elite leadership of private 
educational institutions who, seeing what was essentially a voucher system as a falsely 
competitive system (in which they would never be able to fairly compete against lower-
cost, public institutions), mobilized against the new funding provisions in a break from 
the rest of the veterans’ benefit coalition. 
The ramifications of the Korea G.I. Bill are not limited to the breakdown of the 
veterans’ benefit coalition, however; rather, the same stress on the coalition that was 
created by the public/private divide over tuition payments spilled over into the higher 
education sector more broadly. The Korea G.I. Bill marks the first time in American 
history that accreditation is preferred as a means of assuring quality in higher education; 
the provisions surrounding accreditation requirements came directly from the legislative 
debate concerning the ability of the VA to assure that federal funding was being provided 
to reputable postsecondary institutions. The requirement of accreditation for G.I. bill 
funding after 1952 was a direct result of the development of the veterans’ benefit 
legislation, and one driven by the same members of the veterans’ benefit coalition that 
attempted to win generous benefits for service members returning from the conflict in 
Korea. 
 The analysis of archival evidence suggests that this fracture in the veterans’ 
benefit coalition over the abuses of the 1944 legislation – as well as the best way to 
inoculate the reformed legislation against a similar fate – also helped facilitate spillover 
effects into the field of higher education policy. The education benefits in the 1952 
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legislation – though similar in intent and design to those in the earlier bill – featured a 
distinct administrative system meant to correct the abuses that had wracked the 1944 bill. 
By making tuition assistance payments directly to veterans (who would then use these 
payments as vouchers to attend whatever postsecondary institution to which they were 
accepted), and stipulating that only accredited institutions could be in receipt of federal 
funds through the G.I. Bill, the veterans’ benefit coalition created lasting effects for the 
higher education system. The reliance on accreditation as a substitute for federal 
standardization of curricula or degrees was instantiated in the 1952 legislation, setting a 
precedent for accreditation as a necessary precondition to the receipt of federal funding 
(via a student’s enrollment). 
 Moreover, the case study of the Korea G.I. Bill shows the first signs of a 
remarkable trend in changes to state capacity following the reform of the original G.I. 
Bill. The VA had been a target of investigation and harsh criticism in the years following 
the original legislation, as its management, backlog of claims, and inattention to 
education institutions’ fraudulent practices were brought to light in popular reports and 
Congressional hearings. Though the VA was targeted by members of the veterans’ 
benefit coalition as part of the problem surrounding the original legislation, the agency 
was able to insulate itself from substantive change as a result of the legislative reform. 
Furthermore, calls to remove the education program from under the umbrella of the VA – 
which to that point had been a centralized administrative hub for all of the programs 
involving America’s veterans – were largely ignored or dismissed by legislators. Though 
various agencies and officials recommended that the Department of Education – and not 
the VA – have control over veterans’ education benefits, the VA was able to retain its 
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jurisdiction over the veterans’ education benefits system, establishing an enduring 
precedent that continues to inform veteran benefit politics through the present day. 
 
The Post-WWII Political Climate and the Veterans’ Benefit Coalition 
 Despite the success of the veterans’ benefit coalition in securing the education 
provisions of the G.I. Bill, the coalition membership would not remain similarly united 
within the context of emerging policies in the late 1940s and early 1950s. In fact, the 
evolving American national security state and questions concerning the necessary size of 
the federal apparatus (especially relative to that of the states) would continue to be the 
point upon which many of the coalition members would diverge in their individual 
interests. The political landscape at the time, though perhaps ideologically disposed to the 
idea of a “vital center” in regard to international affairs,133 was still fragmented as debate 
over the increasing federal structure – and remnants of both the New Deal and the World 
War II agency controls – continued to rage.  
 Harold Lasswell’s warning of an impending “garrison state”134 – in which 
military leadership would overshadow civilian control and drive domestic policy toward 
an increasingly totalitarian extreme – was echoed by Republicans, though for different 
reasons than Lasswell had laid out in his original argument. While Truman was 
committed to balancing the budget in the post-WWII years, Republicans became 
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concerned that there had not been a balanced budget in over 16 years by 1947, and that 
Truman’s reluctance to restrict social spending – combined with his apparent willingness 
to rein in Pentagon requests for defense appropriations above what he and his Budget 
Bureau director, James E. Webb, considered reasonable for the current national security 
climate. Republicans and conservative Democrats pressed strongly for tax cuts for 
individuals (arguing that it would stimulate investment), while the rest of the Democratic 
Party rallied behind Truman as he planned incremental expansions of the New Deal 
benefits policies (such as Social Security). The budget battle, split cleanly across party 
lines, placed social welfare policies at the center of a struggle over how to balance the 
needs of an interventionist international power with that of a recovering domestic 
economy.135 
 Stress along party lines was also being exacerbated by Truman’s “Fair Deal” 
policies regarding race and racial integration, and the subsequent shift from “prewar” to 
“postwar” Democrats.136 After Truman’s desegregation of the military by executive order 
in 1948, the values of minority inclusion and equality that had been purported to be at the 
center of the New Deal policies (though in practice were not actually an integral part of 
many of the New Deal provisions) were more substantively represented in the 
Democratic Party’s ideological bent.137 As the Democratic Party became more concerned 
with tolerance and addressing previously underrepresented groups, it further pushed away 
conservative Democrats who were opposed to federal intervention into the states’ 
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management of racial issues.138 The original G.I. Bill brought the racial animus of 
southern Democrats to the forefront, as the party had fought for state-level administration 
of the Bill’s programs (to prevent federal intervention into unemployment insurance 
programs and higher education systems). As Katznelson notes, “The GI Bill’s remarkable 
bounty thus could be directed to the country’s poorest region while keeping its system of 
racial power intact.”139  
 As far as the political membership of the veterans’ benefit coalition was 
concerned, their loyalties fell squarely along the scrimmage lines drawn by concurrent 
debates in domestic politics. Rogers, for her support of increasing veterans’ benefits and 
her concern for the veterans’ healthcare system, remained opposed to New Deal policies 
which she argued only served to needlessly expand the size of the federal government.140 
Representative John Rankin (D-MS) similarly fell in step with conservative Democrats in 
his vehement defense of segregation, as well as his willingness to continue the mission of 
the Dies Special Committee and amending the House rules to establish the Un-American 
Activities Committee.141 Rogers was also supportive of Rankin’s establishment of the 
HUAC and was a close personal friend of Senator John McCarthy. 
 In terms of the political landscape, then, the members of the veterans’ benefit 
coalition were routinely being pitted against one another in struggles over the size and 
funding of the national security state as well as the Democrats’ increasing interest in 
minority politics and issues of civil rights abuses. Notably absent from this lead up to the 
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development of the 1952 G.I. Bill were the veterans’ groups. Despite their overwhelming 
presence in creating the 1944 legislation, by the early 1950s the groups were not eager to 
advance particular proposals for the veterans returning from Korea. Their hesitance, 
outlined later in their Congressional testimony, was a stark contrast to their previous 
vocal support of the original G.I. Bill. The lack of similar legislative momentum on the 
part of the veterans’ groups concerning the 1952 legislation meant that individual 
legislators moved to the forefront of the veterans’ benefit coalition, and ultimately 
decided the direction of the final legislation.  
Moreover, the disagreements over the federal budget – combined with Truman’s 
attempts to continue slowly increasing the size and scope of New Deal-era social welfare 
programs – meant that legislators were already keenly attuned to the issues of austerity 
and budget balancing, especially in a context in which the defense budget’s share was 
increasingly eclipsing that of other programs. The desire to rein in unnecessary social 
spending – and to ensure that America had indeed capitalized on the investment that it 
had made in its World War II veterans – set the stage for an investigation into the original 
G.I. Bill and the extent to which veterans’ benefit coalition members could prove its 
utility years after its enactment. 
 
Investigating the Original G.I. Bill 
Following the legislative success of the original G.I. Bill (including the legislative 
provisions which further liberalized plan benefits in 1945), it appeared that the bill would 
soon provide significant dividends to the American economy as veterans flooded colleges 
and took part in various vocational programs. While the education benefits in the G.I. Bill 
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proved popular to both veterans and civilian public opinion alike,142 the size and scope of 
the program soon drew critical attention as the administration of the program came under 
investigation. After several years in operation, the Bill would soon become the focal 
point for a Congressional investigation, as well as a potential template for how the federal 
government should – or should not – involve itself in the higher education system in the 
years to come.  
By July 1951, as the original G.I. Bill’s education benefits program neared its 
deadline for new applicants, the investment that the federal government had made in 
returning military personnel was gaining public attention. Out of the entire G.I. Bill 
omnibus legislation – including low-interest home loans, increased outlays for 
hospitalization and medical care, and provisions for unemployment compensation –the 
education program amounted to nearly $14 million, $3.5 million of which was on direct 
tuition payments to institutions alone. Approximately 8,000,000 former service members 
utilized G.I. Bill benefits during the time period from July 1944 through July 1951; at its 
peak in 1947, veterans represented nearly 49% of all college and university students, with 
nearly 50% of veterans accessing G.I. Bill education benefits in that same year.143  
Despite its widespread popularity and success, significant issues began to emerge 
in the administration of veterans’ education and training benefits, and concern grew about 
the money invested in the program and reported fraud across the country. Investigation 
into the previous GI Bill was led by Representative Olin Teague (R-TX), as chair of the 
House Select Committee to Investigate Educational, Training, and Loan Guaranty !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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G.I. Bill Transformed the American Dream (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2006). 
 79! !
Programs under the GI Bill. Though public opinion among those in the education sector 
was generally favorable, concerns grew as the program hemorrhaged approximately $2 
billion per year in mismanagement and potential abuses in the payment system for 
institutions of higher education.144  
The committee ran hearings in several cities across the country, soliciting 
testimony from veterans’ groups, colleges, contractors, and veterans themselves – all 
stakeholders in the original legislation. Veterans testified about their inability to secure 
due benefits and the disruption caused by dishonorable for-profit schools and contractors. 
Veterans testified about being recruited into institutions with dubious qualifications, and 
being offered degrees in fields like bartending, that proved ultimately far less useful than 
degrees from accredited postsecondary institutions. The “fly-by-night” schools that 
infiltrated the education market following the enactment of the original G.I. Bill proved 
to be only one of the more discouraging developments; further allegations against 
postsecondary institutions added fuel to the fire. Charges that schools intentionally 
inflated their enrollment numbers to collect more federal funding from the VA were also 
leveled, and legislators became concerned that the potential benefits to the original G.I. 
Bill program might become overshadowed by the corrupt practices that invaded the 
system (especially due to its administration, which relied heavily on VA and states’ 
oversight of their postsecondary schools).145  
The committee ultimately recognized the extreme deficiencies in the 
administration of the G.I. Bill program in its report to Congress, but still recommended 
the extension of benefits to Korea veterans and a revision of the existing veterans’ benefit !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
144 Fine, “14 Billions Spent” 
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program. While the committee expressed concern over the reports of corruption in the 
G.I. Bill system, they also expressed a desire to facilitate the reintegration of Korean War 
veterans in the same way that those from World War II had been helped.146 The positive 
aspects of the G.I. Bill program – combined with House committee recommendations to 
restructure the payment plan and ensure school quality through requirements for 
accreditation – would ultimately find themselves not only at the center of the reformed 
G.I. Bill legislation, but also at the starting point of a deep rift evolving in the veterans’ 
benefit coalition. 
 
The Korea G.I. Bill in Development 
As the U.S. entered into a military conflict in Korea, some legislators called for an 
immediate revision of the G.I. Bill to accommodate the veterans of the current conflict. 
Teague and others in both the House and Senate were, however, not interested in 
applying the same pre-conflict planning strategies to the situation in Korea as had been 
done towards the end of WWII. In July 1950, shortly after what was then a “police 
action” in Korea began, Teague expressed reluctance to begin hashing out details for a 
Korea G.I. Bill before the full scope of the conflict was revealed.147 The veterans’ groups 
were uncharacteristically united on a hesitant approach to Korea G.I. Bill benefits, 
preferring to wait until the conflict developed further before making legislative action. By 
August, several extension bills to the original G.I. Bill had been introduced in the House, 
but had languished as neither legislators nor veterans’ groups were anxious to move on 
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them while monitoring the conflict. One extension bill was introduced by a New York 
representative as an active of protest against the Truman Administration’s intervention in 
Korea.148 
Rankin made plans for House committee hearings on proposed Korea veteran 
benefit legislation, setting the meetings to begin in February. For all his previous support 
for veterans, was a noted segregationist who opposed extending benefits to African 
Americans; although he failed in a special senate race in Mississippi in 1947, he 
continued to remain a prominent force in the House.149 He noted that new legislation 
would likely provide almost all (if not duplicate) benefits to Korea veterans as it had to 
those of WWII; the New York Times noted that, “Congress seldom turns down veterans’ 
legislation.”150  
 The Truman Administration’s stance on extending veterans’ benefits was 
measured; while generally supportive of extending benefits for the reintegration of Korea 
veterans, there was resistance within the administration to an equally broad-based 
program of education benefits. The Bureau of the Budget recommended a modified plan 
in January 1951, advocating a formula that relocated some of the onus of college 
payments onto the veteran, offering to pay half tuition only if there was evidence 
suggesting that education had been interrupted or impeded by an eligible person’s service 
in the Korean conflict. Assistant Director Elmer Saats outlined in a memo to Rankin that 
“the veteran should have a financial stake of his own” in his education, and therefore 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
148 The Boston Globe, “Vet Groups Stall in G.I. Benefits for Service in Korea,” August 6, 1950, C18. 
149 V.O. Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation. (Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 1949), 
253. 
150 The New York Times, “G.I. Bill Hearings Set: Plan Would Give Educational Benefits to Korean 
Veterans,” December 17, 1951. 
 82! !
should have his education only partially subsidized by the federal government. 151 
Similarly, communication from within the Federal Security Agency indicated that the 
administration was bracing itself for a potential landslide of veterans exiting school into 
an unstable labor market, and speculating on the ability of the current social safety nets to 
meet this need.152 The administration was undoubtedly preparing for a crush of veterans 
onto the labor market even before the U.S. entered the Korean conflict, and the 
immediate calls for Korea G.I. Bill benefits likely accelerated their policy development 
process. 
The version of a new G.I. Bill offered by the Bureau of the Budget would allow a 
maximum government payment of $300 for tuition and fees, in comparison to the full 
tuition (up to $500) offered by the original GI Bill. Additionally, the duration of 
schooling would be shortened and eligible veterans would need to show combat 
participation. This desire for combat participants alone to benefit from a G.I. Bill was 
echoed by the VFW; Omar Ketchum, the organization’s Director, stressed in a letter to 
Rankin that only those personnel eligible for combat ribbons should be granted the 
education provisions of a new version of the GI Bill.153 The discussion of combat 
participation would soon fall out of the debate over the bill, as new legislation was 
introduced in both the House and Senate that treated Korea veterans the same way as 
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those of WWII (specifically, in defining eligibility by days spent on active duty, as 
opposed to verified participation in combat). 
In August 1951, Senators George (D-GA) and Kerr (D-OK) introduced legislation 
to revise the previous G.I. Bill while extending similar benefits to veterans of the conflict 
in Korea. They acknowledged that the previous legislation had fallen prey to 
noncompliance and corruption, but argued that their more restricted plan would “provide 
more adequate safeguards against excessive expenditure of public funds.”154 H.R. 5040 
and S. 1940 emerged during the second half of 1951 as viable plans for extending the 
education benefits present in the original GI Bill to those involved in the Korean War. 
The recommended BOB provisions remained; namely, that the term of enrollment be 
shortened, that tuition payments were to be reduced, and that veterans must be able to 
prove that their education had been interrupted by their term of service. In reviewing the 
two proposed pieces of legislation, Saats noted that an extension of veterans’ benefits 
would necessarily require an assessment of the purpose and utility of veterans’ benefit to 
the American public, both economically and socially. Referencing the adjusted 
compensation “bonus” and insurance payouts of World War I veterans, Saats commented 
that the WWII policies had been much more generous – and thereby successful – in 
reintegrating soldiers into civilian life. He did caution, however, that revising these 
benefits with each conflict would create establish a set pattern of entitlements for each 
military engagement in the future, arguing that: 
The concept of readjustment for the millions of veterans of 
World War II, whose lives and expected means of 
livelihood were interrupted by military service, was a great 
advance….However, additional legislation in this field !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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should take into account the further strides which we have 
made in the United States in providing greater opportunities 
for education and vocational training, and for freedom from 
want when early disability or death strike down the wage 
earner in the family. General programs in which veterans 
participate may well be of greater value than programs 
designed only for veterans,” [emphasis added].155  
 
Saats’ comment on the availability of general welfare programs at both the state and 
federal levels designed to compensate for disability or death of the main wage earner in 
the household (presumably husbands and fathers), signals resistance in the executive 
branch to lay the groundwork for a perpetual system of veterans’ benefits that would be 
expected for any military engagement. This connection foreshadows the influence that 
the development of the Korea G.I. Bill would have on related areas of social policy – and 
how its very reach and scope could drive a wedge through the coalition that had 
supported its predecessor. 
 
The Fracture of the Veterans’ Benefit Coalition 
The original G.I. Bill was supported by a coalition that included a diverse set of 
political actors, including veterans’ organizations (though at times competing in their 
message), legislators from across the aisles, business, labor, and postsecondary 
institutions.156 While the coalitions’ competing interests had been subordinated to the 
interest of the 1944 G.I. Bill, the revision of the legislation for Korea veterans began to 
stress the tenuous connections among the group members. Two major rifts flourished !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
155 Letter from Elmer B. Saats to Senator James E. Murray, September 14, 1951, reprinted in “Education 
and Training and Other Benefits for Veterans Serving on or After June 27, 1950,” Hearings before the 
Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, United States House of Representatives (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office), 1109. 
156 See Mettler, Soldiers to Citizens; Frydl, The G.I. Bill; Brooks, “Unexpected Foes,” discusses the 
collaboration of business and labor specifically; Katznelson, When Affirmative Action Was White describes 
the alliances between segregationist Southern Democrats, Republicans, and more progressive Democrats all 
interested in promoting veterans’ benefits. 
 85! !
during this time period, stressing the connections between and among members of the 
veterans’ benefit coalition as they debated the merits of the G.I. Bill legislation. The first 
major divide came between the veterans’ organizations, whose conflicting approaches to 
veteran benefit policy were pushed the forefront as Congressional leaders developed the 
Korea G.I. Bill legislation. The second split was the divide between public and private 
educational institutions moved to the forefront, as issues of tuition payments would 
fundamentally change the complexion of veterans’ benefits, as well as the VA’s 
relationship with the colleges.157 
 
The Public/Private Divide in Postsecondary Education 
 Prior to the hearings in the House, Rankin had solicited feedback from various 
education administration and veterans’ groups about the proposal for a Korea G.I. Bill. 
The messages from education administration leaders were unified on the point of offering 
benefits to veterans; despite the challenges faced in administering the previous program, 
the education associations were still supportive of the program (and the rapid increase in 
college students – and indirect federal investment – that accompanied them). The 
National Veterans’ Educational Association in a 1952 letter restated its preference for the 
1944 entitlement guidelines (one year per year served, up to four years total). The NVEA 
also recommended that administration over veterans’ benefits be turned over to the states, 
with the VA serving the role of adviser and solely concerning itself with determining 
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eligibility and oversight of the nationwide program.158 By allowing state-level oversight 
of the educational benefit program administration, the NVEA suggested that the Korea 
G.I. Bill program would be devoid of the mismanagement and corruption that had 
characterized the 1944 legislation. Allowing state agencies the power to evaluate their 
own institutions of higher education and make the deciding call on the extent to which 
those schools were eligible for the receipt of federal funding would, in turn, free VA 
administrators to manage the broader contours of the program at the national level. 
While some education officials called for an end to VA authority, the real schism 
developing in the veterans’ benefit coalition began to emerge on the public/private divide 
in higher education. Before the Senate Labor and Public Welfare committee’s hearing on 
the proposed legislation, Teague commented that, in investigating the G.I. Bill, “there 
were very definitely two types of private schools: One group that was interested in 
education and another that was more interested in dollars.”159 Private postsecondary 
schools’ concerns about enrollments as a result of direct payments to the veteran were at 
the heart of their resistance to the new Korea G.I. Bill, and this provision mobilized the 
schools as a faction within the veterans’ benefit coalition (ultimately pitting them against 
their prior interests in supporting the earlier G.I. Bill).  
The breakdown over the direct payment to veterans came to a head in the House 
when the Springer Amendment (which would provide for payments to schools, rather 
than individual veterans) was introduced. The private schools soon found their champion !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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in the rather unlikely ally of William Springer (R-IL), a new Republican representative 
from Illinois’ twenty-second district (which had been solidly in Republican control for at 
least a decade), and whose interests advocacy generally ran toward those of agriculture 
and farm subsidies.160 A Navy veteran himself, Springer would soon become embroiled 
in the center of the rift in the veterans’ benefit coalition, driving a wedge between higher 
education officials and ultimately accusing the House Veterans’ Affairs Committee of 
skirting procedural rules in favor of heavy-handed politics. 
In response to news that the Korea G.I. Bill would offer direct payments to 
veterans as a means of skirting the thorny issue of direct payments to postsecondary 
institutions, Fred Fagg, President of the University of Southern California, began to 
mobilize fellow private school presidents through a letter-writing campaign.161 Fagg and 
others were in favor of maintaining the original indirect payment plan as established in 
the 1944 legislation, an aspect of the program that had come under intense scrutiny 
during the Teague Committee investigation. The group reflected concerns that direct 
payments to veterans’ would privilege public schools with lower tuitions, effectively 
biasing veterans against attending private schools (especially when tuition payments 
would be $200 lower for Korea veterans than for World War II veterans).  
Fagg’s letter campaign found its advocate in Springer, who heeded Fagg’s so-
called “emergency committee’s” call to action (and remained the only real advocate for 
the private school officials in either the House or Senate). The Illinois representative soon 
crafted what became known as the Springer Amendment, an addendum to H.R. 7656 that 
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would restore the direct-payment provisions for postsecondary institutions and remove 
any type of voucher or stipend system for veterans (for tuition payments only; any room-
and-board stipends meant to assist veterans in attending school would remain untouched 
by the Springer Amendment). The private schools’ opposition to the new payment 
provisions was not mirrored by any public school representatives, who remained silent on 
the issue in their Congressional testimony. Rather than rally against the private 
institutions, the public postsecondary schools appeared to leave the debate up to Congress 
to resolve; no similar countermovement against the private schools’ requests was 
acknowledged either in the Congressional Record or in any Congressional committee 
hearing transcripts. 
This divide between public and private universities represents a sharper fracture 
in the veterans’ benefit coalition than even the growing rift between the veterans’ groups. 
While the Legion, VFW, and DAV, among others, were reluctant to come to the table as 
a unified front in dealing with Congressional leadership (especially in the wake of the 
Teague Committee’s investigation into the mismanagement of the original G.I. Bill 
funding), their disagreements had manifested themselves in a similar fashion during the 
development of the 1944 legislation. To the extent that the veterans’ groups has disagreed 
before on issues of veterans’ benefits, their conflict was feeding back into itself from the 
previous legislation’s political process. The divide between the public and private 
postsecondary institutions was, however, driven by a vocal minority in one sector of the 
coalition (the private schools). When the interests of the private schools was threatened 
by the direct-payment provision, the previously unacknowledged differences between the 
private and public universities (with respect to their treatment under the G.I. Bill payment 
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program) were suddenly important enough to force the private schools to attempt to alter 
the legislation in furtherance of their own private interests. 
Despite the “emergency committee’s” attempts to contact other representatives, 
the Springer Amendment generated little discussion in the House. On May 26, Rankin, 
Teague, and Rogers162 (R-MA) pushed for a closed rule on the proposed Korea G.I. Bill. 
By invoking closed rule, the Veterans’ Affairs Committee members were effectively able 
to restrict the addition of amendments to the legislation, and set a limit of no more than 
two hours of debate on the House floor.163 Springer fought back zealously on the floor, 
contending that, “If there was ever a gag rule that was imposed upon any particular piece 
of legislation which was so vital to a certain group of people in the Armed Forces, it is 
the action of these people trying to pass this bill under a suspension of the rules.”164 
Springer charged Teague with running the House veterans’ committee as if it were his 
own private enterprise, to which Teague made a point of order establishing a lack of 
quorum and effectively ending Springer’s time to contest the legislation (within the 
shortened debate timeframe of the closed rule).165 
 In the Senate, the testimony was more subdued and reflected concerns not about 
the ability to attract the veteran who now had his or her own subsidy in hand, but rather 
distancing legitimate private schools from those for-profit institutions that sprang up 
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during the previous G.I. Bill. Bernard Ehrlich of the National Federation of Private 
School Associations argued that the competition that would naturally develop among 
public and private schools as they attempted to attract veterans was actually beneficial for 
veterans, ultimately driving the education market toward higher standards and better 
practices.166 Springer pushed back, once again attempting to gain favor on the Springer 
Amendment by introducing it into consideration before the Senate; though supported 
there also by representatives from the University of Southern California and Macalester 
College,167 the amendment failed to gain legislative support. 
 Despite the opposition of the private school “emergency committee” and 
Springer, Truman signed the bill into law in June 1952. The VA endorsed the provisions 
of the new legislation; Deputy Administrator O.W. Clark, in a letter to Rankin, reiterated 
the agency’s support of the new direct-payment provision for tuition benefits and 
reiterated his belief that such a system would inevitably assist the VA in better managing 
the “many diverse types of institutions [and] amounts representing tuition and fees.”168 
Despite the reactions to the bills payment provisions and accreditation requirements, it 
appeared to have the tacit acceptance of the veterans’ benefit coalition – though not 
without a significant struggle on the part of the private postsecondary schools that had 
rallied behind the unlikely figure of Springer. Although Springer was ultimately unable to 
successfully ensure that the new bill made tuition payments directly to the schools as the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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“emergency committee” had wanted, Springer’s vocal opposition to Teague, Rankin, and 
others in the House was a warning of impending further breakages within the veterans’ 
benefit coalition. 
 The recommendations of the Teague committee formed the basis of the 1952 
Korea G.I. Bill in its final (passed) version, and represented a different sentiment than the 
original legislation. Far from the fearful and speculative claims of veteran unrest and 
mass poverty that animated the debate over the 1944 G.I. Bill, the 1952 Korea G.I. Bill 
was motivated as much by veteran contentment and relative economic prosperity as it 
was the political machinations of the veterans’ benefit coalition. While the bill was 
intended to help Korea veterans reintegrate into society, its political effects reached far 
beyond the jurisdictional boundaries that separated veterans from civilians. The revisions 
to the bill would soon affect the way in which the federal government assesses the quality 
of postsecondary education. Moreover, the process of reforming the Korea G.I. Bill 
would put the VA’s bureaucratic power on display, its relative insulation and durability 
apparent as it deflected any potential changes to the administration of veterans’ education 
benefits under the proposed legislation. 
 
Spillover from the Korea G.I. Bill 
 The breakdown in the relationship among members of the veterans’ benefit 
coalition – precipitated by the legislative debate over the new iteration of the G.I. Bill – 
was not the only major effect of the original G.I. Bill or the process surrounding its 
reform. The changes to state capacity that resulted from a policy development process –
the “spillover” effects into a related area – involved the accreditation standard for 
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postsecondary education. Additionally, the ability of the VA to successfully emerge from 
the investigation into the G.I. Bill with its power intact suggests that the Korea G.I. Bill 
marks a further entrenchment of the VA’s power over a parallel set of social policy 
programs – ones that would become increasingly difficult to attempt to merge with the 
universal policy sphere. 
 One way in which the policy feedback process between the WWII and Korea G.I. 
Bills affected state capacity was by reifying the postsecondary education accreditation 
system. The experience of the 1944 G.I. Bill had shown legislators, bureaucrats, and 
veterans that all postsecondary institutions were not created equal: as the number of for-
profit institutions grew in response to a need for schooling (and a demobilized population 
used its newfound benefits), veterans soon learned that not all institutions were reputable. 
The Teague committee heard testimony from many veterans who claimed they had been 
swindled by “fly-by-night” institutions that provided little in the way of education. While 
accreditation had been in practice during this time, it was not until the Korea G.I. Bill that 
the system was entrenched at the federal level. 
 Through the Korea G.I. Bill, the federal government established a precedent for 
federal aid to higher education on the basis of accreditation. Though there was no move 
toward a federal system, and the new legislation did not require that tuition benefits could 
only be used at state-accredited institutions, the federal government did begin 
maintaining a list of accredited postsecondary institutions for public reference. The list 
was conceived of as a guide for potential student veterans, in hopes that they could 
sidestep some of the less reputable institutions in making their decisions on higher 
education after their service had ended. In making the accreditation statuses public, 
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legislators believed that any corrupt institutions would soon be forced to close their doors 
as student-veterans directed their tuition stipends toward the accredited institutions.169  
Moreover, the legislation used accreditation as proof of educational quality, or a 
way to ensure that veterans’ education benefits would not be wasted at an institution that 
lacked a solid reputation.170 The new reliance on accreditation as a standard of education 
pushed accreditation agencies to become accountable to the VA in endorsing schools that 
would be considered “worthy” of indirect government aid. While there was no push for 
any type of standard federal assessment of postsecondary institutions or their curricula, 
there was a concerted effort on the part of lawmakers to utilize the existing accreditation 
structure to validate the receipt of federal funds under the Korea G.I. Bill. The 
accreditation system would serve to legitimate not only the funding of a particular 
institution, but would help strengthen the entire administration of this new G.I. Bill to 
insulate it against the abuses that had wracked its previous version.171 
 While the changes to the accreditation system were not a wholesale federalization 
of the process, the shift in reliance on accreditation agencies’ approval as a prerequisite 
for government aid was established during the Korea G.I. Bill. By placing the 
accreditation process at the forefront of the fight against unqualified postsecondary 
education, the Korea G.I. Bill set an important precedent for using accreditation to signify 
a school that is worthy of indirect aid payments. Nowadays, accreditation is used as a 
condition for federal student financial aid, and although this standard was not codified in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
169 John R. Proffitt, "The Federal Connection for Accreditation." The Journal of Higher Education (1979): 
145-157. 
170 Margaret M. Conway, "The Commissioner's Authority to List Accrediting Agencies and Associations: 
Necessity for an Eligibility Issue." The Journal of Higher Education (1979): 158-170; Matthew W. Finkin, 
"Federal Reliance on Voluntary Accreditation: The Power to Recognize as the Power to Regulate." Journal 
of Law and Education 2 (1973), 339. 
171 Patricia A. Thrash, "Accreditation: A Perspective." The Journal of Higher Education (1979): 115-120. 
 94! !
the Korea G.I. Bill, the important first steps of utilizing accreditation as a standard for 
student aid were established during this time. 
The second major change in state capacity was not necessarily a marked departure 
from the status quo, but rather a story about effects that were not felt at the bureaucratic 
level; that is, the ability of the VA to remain insulated from the G.I. Bill’s critiques 
despite being its sole administrator at the federal level. This critique of the VA would 
soon become a hallmark of the testimony of higher education groups, as their experiences 
in dealing with the VA during the previous G.I. Bill presented questions about which 
government agency was best equipped to deal with issues arising from an active 
education benefits program. Ralph McDonald of the National Education Association of 
the United States (NEAUS), in a letter to Rankin at the request for feedback on the 
proposed changes to the education benefits, expressed displeasure at the VA’s 
administration of veterans’ education benefits, claiming that “the administration has been 
in the hands of persons who, because of their experimental background, were not in a 
position to know much about the administration and finance of colleges and universities 
in this country…As the law now stands, the Federal agency with which educators are 
accustomed to deal in most matters involving the Federal Government’s participation in 
educational programs is completely eliminated.”172  
Russell Thackrey, the Executive Secretary of the Association of Land-Grant 
Colleges and Universities, wrote to Rankin that the VA’s power to review its policies 
regarding education benefits administration and decide if and when reforms were 
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necessary turned the VA into “judge and jury,” effectively removing any kind of 
legislative oversight into the veterans’ benefit system.173 NEAUS renewed its criticism of 
the VA in a letter to Rankin, urging that the administration of the veterans’ education 
benefits program be vested in the Department of Education and state education boards.174 
Various education lobbying groups expressed opposition to proposed veterans’ benefit 
legislation that would continue to locate the authority over the veteran education program 
in the hands of the VA. Despite the Teague committee’s investigation into the G.I. Bill 
administration, the VA emerged relatively unscathed from this legislative oversight, able 
to effectively deflect critiques of its administration by laying blame on faulty education 
institutions and “fly-by-night” schools that denigrated the reputation of the G.I. Bill 
program. 
The support for maintaining the VA’s administrative authority over the veterans’ 
benefit program came from both the administration and legislators (even those who were 
outspoken critics of state expansion and the New Deal programs). In a letter to Rankin, 
Bureau of the Budget Director F.J. Lawton objected to the proposed restructuring of the 
veterans’ education program to involve Comptroller oversight. Lawton argued that the 
Bureau saw “no compelling reason for this departure from established precedent,” noting 
that the major interactions between the veteran and the VA would be simplified under a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
173 Letter from Russell Thackrey to John Rankin, July 20, 1950, reprinted in “Education and Training and 
Other Benefits for Veterans Serving on or After June 27, 1950,” Hearings before the Committee on 
Veterans’ Affairs, United States House of Representatives, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 
1950), 913. 
174 Letter from Willard E. Givens to Senator John Rankin, February 7 1952, reprinted in “Education and 
Training and Other Benefits for Veterans Serving on or After June 27, 1950,” Hearings before the 
Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, United States House of Representatives, (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 1952), 1194. 
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plan with direct payouts to the veteran (rather than the schools).175 The administrator of 
the Federal Security Agency, John Thurston, expressed his agency’s opposition to this 
proposed maintenance of the VA structure in administering the program. Thurston noted 
that the FSA – which had a vested interest in bringing veterans’ education benefit 
legislation under the same mantle as the other social programs that it supervised – would 
prefer if the veterans’ education benefit program could be at least partially managed by 
the Department of Education (then the Office of Education). Thurston noted that this 
reorganization would not divest the VA of its power in veterans’ benefits writ large, but 
rather would assist the VA by offering the OE’s expertise and experience in education 
policy.176 Despite the various calls for the VA to relinquish at least part of its influence 
over the administration of the Korea G.I. Bill, there were no attempts on the part of 
Congress or the White House to officially support divesting the VA of its responsibility 
in the field of veteran education policy. 
Additionally, the recommendations of the Commission on the Reorganization of 
the Executive Branch of the Government (the Hoover Commission) supported the 
existing structure of the veterans’ education benefit program within the VA, and 
recommended that the tuition program be kept under the control of the VA (rather than 
moved to the Department of Education).177 The debate over the VA’s control of the 
education benefit program was, with the exception of testimony on behalf of several 
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175 Letter from F.J. Lawton to John E. Rankin, May 16 1952. Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, United 
States House of Representatives, Untitled Prints of Correspondence, 82nd Congress, 2nd Session. 
176 Letter from John L. Thurston to John E. Rankin. May 16, 1952. Reprinted in Congressional Record 
94086-52, no. 280. 
177 Recommendations of Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government 
Providing for Reorganization of the Veterans’ Administration and Creating a Veterans’ Insurance 
Corporation, Hearings Before the House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, United States House of 
Representatives, 82nd Congress, 2nd session, May-June 1952. (Washington, DC: United States Government 
Printing Office, 1952). 
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interest group representatives before the House, largely absent; even the Teague 
committee’s recommendations following the investigations into the original G.I. Bill 
offered little in the way of criticism on the role of the VA in overseeing the corrupted 
program. 
The VA, then, was able to maintain its authority over the veteran education 
benefit program even in light of previous accusations of mismanagement and poor 
administration; moreover, the blame for the breakdowns in the system was placed on 
postsecondary institutions. Additionally, the direct payments laid out in the Korea G.I. 
Bill reduced the program structure to being solely between the VA and individual 
veterans, allowing the agency to not only make direct payments to veterans but also to 
investigate and resolve any problems in the administration of its programs. It seemed 
that, despite calls for changes in program administration, the VA would retain the ability 
to be “both judge and jury,” despite recent investigations into the agency’s faults. 
One explanation for this insulation could lie in the VA’s ability to build 
institutional credentials through its administration of the G.I. Bill, such that it became 
seen as the only viable agency within which a complex set of veterans’ benefits could be 
housed. This concept is best articulated in Carpenter’s theory of bureaucratic autonomy, 
which suggests that agencies build up leverage by controlling a particular policy sphere, 
such that moving that policy’s administration is not considered a viable alternative to 
legislators.178 The testimony of administration and legislative officials suggest that they 
preferred to keep all veterans’ benefit programs within the jurisdiction of the VA, rather 
than splitting programs up under the control of different agencies. The way in which the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
178 Daniel Carpenter, Forging Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in 
Executive Agencies, 1862-1928. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001). 
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original G.I. Bill fed back into the development of the Korea G.I. Bill – and the fact that 
the VA was able to emerge from this process with its power still intact – suggests that 
there may be reification of existing power structures as a result of policy development. 
Additionally, the case of the VA may provide further evidence that agencies can gain 
power that allows them to then affect changes in parallel policy spheres, rather than 
exclusively focusing on changes within the same policy area. 
 
Conclusion 
 The 1952 Korea G.I. Bill is more than an isolated example of a policy that was 
affected by its own previous incarnation; rather, it provides an important example in 
which to test a more expansive approach to the policy feedback model. In expanding the 
policy feedback model to include heterogeneous groups whose composition and internal 
strength vary over time (and as a direct result of repeated interactions with one another on 
the same types of legislation), I argue that the veterans’ benefit coalition demonstrates 
that policies can feedback negatively to the detriment of their original supporters. The 
experience of reforming the original G.I. Bill – beginning with the investigation into the 
mismanagement of education benefit funding and culminating in the legislative debate 
surrounding the format of the new legislation – forced the individual coalition members 
to once again subordinate their own individual interests to that of the greater good. When 
the private schools’ interests in attracting and retaining students were threatened via the 
direct payment provision as proposed, the private schools broke rank and sought out 
legislative support for reestablishing the same payment program as had existed in the 
earlier legislation. Though the private schools did not necessarily exit the coalition 
(thereby constituting a complete break in the coalition), their opposition to the legislation 
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generally accepted by the rest of the members suggests that the strain of reform was too 
great to maintain the fragile connections within the veterans’ benefit coalition. 
 Moreover, the coalition’s actions in reforming the G.I. Bill spilled over into other 
policy areas. First and most visibly, the requirement of accreditation embedded in the 
1952 Bill instantiated the concept of accreditation as a substitute for federal 
standardization of higher education. By utilizing the regional and subject-specific 
accreditation agencies’ approval as preconditions for the receipt of federal funds under 
the G.I. Bill, the VA could be assured a smaller risk of the misallocation of funds or the 
misuse of funds by non-reputable institutions. The federal government’s endorsement of 
accreditation agencies’ approval – and the reluctance to establish a federal accreditation 
system – were codified in the 1952 Bill, setting the stage for the reliance on accreditation 
as a condition for federal aid receipt under the financial aid system in the years to come. 
 Finally, the ability of the VA to hold onto the veterans’ education benefit program 
management – despite calls from various agencies and officials for the removal of the 
system into more capable or experienced hands – is a testament to the hidden strength of 
the VA in establishing its sphere of influence. The VA was able to retain the 
administration of its education programs and prevent any part of its benefit program 
structure from being annexed by another federal agency (or being decentralized fully to 
the state level). The VA, then, was able to insulate itself from countervailing political 
forces, and was ultimately strengthened by the process of revising the 1944 G.I. Bill into 
the 1952 legislation. 
 Overall, the Korea G.I. Bill presents an important case study in assessing the 
ability of policies to affect politics at a later time. The coalitional politics involved in the 
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promotion of veterans’ benefits were not only affected (negatively) by the process of 
reforming the original G.I. Bill; they in turn pushed the ramifications of the legislation 
into other areas of social policy and state capacity. The policy feedback model’s 
specifications for how interest groups and state capacity are both affected by the policy 
process deserves update in light of the case study of the Korea G.I. Bill; expanding the 
model to account for more types of feedback is useful not only for understanding the first 
reform to a piece of legislation, but for understanding various subsequent reforms as well. 
In the next chapter, we turn our attention to the Vietnam Era, and the ways in which the 
1966 G.I. Bill further extended the effects of the 1952 legislation, while creating its own 
distinct political affects in that era. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 A GREAT SOCIETY WITH A ‘PECULIAR PROBLEM’: PEACETIME VETERANS 
AND THE 1966 COLD WAR G.I. BILL 
 
 Although the veterans’ benefit coalition had provided the momentum behind the 
1944 and 1952 G.I. Bills, the relative power of this set of political actors appeared tied to 
the exogenous shock of American military engagement. As the war in Korea drew to a 
close, it seemed that the question of how to best address the reintegration of veterans had 
been answered in the political struggle over the 1952 bill; after all, the legislation would 
provide a parallel education benefit system to the precedent-setting program that had 
been utilized by World War II veterans. As America entered a period of relative 
peacetime (insofar as no other large-scale military engagements loomed on the horizon), 
the question of how to address the peacetime veteran would soon move to the forefront of 
veterans’ benefit discussion. This group of veterans was, as Republican National 
Committee leader Bradley Taylor wrote, “in a class set aside – they are different and 
what has made them different is a little pice [sic] of paper that said ‘greetings from the 
President’…they are set into a nother [sic] class within the nation.”179 How would 
America address the reintegration of the so-called “peacetime veteran,” and in what ways 
would this period of policy reform compare to the development of the previous veteran 
education benefit systems in its effects on parallel policies? 
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179 Letter from Bradley R. Taylor to Ivy Baker Priest, June 14, 1953. The Papers of Maxwell M. Rabb, Box 
37, Folder Ta(4). The Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library. Taylor was the Assistant Campaign 
Manager of the Veterans’ Division in the Republican National Committee at the time; Priest was the 
Treasurer of the United States.  
 102! !
 In this chapter, I argue that the 1966 Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act – 
also known as the “Cold War G.I. Bill” and which extended education benefits to Cold 
War era military personnel – marks an important turning point in not only the politics of 
veterans’ benefits, but of social policy development more broadly.180 The legislation 
passed in the absence of the strong support of the veterans’ groups or colleges that had 
been the driving force behind the legislation of 1944 and 1952. Additionally, the 
executive branch was, from the Eisenhower to the Kennedy administration, opposed to 
the extension of education benefits to veterans’ that had not been in conflict; even the 
more sympathetic Johnson Administration would have preferred to focus more on 
universal postsecondary education than on reintegration benefits for veterans. In the case 
of the Cold War G.I. Bill, it would be the House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs (and its 
allies in the Senate) that would secure passage of the legislation after nearly seven years 
of constant appeals to the President, Congress, and the broader public. Thus, it would be 
individual legislators who would activate the coalition’s support – however tacit – for 
peacetime veterans’ benefits and ultimately negotiate its separation from similar 
programs aimed at universal higher education programs. 
The country faced a “peculiar problem” with regards to the peacetime veteran: he 
was still under compulsory service obligations, but did not share in the wartime 
experiences that previous draftees had encountered.181 Moreover, the 1952 election that 
had placed Eisenhower in the White House – though with Democrats in control of the 
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180 In this chapter, I use the terms “Cold War G.I. Bill,” “1966 G.I. Bill,” and “peacetime G.I. Bill” 
interchangeably. 
181 In testimony before Congress, AMVETS National Commander Edwin Fifleiski called the post-Korea 
situation a “peculiar problem not heretofore encountered by this Nation.” Testimony before the Committee 
on Veterans’ Affairs, “Legislative Recommendations of the Veterans’ Organizations,” United States House 
od Representatives (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office,1962), 2310. 
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Congress – marked a decided electoral shift away from the support for Democrats’ brand 
of social policy development throughout the Roosevelt and Truman eras. Though the 
system of Selective Service remained in effect, the lack of military conflicts did not elicit 
the same urgency from political actors (from either side of the aisle, or even within some 
of the larger veterans’ groups) to establish broad-based education programs for returning 
military personnel. Politicians seemed to agree that an “opening up of the government’s 
coffers” need not immediately follow compulsory service182 
Alongside the call for education benefits for peacetime veterans was President 
Lyndon Johnson’s plan to revitalize the public sector and increase the quality of life in 
the country through a series of targeted government programs.183 The development of the 
1966 Cold War G.I. Bill falls in line with the legislative trajectory of the 1965 Higher 
Education Act, and the two pieces of legislation were effectively aimed at overlapping 
audiences (especially as a peacetime draft maintained a fighting force of over 2 million 
people through the beginning of the 1960s, who were unable to secure deferments for 
education or other socioeconomic reasons) (see Figure 1 below).  
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182 Mark Boulton, “A Price on Patriotism: The Politics and Unintended Consequences of the 1966 G.I. 
Bill,” in ed. Stephen Ortiz, Veterans’ Policy, Veterans’ Politics: New Perspectives on Veterans in the 
Modern United States. (Florida: University Press of Florida Press, 2014), 246. 
183 Sidney M. Milkis, “Lyndon Johnson, the Great Society, and the ‘Twilight’ of the Modern Presidency,” 
in eds. Sydney M. Milkis and Jerome M. Mileur, The Great Society and the High Tide of Liberalism 
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Figure 1: Size of the U.S. Military Post-Korea184 
 
This chapter focuses on the development of the 1966 Cold War G.I. Bill as a 
function of a very different veterans’ benefit coalition than the one that had successfully 
secured the passage of the 1952 G.I. Bill. While the development of the 1952 bill created 
a fracture in the veterans’ benefit coalition between public and private postsecondary 
institutions – with the private schools concerned about their enrollment in comparison to 
the less costly public schools – the 1966 legislative process was far different. The 
peacetime veterans’ education benefit had (at best) lukewarm support from veterans’ 
organizations and political parties, and outright opposition from not one, but three 
different presidential administrations. The driving force behind the veterans’ benefit 
coalition would come from the House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs (and, to a lesser 
extent, allies in the Senate). In line with my first contention, I argue that the powerful 
combination of individual legislator incentives (due to concerns about voting patterns 
among veterans), combined with the popularity of veterans’ benefits regardless of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
184 Data compiled from the Defense Manpower Data Center’s “Active Duty Military Strength by Service – 
Historical Reports FY 1954-1993” Accessed March 3, 2014. 
https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/reports.do?category=reports&subCat=milActDutReg. 
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perceptions of the military conflict in which the veterans were involved, allowed for a 
select few members of Congress to overreach their positions within the coalitions and 
move forward on education benefit legislation in the face of uncertainty or inactivity 
within the group. 
 The evolution of education benefits for peacetime veterans would test not only the 
strength of the veterans’ benefit coalition, but the ideational attachments to the social 
construction of the American veteran that had persisted through the Korean War. 
Changing the political landscape for the peacetime veteran would continue to fracture the 
veterans’ benefit coalition, even as it entered the debate about these education benefits 
without a uniform stance on the legitimacy or even necessity of postsecondary education 
for all former military personnel, regardless of their experience in military conflicts. 
  
A Coalition of Diverging Interests? The Veterans’ Benefit Coalition in the  
Post-Korea Era 
While the debates concerning the 1952 G.I. Bill were undertaken by a veterans’ 
benefit coalition generally reified by the legislation’s development, the period of reform 
surrounding the 1952 bill was not as constructive to the veterans’ benefit coalition. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, the process of reform undercut the coalition by creating schisms 
along lines of public and private postsecondary institutions. Moreover, the 1952 
legislation had solidified the Veterans’ Affairs Committee in the House as a powerful 
component of the coalition, and one that appeared to fall in lockstep with the veterans’ 
organizations’ demands. By 1959, however, the differences among the veterans’ 
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organizations was thrown into stark contrast as their legislative agendas featured distinct 
mismatches on the issue of education.  
Moreover, the House and Senate Committees were not homogenous in their 
support for extending veterans’ benefits, and were not motivated by the investigatory 
hearings that had been generated by the 1944 bill (and which, I argue, helped solidify 
support for the 1952 legislation). Additionally, the support of the President – which had, 
until Eisenhower, been relatively firmly in place behind the extension of benefits to 
veterans – was now no longer guaranteed, regardless of party affiliation. The veterans’ 
benefit coalition closed out the 1950s in a state of disjuncture, no longer united behind a 
response to an ongoing conflict, and grappling with the policy consequences of an 
ideological shift in how America would define a “veteran.” 
 
The Vietnam Era Coalition and Divided Interests 
 Though the veterans’ benefit coalition remained concerned with issues of veteran 
medical care and the treatment of veterans’ dependents, the issue of education benefits 
(parallel to those that had been established for veterans of both WWII and the Korean 
War) would soon occupy space on the agenda. The discussions over these particular 
benefits would draw in the members of the coalition into a heated debate about policy 
priorities, fairness to veterans of different conflicts, and government responsibility to the 
peacetime veteran who did not see the kind of combat that his predecessors had 
experienced. 
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Veterans’ Organizations 
Though veterans’ groups had been united behind the reforms to the 1944 G.I. Bill 
that would become the Korean G.I. Bill, their tenuous joint commitment to veterans’ 
education would begin to falter at the end of the 1950s. As attention turned to healthcare 
and disability rehabilitation, the reintegration of veterans seemed to focus largely on 
physical ailments and helping to reduce the unemployment rate among former military 
personnel. The issue of postsecondary education for veterans would soon cause conflicts 
among the major veterans’ groups, with their opposition to the issue – either through 
silence or outright direct contestation – becoming a wedge that would further divide the 
groups. The differences in the attention that the groups paid to the issues in their national 
resolutions – presented annually before the House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs – 
highlights the disparities in each group’s agenda and their uneven support of extending 
G.I. Bill benefits to the newest cohort of veterans (see Table 2, below).185 
Table 2: Veterans' Organizations and Support for Peacetime Veteran Education Benefits 
 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 
American Legion       + 
AMVETS + + + + + +  
Disabled American 
Veterans 
       
Veterans of Foreign 
Wars 
+  + + + + + 
Veterans of WWI of 
the USA 
-       
+  Explicit group support in legislative agenda for Congress 
-   Explicit group opposition in legislative agenda for Congress 
 
The American Veterans of WWII (AMVETS) was one of the only groups that 
actively sought educational benefits for peacetime veterans, appearing before Congress in 
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185 Source: Annual Legislative Recommendations of Veterans’ Organizations before the House Committee 
on Veterans’ Affairs, 1960-1966. Retrieved through ProQuest Congressional database. 
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1960 to request that the G.I. Bill model of education benefits – though with a different “1 
day of benefits per 1 day of service” model – be extended to veterans who had entered 
the service after 1955.186 Theirs was the only veteran group to consistently make explicit 
remarks in support of educational benefits for peacetime veterans from 1960-1966, 
arguing that the “new breed of veteran” deserved to have the same types of educational 
opportunities as those from previous eras, despite the potential cost to the federal 
government.187 AMVETS leadership argued that “the education and lives of the young 
men serving today are interrupted and their preparation to compete in the Great Society 
disrupted,” without the remedy of an extended veterans’ education benefits system in 
place.188 The AMVETS consistent organizational support for the extension of peacetime 
education benefits throws into sharp relief the varying levels of opposition that all but one 
of the other veterans’ organizations held for a peacetime G.I. Bill. 
The Disabled Veterans of America (DAV) maintained consistency in its message 
that the most critical constituency of veterans were those with physical or mental 
limitations created by military service. As such, the DAV had, in previous debates about 
the 1944 and 1952 G.I. Bills, called for more emphasis on disabled veterans and publicly 
opposed investing in broad-based education initiatives that would only serve to siphon 
money and attention away from the disabled veterans. The leadership of the DAV put it 
succinctly: “In discussing prospective benefits for current members of the Armed Forces, 
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186 Harold T. Bere, AMVETS, Legislative Recommendations of Veterans Organizations to the United 
States House of Representatives, Committee on Veterans’ Affairs. (Washington, DC: Government Printing 
Office, 1960), 1965. 
187 Don Spagnola, AMVETS national commander. Legislative Recommendations of Veterans 
Organizations to the United States House of Representatives, Committee on Veterans’ Affairs. 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1963), 5. 
188 Don Spagnola, AMVETS national commander. Legislative Recommendations of Veterans 
Organizations to the United States House of Representatives, Committee on Veterans’ Affairs. 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1962), 2436. 
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it comes to mind that attempts are being made to bring GI educational and other 
programs within the scope of the sweeping welfare activities of the Great Society.”189 
The DAV refused to speak in support of education benefits for peacetime veterans, 
pressing members of Congress to place more of an emphasis on programs to provide 
education and vocational training for those who had sustained injured during their service 
in Korea and in WWII. 
Unlike the DAV, the VFW was routinely supportive of the Cold War G.I. Bill in 
their national resolutions, consistently adding the extension of G.I. bill benefits to their 
platform throughout the first half of the 1960s, although never adding testimony before 
Congress to strengthen – or even draw attention to – their position. Thus, the VFW’s 
support can be considered relatively symbolic, as it blended its support for education 
benefits in alongside a variety of other measures for vocational training and 
rehabilitation. Interestingly, in 1965 – as the debates over the peacetime G.I. Bill were 
coming to a head – the VFW adopted language in their national resolution that would 
limit potential pool of beneficiaries of any education program to only those who had been 
in active combat.190  
The Veterans’ of World War I renewed its protest against the increasing attention 
paid to the new veteran cohorts at the expense of legislation directed toward older 
veterans. In a 1960 Congressional hearing, the group’s national commander expressed his 
opposition to the continued neglect of the WWI veteran, asking, “What were the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
189 Claude L. Callegary, National Commander of the DAV. Testimony before House committee on 
Veterans’ Affairs, Legislative Recommendations of Veterans Organizations to the United States House of 
Representatives, Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, 1965 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 
1965), 3336. 
190 Statement of John A. Jenkins, Commander in Chief, VFW. Testimony before House committee on 
Veterans’ Affairs, Legislative Recommendations of Veterans Organizations to the United States House of 
Representatives, Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, 1965 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 
1965), 2408. 
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opportunities offered for furthering his education, suddenly become so necessary in a 
world upside down to prewar concepts and requirements? None…the now fast-aging 
veteran of the First World War gladly paid the soaring taxes made necessary by war in 
addition to striving for those benefits in favor of the boy who was to return.”191 The 
group remained steadfast in its unwillingness to continue advocating for benefits that its 
own members would never receive in the future, and had never been offered when they 
had left the military. 
 
The Parties 
Similarly, neither of the two political parties seemed to place veterans at the 
forefront of their party agendas on a post-Korea political system, giving short shrift to the 
issue of veterans’ reintegration through the beginning of the 1960s. Though individual 
legislators like Senator Ralph Yarborough and Representative Olin Teague remained 
powerful forces in the veterans’ benefit coalition, the broader party organizations did not 
echo this strong advocacy in the arena of veteran’s benefit programs at the national level 
(nor did their presidential candidates in either the 1960 or 1964 elections).  
 The 1960 Democratic Party platform featured a small section on veterans’ affairs, 
pledging to continue expanding coverage for veterans with service-connected disabilities 
and maintaining the healthcare system. Additionally, Democrats pledged to 
“continue…educational benefits patterned after the G.I. Bill of Rights,” though did not 
specifically mention whether such benefits would be extended to peacetime veterans or 
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191 Charles A McCarthy, World War I Veterans of the USA, Inc.. 1960. Testimony before House committee 
on Veterans’ Affairs, Legislative Recommendations of Veterans Organizations to the United States House 
of Representatives, Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, 1960 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 
1960), 1982. 
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only those who had been involved in military conflict. During the same year, the party 
proposed a system of national grants and scholarships at the federal level to assist young 
people with obtaining postsecondary education, citing the benefits of a well-educated 
American youth.192 The 1964 party platform, however, did not make mention of specific 
plans for the extension of any veteran education benefits, though it did reference 
legislation passed in 1963 which nearly tripled the amount of federal aid available to 
students, from $50 million to $142 million.193 Notably, of the Democratic presidential 
candidates from 1952-1964 (Stevenson, Kennedy, and Johnson), not one made any 
mention of veterans in any of their national convention addresses.194 Though veterans did 
make it into the Democratic Party platforms of the 1960s, there was no extension of the 
initial drive for either the 1944 or 1952 G.I. Bills present in the party’s messages. 
Republicans, in comparison, were more focused on the role of veterans’ benefits 
as economic reintegration, as opposed to a portal for more education funding. In 1960, 
the Republican Party pledged to improve veterans’ reemployment rights, with no mention 
of educational programs or benefits. They also pledged to stand behind the maintenance 
of the VA as a separate agency. In the realm of higher education, they did mention 
support for federal aid programs, but pledge to keep funding and control over all forms of 
education delegated to the state level.195 The 1964 platform made only minor references 
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192 Democratic Party Platforms: "Democratic Party Platform of 1960," July 11, 1960. Online by Gerhard 
Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29602. 
193 Democratic Party Platforms: "Democratic Party Platform of 1964," August 24, 1964. Online by Gerhard 
Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29603. 
194 Source: Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://presidency.ucsb.edu. 
195 Republican Party Platforms: "Republican Party Platform of 1960," July 25, 1960. Online by Gerhard 
Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25839. 
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to veterans, and focuses on veterans’ preferences in employment and disability and 
medical care. In higher education, the GOP proposed a system of tax credits for those 
with higher education costs, as well as aid to states and a limited federal student aid 
program to assist with postsecondary school costs.196 
This reluctance of either party to reiterate the message of the veterans’ benefit 
coalition has several potential explanations. One rationale centers on the minor recessions 
of the 1950s – in 1949-1950, 1953-1954, and 1957-1958 – that together placed Congress’ 
focus squarely on unemployment and inflation issues. These economic downturns would 
have drawn focus away from issues of education and toward more immediate questions 
of economic policy. Thus, at the time when the question of veterans’ benefits was 
beginning to gain traction among some interested veterans’ groups, the parties’ policy 
priorities were not amenable to questions of veteran education.197 Another potential 
explanation is that the peacetime draft allowed for a great deal of deferments – for 
education, childrearing, etc. – that the reintegration needs of military personnel became 
less salient as those who could achieve high levels of education and professional training 
were already opting out of military service.198 Neither of these explanations, however, 
account for why neither party would at least entertain valid policy proposals from a loyal 
voting constituency.  
The best explanation for this lack of attention comes in the form of the ideological 
shift that the Democrats begin to undergo after 1952 (which John Gerring refers to as the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
196 Republican Party Platforms: "Republican Party Platform of 1964," July 13, 1964. Online by Gerhard 
Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25840. 
197 James L. Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in 
the United States (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1983), 342. 
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“universalist epoch”199) and the concomitant reaction from the Republican Party in the 
wake of Eisenhower’s win. As the Democrat’s platform shifted from New Deal era 
policies to a focus on “the American public” (and less on individual minority groups), 
singling out veterans as a target population was less aligned with this new strategy. 
Similarly, the GOP’s parallel focus on the “populism of the right” (as Gerring argues) 
meant that it eschewed a public emphasis on special interests in favor of supporting 
“American values” held in common by the entire citizenry. 
 
Veterans’ Affairs in the House and Senate 
 At the outset of the discussions concerning the Cold War G.I. Bill, several 
holdovers from the development of the 1952 legislation remained in powerful positions in 
Congress. While having such support would appear to mean a more influential role for 
veterans’ education benefits in the legislative agendas of the late 1950s, the issue of 
peacetime veterans’ education benefits was actually met with intense resistance from 
various members of the veterans’ benefit coalition. The task of championing this benefit 
reform would fall to various members of the House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, and 
the Subcommittee on Veterans’ Affairs (within the Committee on Labor and Public 
Works) in the Senate. 
 In the House, Olin Teague (D-TX), who had been a major force behind the 1944 
G.I. Bill investigations as well as the 1952 Korea G.I. Bill’s development, headed the 
Veterans’ Affairs committee. The House Committee generally presented a unified front 
on veterans’ issues, allowing the veterans’ organizations latitude in shaping each year’s !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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legislative agenda (via annual testimony and review of the five largest groups’ national 
resolutions). The House remained poised to move on peacetime veterans’ benefits, 
insofar as their committee membership remained largely intact and featured several high-
ranking representatives from both sides of the aisle. 
 The issue of peacetime veterans’ education benefits was introduced in Congress 
in 1959, via legislation proposed in the Veterans’ subcommittee of the Senate Committee 
on Labor and Public Welfare. Member of the subcommittee Lister Hill – a Democrat 
from Alabama – was also chair of the full committee, and had been an advocate of the 
1952 Korean War G.I. Bill. Similarly, the subcommittee contained Ralph Yarborough, a 
vocal advocate for veterans who would ultimately take the lead in pressing forward with 
the legislation until it was passed in 1966. Though the subcommittee setup seemed to 
favor the enactment of powerful veterans’ legislation, it would not become its own 
standing committee until 1970, leaving veterans’ benefit issues split between Labor and 
Public Welfare, and Finance. This bifurcation of the veterans’ issues agenda would 
plague Senate leaders as they attempted comprehensive action on various issues, and 
leave them especially vulnerable to a powerful LPW committee (even with Hill at the 
helm). Additionally, Congress would be met with strict opposition from the Eisenhower – 
and later, Kennedy and Johnson – administrations, stunting the ability of the 
subcommittee to even report out various versions of the legislation. Though the Senate 
appeared fertile ground for increasing veterans’ benefits, it appeared that it would not be 
able to match the opposition of the White House. 
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The Executive: The Presidents and the VA 
The Eisenhower Administration’s last year in office would be the target of the 
first round of appeals for broader veterans’ benefits. The Bradley Commission had 
recommended in 1956 that education benefits for veterans after the Korea War cohort be 
opposed, since they would increase spending on a social program with no direct relation 
to a military conflict.200 In private legislative meetings with advisors, Eisenhower 
stressed the need to rein in spending and to reject any provisions for veterans that had not 
served in either of the World Wars or in Korea, contending that doing so would be a 
reversion to New Deal era policies.201 
The Kennedy Administration kept largely silent on veterans’ benefits, giving the 
semblance of agreement with the Eisenhower Administration and the Bradley 
Commission’s recommendations. The Administration, similarly, did not concede ground 
to the veterans’ groups’ demands for more benefits, either. In responding to appeals from 
the National Director of the American Association of University Veterans (based at West 
Virginia University) to provide educational benefits for the peacetime veterans, White 
House Assistant Special Counsel Lee White noted that other scholarship programs will 
meet the needs of the newest cohort of veterans. Holding the line of the Administration in 
their overall reluctance to engage in an expansion of veterans’ education benefits, White 
stated, “We do not oppose expansion of educational and training opportunities for 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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peacetime ex-servicemen, but believe that these should be provided by programs 
designed to increase the opportunities for all of our qualified young people.”202 
It would not be until the Johnson Administration that the veterans’ benefit 
coalition would meet a President that tacitly accepted – if not explicitly endorsed – its 
place in their ranks. Johnson’s Great Society plans would dovetail to some extent with 
the goals of reintegrating veterans, though the two goals would eventually come into 
conflict as his plans for higher education reform necessarily included discussions of 
education former military personnel. 
 Although the VA had been instrumental in advancing the interests of veterans’ 
groups during the development of the 1952 G.I. Bill, the agency was initially stridently 
opposed to the idea of peacetime veterans’ benefits (beyond service-connected disability 
programs). The VA’s strict criterion for the “deserving veteran” emerged as early as 
1957, when the House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs requested comments on a 
measure that would extend Korea G.I. Bill benefits to those service members who had 
voluntarily joined the military during January 1955, in the 30 days between the end of 
active combat (in the DoD’s assessment) and the beginning of the benefit program. This 
group, VA officials argued, had only willingly joined the armed forces in an attempt to 
extract potential benefits from the military while not actively participating in the conflict 
as other members had.203  
The VA’s resistance to awarding benefits to peacetime veterans extended well 
into the following decade, mirroring the Eisenhower administration’s reluctance to 
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increase VA spending for the express purpose of reintegrating veterans who had not 
experienced combat.204 Most of the VA’s concerns stemmed from the potential drain on 
resources that a peacetime veterans’ benefit program would produce, which 
administrators feared would overload the benefit system and create further delays and 
backlogs. Interestingly, the VA’s assertions of its own administrative capacity had been 
fervent just a few years earlier as it argued for retaining control over the veterans’ 
education program (despite legislative and interest group calls for its transfer to Health, 
Education, and Welfare).  
The efforts on the part of the VA to retain their jurisdiction over the entire set of 
veterans’ benefits offered at the federal level left HEW somewhat sidelined in the debates 
about further changes to the G.I. Bill’s eligibility. The agency could only weigh in on the 
potential effects on higher education policy, as well as the precedent that peacetime 
veterans’ benefits might set. In a letter to Teague upon request of the House Committee 
on Veterans’ Affairs, one HEW administrator expressed concern that extending 
peacetime veterans’ benefits was not in the national interest, and that doing so could 
fundamentally alter the way in which the government distributed loans to college students 
in the future.205 The agency especially questioned the format in which the veteran’s 
benefits would be extended to service personnel, and whether changing the method of 
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payment from tuition vouchers to types of grants or scholarships would have effects on 
how aid would be extended to civilian students.  
Overall, the veteran’s benefit coalition members remained divided in their 
expressed interests as individual lawmakers and interest groups began to put serious force 
behind a peacetime G.I. Bill. The most aggressive supporters would be found in 
leadership positions in the House and Senate, and not among the veterans’ groups or VA 
as had occurred during the previous iteration of legislative development following the 
Korean War. The fact that coalition members were not wholly supportive of the extension 
of peacetime benefits – and in some cases, were vocally opposed to the establishment of 
these provisions – sets the stage for a future schism in the coalition and a potential for 
these interests to overshadow attempts at cooperation. 
 
Attempting to Cooperate 
 While veterans’ benefit coalition members retained diverging (or at least, 
unaligned) interests in terms of a peacetime G.I. Bill, individual members of the coalition 
attempted to advance various proposals to continue education assistance to veterans. In 
1959, Ralph Yarborough began advocating for a “Cold War G.I. Bill,” that would have 
similar positive effects on national educational attainment and employment that the 
previous bills had offered.206 He did so without the majority of the veterans’ groups 
offering explicit support on the measure, and also to a Senate Labor and Public Works 
Committee that vocally opposed what appeared to be a “blank check” to the VA for the 
foreseeable future. 
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In an editorial, Yarborough argued for the adjusted compensation model of education 
benefit extension, and even as a corrective for the inequality amongst those who had been 
drafted for service (especially that those who were wealthy enough to attend college 
would be not only exempt from service, but have that much more of an advantage in 
postsecondary education than their peers serving in the military). In an editorial 
responding to a column claiming the equitable nature of military service, Yarborough 
argued, “I doubt that cold war veterans and their families will appreciate the force of your 
subtle argument that, even though we may select for military service those of lesser 
financial standing, on discharge ‘the best of these’ may compete ‘equally’ with the more 
wealthy for their education.”207 Yarborough’s claims would be met with resistance from 
both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, as neither was willing to increase 
spending on veterans’ benefits beyond those in health and disability compensation. 
Teague, at the helm of the Veterans’ Affairs Committee in the house, was already 
prepared for an uphill struggle against the White House. He noted the lack of references 
to veterans or veterans’ benefits programs in the 1961 State of the Union address (and 
what he perceived to be silence on the subject of veterans during the 1960 presidential 
campaign) to his committee.208 He interpreted this lack of rhetoric as opposition to his 
committee’s active agenda, one that was becoming increasingly shaped by veteran’s 
organizations who found sympathetic legislators willing to advocate on their behalf in the 
committee. Teague told members of the committee and veterans’ organizations, in 
looking ahead to veterans’ benefit programs for those service members who had joined !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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after 1955, “We will have a tough job.”209 With a veteran’s lobby that was divided on the 
issue of extending education benefits to peacetime veterans, Teague’s committee (though 
internally united) was left in position of flux on peacetime veterans’ benefits through the 
early 1960s. Despite the diverging interests of the veterans’ groups and the difficulty that 
Yarborough and others were having in the Senate, the House committee was poised for 
action – though admitting that their demands would not be met with positive reactions 
from the White House. 
 Similarly, the VA remained unwilling to yield to lawmakers in appeals for 
support for increased veterans’ education benefits. They provided repeat testimony in 
House and Senate hearings that the extension of these benefits would be harmful to their 
broader agenda and constituency, and mirrored presidential opposition to increased 
spending for veterans who had not been in combat. By 1964, though, the Johnson 
Administration’s influence would push the VA to make a deliberate turn towards support 
for tuition and aid programs for veterans, and the agency would ultimately cooperate with 
Teague, Yarborough, and others in advancing the legislation forward. At the outset of the 
legislative process, however, the VA was unwilling to yield to legislative drives for the 
expansion of the benefits program.  
The lack of cooperation between and among members of the veterans’ benefit 
coalition is due in large part to the lack of cohesion on the issue of peacetime G.I. Bill 
benefits. Without a unifying goal for coalition members, the strain of cross-pressures 
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began to corrode the fragile structure of the coalition,210 driving members back into their 
own vested interests and out of important strategic arrangements around their common 
issue. Thus, the previous success of reforming the 1944 G.I. Bill was not sufficient to 
reify the coalition for further iterations of the reform process, as their individual interests 
eventually overshadowed their previously shared position. Moreover, the definitional 
questions about veteran status threw the coalition into debate over what constituted the 
“American veteran,”211 and a lack of consensus among members (and varying degrees of 
support for a more inclusive definition from across the coalition), further prevented 
unified action on the part of coalition members. In this way, the veterans’ benefit 
coalition’s divisions left it immobilized until the mid-1960s, as individual members found 
support in the administration and (eventually) among veterans’ organizations. 
 
Reform Strains the Coalition: The 1966 Cold War G.I. Bill 
 In earlier chapters, I argue that previous iterations of the G.I. Bill legislation 
strained the coalition through their reform process (which forced to the surface the 
conflicting interests of coalition members both in and out of the realm of veterans’ 
education benefits. The 1966 G.I. Bill was no different in this regard, though it did 
sidestep some of the more contentious debates of the 1952 legislation (centered on tuition 
vouchers) by introducing a more immediate conflict: defining the new American veteran. 
Whereas both WWII and Korea veterans held active combat experience in common, the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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peacetime veterans could not claim the same effects of active duty service as their 
predecessors. Rather, in attempting to define the new American veteran through 
compulsory service – but not necessarily combat duty – Cold War G.I. Bill supporters 
were drawing a more explicit connection between federal intervention and the mitigation 
of inequality.  
After Yarborough’s introduction of a Korea G. I. Bill extension in 1959, the 
Eisenhower Administration quickly came out in opposition to Yarborough’s proposal.212 
Eisenhower in particular was adamantly opposed to the idea that peacetime veterans 
would receive the same treatment as those that had been involved in active combat, 
telling legislative leaders that he would remain staunchly opposed to any attempts to 
include peacetime veterans into the same benefit eligibility category as combat 
veterans.213  
Eisenhower was not alone in his opposition to the peacetime veteran receiving 
education benefits. The Department of Defense also removed its support from the idea of 
veteran education provisions with the realization that such a program would adversely 
impact its ongoing Cold War operations. The DOD argued that the extension of the 
benefits would ultimately pull qualified and trained service personnel in technical fields 
out of military careers and into secondary education with guaranteed benefits.214 An 
internal 1961 White House memo reiterates that the potential damage to the armed forces 
could be severe, as education benefits would lure prospective non-commissioned officers 
and commissioned officers out of the service and into education or training programs in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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the civilian sector. More than merely changing the definition of the category of “veteran,” 
administration officials were concerned that such a benefit program would negatively 
affect the potential of the military to retain quality personnel beyond their term of 
compulsory service.215 
Senator Yarborough moved forward, undeterred. In 1959, a set of three bills were 
introduced in the Senate, only one of which (86 S. 1138) would mirror the provisions of 
the previous G.I. Bills in its structure and substance. The legislation was sponsored by 26 
senators, among them three of the five members of the Veterans’ subcommittee (of which 
Yarborough was chair). Lister Hill (D-AL), who had been a major proponent of the 1952 
Korea G.I. Bill and who chaired the Senate Labor and Public Works Committee, as also a 
cosponsor and an ally above the subcommittee level. Senator John F. Kennedy was 
another Veterans’ Committee member who signed onto the early version of the bill 
(though he would later turn away from attempts to pass the legislation as president).  
The major provision of the legislation was a combination grant and scholarship 
program to replace the original method of funding postsecondary education for veterans. 
The bill laid out a plan to make aid to peacetime veterans contingent upon either 
successful academic progression during a probationary period (after which they would 
continue to receive aid as long as they received good grades), or enrolling in in-demand 
programs (essentially earning government grants for their education in desirable fields). 
This aid structure replaced the tuition voucher system that had been created during the 
1952 bill reforms (and which itself was a corrective to the method of direct payments to 
schools in the 1944 legislation).  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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The Veterans’ subcommittee and Labor and Public Works Committee successfully 
reported it out to the full Senate. Then-Senator Lyndon Johnson called for a limited 
debate and no further amendments to S. 1138 on January 1, effectively containing the 
debate to only the provisions regarding loans to military personnel in lieu of the federal 
grant program.216 The measure passed in the Senate, though the vote was clearly down 
party lines with no Republicans voting in favor, and only 10 of the 63 Senate Democrats 
voting in opposition (though 4 did vote “present” during the roll call).217 
The bill would ultimately die in the House Veterans’ Affairs Committee due to 
resistance to the education loan structure. The VA repeatedly came out in opposition to 
the structure of the benefit program in S. 1138 (and its parallel bills in both the House and 
Senate), actively lobbying House Committee Chair Teague to reject the measure in 
committee.218 The proposed structure of the legislation was one of the major sticking 
points for House Committee members, who could not reach a consensus on the 
establishment of a new system of veterans’ education benefits (paralleling those offered 
to civilian students through higher education aid).  
The disagreements over the specific elements of S. 1138 would foreshadow a broader 
debate about peacetime military service, as a Cold War G.I. Bill took shape that more 
clearly resembled the ones passed in 1944 and 1952. The debates about the peacetime 
G.I. Bill reforms would not be resolved until the beginning of the Johnson 
Administration, at which point a new executive focus on social policy (though not !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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necessarily on ones for veterans) would present coalition members with a more 
supportive member in the White House and the rhetorical leverage they needed to frame a 
peacetime G.I. Bill as a beneficial policy for the entire country. 
 
The Conflict over Specific Reforms 
 While S. 1138 had been attached largely due to its payment structure, the 
underlying question of providing benefits to peacetime veterans would prove to be the 
more durable debate in the early 1960s, as select coalition members continued to 
advocate for a more inclusive benefit program. Only during the Johnson administration 
did coalition members find the tacit executive support they needed to move forward with 
a peacetime G.I. Bill; moreover, it would be Johnson’s Great Society initiative that would 
help form the basis for appeals to increased government expenditures for former service 
personnel (though it was potentially the blowback from other veterans’ policies that led 
to Johnson’s support of the Cold War G.I. Bill).  
After the failure of his first attempt to pass S. 1138, Senator Yarborough reached 
out to his former subcommittee member (and cosponsor on the bill), then-President John 
Kennedy, to take up the issue of peacetime veterans’ benefits. Despite the lack of interest 
on the part of the Kennedy administration to move forward with peacetime veterans’ 
benefits in 1960, Yarborough continued to apply pressure after his failed attempt to rouse 
interest in 1959 (and a shutout in the House Veterans’ Affairs Committee). In June 1961, 
he sent a call to action to White House Special Counsel Theodore Sorensen, and Special 
Assistants Lawrence O’Brien and Kenneth O’Donnell. “I think these needs more vital for 
the preservation of the liberties of this and the succeeding generations of Americans, than 
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all the other educational bills pending in the Congress combined, and I am not alone in 
the Senate in this opinion.” He closed by declaring, “I am trying to get someone in high 
executive office to listen to the facts.” [Emphasis his].219 A memo attached to the letter in 
O’Brien’s files notes, “His proposal will certainly be given careful consideration. That 
really means we will try to keep it from being adopted.”220  
In sharp contrast to the Kennedy administration’s inattention to the peacetime 
veteran benefits issue, the Johnson Administration was poised to engage with coalition 
members (if not as a full member of the coalition itself). In November 1964, Johnson 
directed then-VA Administrator J.S. Gleason to report to the White House on any 
measures that would advance the cause of the Great Society. In a memo to Special 
Assistant Bill Moyers, Gleason writes, “In light of these remarks [Johnson’s October 25, 
1964 speech221], I have re-evaluated the situation and now recommend that the President 
sponsor legislation which would extend to peacetime veterans a program of educational 
assistance patterned on that provided by the Korean G.I. Bill. Such a program would be a 
valuable and feasible step in achieving the Great Society.”222 Unlike the VA, the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare was cautious about extending full 
education benefits to the peacetime veterans in 1964. Assistant Secretary Wilbur Cohen 
(who had worked in the Social Security Administration and had a reputation as a social 
welfare reformer) noted that the proposal had “considerable merit to providing education !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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payments for ex-servicemen,” but that it should “not be a substitute for other desirable 
educational proposals (scholarships, student loans, work-study programs, etc.).”223 
Though the VA was ready to move ahead with the legislation in 1964, HEW 
administrators remained cautious about the possible spillover effects into higher 
education policy, and the potentially detrimental results for broad-based postsecondary 
education aid.  
The Johnson Administration, though willing to entertain peacetime veterans’ 
benefits as a part of its broader social policy vision, still appeared reluctant to transplant 
the veterans’ benefit system into its vision of the Great Society. In a letter to Yarborough 
in 1965, White House Associate Special Counsel Lee White noted that, while Johnson 
was aware of the Senator’s attempts to move the legislation through committee, he was 
publicly committed to universal aid in lieu of veterans-specific policies. White noted that, 
“Veterans who have served their nation should be eligible to participate in these 
[universal] programs…we are hopeful that this general approach will be favorably acted 
upon by the Congress.”224 In fact, the Bureau of the Budget was adamant that not only 
would the legislation not make economic sense within the Great Society initiative; it 
would actually further anger members of the veterans’ organizations whose attention was 
focused keenly on Johnson’s plan to reorganize (and close) several VA hospitals and 
regional care centers. 
By December 1965, Yarborough’s renewed attempt at the peacetime benefits was 
contained within S.9, and Johnson Administration officials were trying to override !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Yarborough’s influence by introducing a new (similar) bill that would keep veterans’ 
benefits within the realm of the Great Society. However, an internal memo reveals that 
Johnson’s advisors were aware that Teague would not support any bill that didn’t 
originate in his committee, and an education bill would land outside of his jurisdiction.225 
As discussed later in Section 3, Teague would move forward with his committee’s own 
version of the legislation, sidestepping the Administration’s plan and establishing a 
precedent for peacetime veterans’ benefits. 
The conflict over the Cold War G.I. Bill before its ultimate passage is reflective of 
a broader schism in the veterans’ benefit coalition. Though the White House was willing 
to entertain a peacetime veterans’ education plan, they wanted to do so through an 
expansion of HEW resources to accommodate the large number of veterans who, like 
their civilian counterparts, had not been engaged in active combat – thus reifying the idea 
that the peacetime veteran was more of a civilian than his WWII or Korea counterparts 
who had seen active combat. However, pressure from the House – combined with an 
incensed veterans’ lobby in the wake of hospital closings – eventually won out over 
Johnson’s attempts to stave off the rising tide of VA funding and instead direct the 
majority of eligible veterans to HEW higher education grants. Despite the inability of 
many coalition members to concede to each others’ policy proposals, the work of 
individual legislators once again proved decisive in extending education benefits to Cold 
War era veterans. 
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Spillover Effects: Higher Education and the Plan of the Great Society 
 While the effects of policy reform on the veterans’ benefit coalition are 
significant, the more important outcome of this process is how it shaped parallel social 
policies during the time period. Due to the vested interests of the veterans’ benefit 
coalition members, policy advocates were able to effectively siphon momentum away 
from broad-based education and training programs and instead divert significant 
budgetary resources toward the Cold War G.I. Bill. Additionally, in maintaining a 
distinction between veterans and civilians, the veterans’ benefit coalition further insulated 
its administrative capacity (through the VA) and established a precedent for veterans’ 
education benefits regardless of the type of military service. The “spillover” and 
“spillback” effects of the 1966 G.I. Bill stunted the development of the Great Society and 
further instantiated the veterans’ lobby as a powerful political force in American politics. 
 
Favoring Veterans’ Benefits over Universal Benefits  
 The Johnson Administration proposed a measure that would effectively change 
the intention of S.9 (Yarborough’s more successful iteration of the peacetime veterans’ 
education benefits legislation). It inserted a clause that would divide the peacetime 
veterans between the college assistance program (run through HEW) and the Manpower 
Development and Training Act of 1962). Drafted by HEW, the stipulation would mean 
that only 10% of the veteran cohort at the time would fall under the proposed 
legislation’s provisions (as they had been in active combat situations), while the other 
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90% would be funneled into one of the two proposed alternate tracks.226 Additionally, 
internal White House memos reveal that the Administration wanted the program to begin 
in 1963 (and not 1955, the end of the Korea G.I. Bill program eligibility).227 Teague was 
wary of the bill and had “grave reservations,” reluctant to seek presidential endorsement 
of the legislation and preferring instead to mirror the Cold War G.I. Bill on the Korea G.I. 
Bill.228 Teague moved forward in committee with H.R. 11985, which left behind all of 
the Administration’s recommendations and replicated the Korea War G.I. Bill, increasing 
the expected budget for the legislation from $100 million to $400 million.229 The Teague 
version was supported in both the House and Senate, and arrived on Johnson’s desk less 
than a month later. 
Upon signing the bill into law in March 1966, Johnson expressed his qualms 
about the Cold War G.I. Bill, noting that the legislation did in fact undermine his broader 
vision of increasing the accessibility of higher education for the broader population. 
“Well, I must be frank. I had felt that we could start the new GI program, and that we 
should, by providing special funds for soldiers who served in combat areas. Others could 
be provided opportunity grants through the Higher Education Act. In that way, I was 
hopeful that we would not ask for more than we could get, or bite off more than we could 
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chew in educational costs.”230 Although the Johnson Administration had seen Congress 
expand the veterans’ education assistance program beyond the scope that they had 
originally considered, Johnson was in no position to veto the bill (especially after the 
uproar over the consolidation of VA hospitals the previous year).  
While much of the conflict surrounding the Bill was focused between Teague and 
Johnson, the veterans’ organizations were also attempting to navigate the conflicted 
coalition by appealing to the Great Society language while still protecting their 
membership. Veterans’ groups had also couched their requests for veterans’ education 
benefits in terms reflective of broader payoffs to the American citizenry via 
postsecondary aid for veterans. AMVETS national commander Harold Bere referred to 
the renewed attention paid to America’s comparative advantage in economic and 
educational fields as a “creeping gaposis” that, while unwarranted in some fields, was 
relevant to the discussions of veterans’ benefits broader impacts. Speaking of the need for 
postsecondary aid for veterans, Bere claimed that while AMVETS was concerned 
primarily for the economic well-being of its own membership, “my secondary and 
extended thinkings [sic] relate to any justifiable opportunity which the Government has to 
intensify, to diversify, to increase, and to spread as widely as possible educational 
opportunities.” This is especially noteworthy because the AMVETS membership would 
not have been eligible to receive any of the benefits being discussed for the post-1955 
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veterans, but the organization was in favor of the extension of these benefits to the new 
veteran cohort on principle.231 
The American Legion spoke out against the proposed legislation, claiming that it 
paid the veteran less through the VA’s program than the individual would receive 
through universal HEW policies. The Legion pointed out that, under the compensation 
rates for the working version of the 1966 act, stipends for single male veterans would be 
about $100 per month; under the training program as a part of the War on Poverty, the 
stipend would be $375 per month. The Legion argued not against the training program, 
but that the veterans’ program be given more generous allowances in line with the 
civilian sector.232 
The concern on the part of the veterans’ groups was not limited to the 
establishment of peacetime benefits, though: the groups were also nervous that the Great 
Society program itself could siphon political momentum away from progress on the 
benefits front for their membership. The VFW became concerned that the Great Society 
program could wreak havoc upon the system of veterans’ benefits that had been 
established. The 1966 National Resolution noted that the Great Society encompassed a 
wide variety of benefits for the elderly and the young, but warned, “there are signposts 
along the road indicating that many long-standing veterans’ rights and benefits and 
services are in serious jeopardy of being eliminated or drastically curtailed.”233 The 
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veterans’ groups, though initially wary of the peacetime veterans’ benefit legislation, 
quickly mobilized to protect their members’ interest and advocate in favor of the plan, 
rather than submitting veterans to the universal programs that civilians were accessing.  
In all, the Johnson Administration was right to be suspicious of Teague and the 
veterans’ organizations. A powerful combination of committee leadership and veterans’ 
lobbies was able to divert significant budgetary resources away from the HEW 
postsecondary programs and toward veteran-specific legislation that mirrored its previous 
incarnations. The passage of the Cold War G.I. Bill was sufficient to prevent the planned 
expansion of HEW and the Manpower Development and Training Act, and instead shift 
more funding to the VA (which had argued for its place in the Great Society initiative 
through the G.I. Bill). Rather than a complement to universal policies (or a way to 
address a small fraction of eligible personnel), the peacetime G.I. Bill supplanted broad-
based HEW initiatives and narrowed the scope of higher education aid through its 
passage. 
 
Veterans’ Benefits and Insulation from Cross-Pressures 
 Despite coalition members’ attempts to effectively link the Great Society 
initiative to veterans’ education benefits, the two policy spheres remained jurisdictionally 
distinct following the 1966 bill. Though, as in the past, calls to better integrate parallel 
programs between HEW and the VA were made by various administrators, coalition 
members helped insulate veterans’ education benefits from any attempts to change their 
centralized administration (through the VA). Thus, the actual administration of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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veterans’ education benefit system was what remained truly removed from any 
reorganization attempts or growing support for addressing inequality through 
government-backed education initiatives. This protection of the VA and its system of 
benefits fits within the concept of “spillback,” or the prevention of similar policies 
through deliberate policy action in a related sphere.  
The most vocal opponents of proposals to move the veterans’ education benefits 
program into HEW were the veterans’ groups, who has similarly resisted these attempts 
during past periods of legislative reform (in 1952). Discussions of moving veterans’ 
reintegration programs drew ire from the veterans’ organizations, especially the longest 
standing groups. Robert E. Hansen, Commander in Chief of the VFW, testified before the 
House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs that the VFW would “resist to the last man taking 
away veterans programs from the Veterans’ Administration.”234 Likewise, the DAV 
“utterly and fundamentally” resisted any attempts to move veterans’ programs out to the 
jurisdiction of other departments under the potential reorganizing force of the Great 
Society initiative.235  
The veterans’ groups at this point were the most powerful proponents of the VA 
and its administrative capacity, though prior to the development of the 1966 act their 
interests had diverged sharply from those of the Administration. Though veterans’ groups 
were more willing to consider the potential for peacetime education benefits than the VA 
was, they were still reluctant to move individual programs out from under the VA’s !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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oversight, for fear that any leverage that they had in determining the administration of 
veterans’ policies would disintegrate.  
Much as in the case of the 1952 G.I. Bill reform, legislative recommendations for 
the VA to release some of its authority over the veterans’ education benefits program 
were sharply opposed by veterans’ organizations. While this opposition represents a 
relatively weak test of the groups’ influence in protecting the veterans’ benefit program 
(since the suggestions for HEW control never went beyond issues raised in Congressional 
hearings), the fact that the VA could not be seriously threatened by attempts to dismantle 
its administrative capacity is in itself evidence of the VA’s durability in the face of 
threats to its power – and, as a corollary, the benefit system that it was charged with 
maintaining.  
 
Conclusion 
 Overall, the case of the 1966 G.I. Bill reveals important connections between the 
policy reform process and the understudied feedback process that can result. By 
analyzing relevant archival materials from different actors involved in the policy process, 
I am able to analyze a variety of perspectives on a singular process and identify potential 
coalitional disagreements or strategic choices.  
 Here it is important to note that there is partial support for each of the three 
hypotheses derived earlier: the process of reforming the G.I. Bill for peacetime veterans 
did in fact reveal a fragile coalition (that was further strained by the policy development 
process). This unstable coalition was, however, able to siphon political momentum (and 
actual material resources) away from broad-based higher education programs and 
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maintain the separate jurisdiction of the VA over veterans’ education affairs (even for 
those veterans who had not served in active combat). 
 In expanding the G.I. Bill’s education provisions to peacetime veterans, veterans’ 
benefit coalition members made critical changes to both public policy and American 
political culture. In the policy realm, the 1966 G.I. Bill’s supporters increased the scope 
of veterans’ education benefits beyond the original intention of the 1944 or 1952 
iterations of the legislation. They also managed to prevent a substantial increase in the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and maintain the power of the VA in 
keeping the entire program of veterans’ benefits for American service personnel distinct 
from social policies for civilians. 
 Moreover, the establishment of the 1966 G.I. Bill signaled an important 
conceptual turning point in American politics. The reality of compulsory service meant 
that every veteran was now entitled to the host of benefits formerly reserved only for 
those who had been involved in American military engagements. This would prove to be 
an important precedent as the country became entangled in warfare in Vietnam and (soon 
after) lifted the compulsory service obligation. Counting peacetime veterans as American 
veterans – without asterisks or qualifiers – would set the stage for the next iteration of 
veterans’ benefit legislation, and one that would test the strength of the veterans’ benefit 
coalition – and the extent of its influence – in a way it had not yet experienced. 
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CHAPTER 5  
THE VIETNAM ERA G.I. BILL AND CONGRESSIONAL TRIUMPH  
 
“That place was cold, man,” commented a Vietnam veteran to a reporter, when 
asked about his experience with the Veterans’ Administration after seeking G.I. Bill 
benefits in a VA office.236 Indeed, the veterans of the Vietnam era would be faced with a 
societal reintegration process that was backed by less generous education benefit 
programs than what their WWII or Korean War peers had encountered. Veterans’ 
education benefits as of the late 1960s had stagnated, remaining at approximately $100 
per month for a single veteran, which veterans’ groups argued was not sufficient to keep 
pace with rising tuition and education costs.237 However divided the public was 
concerning the rationale or process of the war, the political pressure for education 
benefits for veterans remained a constant. Vietnam veterans would ultimately receive 
comparable benefits to those veterans of older generations, and would have only the 
formidable veterans’ benefit coalition to thank for this political victory.  
The story of the 1972 Vietnam Era G.I. Bill actually encompasses two decisive 
political victories on the part of the veterans’ benefit coalition: an increase in education 
allowance benefits in 1970, and the subsequent additional increase under the 1972 
legislation. In both cases, the White House resisted the Congressional pressure for 
increasing spending for the VA at the outset, ultimately acquiescing to the increased 
education provisions under Congressional pressure. Interestingly, the 1972 G.I. Bill case !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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presents the first in which the veterans’ benefit legislation appeared to have little 
influence on concurrent higher education legislation (namely, the amendments to the 
Higher Education Act of 1965 that occurred in 1972, establishing Title IX).  
 This chapter focuses on the political maneuvering between the veterans’ benefit 
coalition and the Nixon Administration between 1968 and 1972. In both the 1970 and 
1972 battles over veteran’s education benefits, Congress would once again move to the 
foreground as the driving factor within the passage of the bills; namely, individual 
legislators with previous success in the realm of veteran’s benefits would continue their 
push for more government provisions for returning military personnel. Their own 
electoral interests to satisfy veterans in their districts, combined with their past successes 
and reputations for popular veterans’ benefit legislation – would drive these legislators’ 
actions within the House and Senate. Despite the presence of veterans’ organizations and 
a new membership cohort of Vietnam era veterans to recruit, legislators were still the 
major policy entrepreneurs in the realm of veterans’ education benefits. By the time of 
the 1972 legislation, the veterans’ benefit coalition was distilled down into two main 
allied groups of Congressional leaders (both Republican and Democrat) and veterans’ 
organizations.  
While previous iterations of the veterans’ benefit coalition had featured a more 
diverse and potentially divisive set of entities, the coalition of the 1970s bore little 
resemblance to that heterogeneous and complex dynamic. After several successes in the 
realm of veterans’ education benefits, the veterans’ benefit coalition was strong, unified 
– and, perhaps most importantly, a strong alliance between key legislators and the 
growing veterans’ lobbying groups. Key members of Congress would maximize the 
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political utility of the popular G.I. Bill program to maintain favor with a critical voting 
bloc, and also continue their personal legislative agendas in the field of veterans’ 
reintegration opportunities. As I argue in Chapters 2 and 3, the veterans’ benefit 
coalition’s composition following the 1944 G.I. Bill was tilted much less in favor of 
veterans’ group action, and more towards the entrepreneurship of individual legislators 
with ties to veterans’ legislation. 
This chapter begins with an overview of the political context at the outset of the 
Nixon Administration, as well as the composition of the veterans’ benefit coalition. 
Beginning first with the political fight over the 1970 education allowance increases, I 
outline the tenuous relationship between Nixon’s promises to the nation’s veterans, and 
his desires (and those of his party) to hold firm against the excessive government 
spending of the Johnson Administration’s Great Society. This first battle sets the stage 
for the 1972 Veteran Readjustment Assistance Act, and helps explain the continued 
victory of the veterans’ benefit coalition in expanding the veterans’ education benefit 
program. Taken together, these two legislative contests provide clear evidence of not 
only the influence of the veterans’ benefit coalition, but most importantly, how 
individual legislators were able to lead not only their fellow party or even committee 
members, but the veterans’ groups themselves on formulating legislation that would 
provide postsecondary education access to millions of returning veterans. 
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Johnson, Nixon, and Vietnam: Changes in the Veterans’ Benefit Coalition 
 In one of his final public addresses, President Lyndon Johnson noted that both 
President-Elect Richard Nixon and Vice President-Elect Spire Agnew were veterans, and 
that he had faith that they would continue the record of success (or at least, success as 
the veterans’ benefit coalition had defined it – that the Johnson Administration had.238 
The 1968 Democratic Party platform noted the increase in GI Bill benefits for Vietnam 
veterans, passed by what the platform described as an “education-minded Democratic 
Congress.”239 While the Republican platform made no mention of veterans’ education 
benefits, the growing issue of returning veterans was not one that the GOP – or their 
newly-elected president – could easily ignore. That same year, the New York Times 
reported, “The Veterans Administration is doing a brisk business in G.I. Bill benefits for 
Vietnam era veterans who are returning to civilian life at an average rate of 70,000 a 
month.”240 This “brisk business” would need to be sustained by an administration that 
was willing to continue increasing outlays for veterans’ benefit programs and, ideally, 
one that would be able to work better with the veterans’ benefit coalition than the 
Johnson Administration had been able to.  
However, during Nixon’s first term, the Administration faced concurrent 
inflation and a rising unemployment rate, pulling much of the White House’s attention 
toward federal spending and job creation programs.241 Meanwhile, the veteran 
population in the country was booming. Vietnam veterans were returning at the rate of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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about one million per year between 1969 and 1972 and increasingly laying pressure on 
the VA’s education programs to help the bridge the gap between military service and 
civilian life. 242 By 1972, there were over 28 million veterans in the United States – a 
combination of WWII, Korea, and Vietnam veterans produced by the draft and 
America’s military interventions.243 This veteran population would become increasingly 
politically important to the Nixon Administration, and would, at the same time, be the 
cause of much strife between the White House and Congress (and even within the 
Republican Party). The veterans’ benefit coalition would represent this new cohort of 
Vietnam veterans, and would force Nixon to make critical decisions in his first term in 
office. Nixon’s strategy was a marked difference from the way in which Johnson dealt 
with the veterans’ benefit coalition, and the debates over the G.I. Bill in the late 1960s 
would establish the framework within which the veterans’ benefit coalition would 
attempt to address the returning Vietnam War veteran cohort.  
 
Johnson and Congress: The Afterglow of the 1966 G.I. Bill 
Toward the end of President Johnson’s final term, he began to express more 
unqualified support for increased veterans’ education benefits. Such a change in rhetoric 
is surprising given his resistance to the 1966 Cold War G.I. Bill, but in his message to 
Congress on January 31, 1967, Johnson recommended an increase in the educational 
allowance from $100 to $130 per month.244 It would be this recommendation to which 
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veterans groups like the DAV would later refer as their policy proposals for returning 
Vietnam veterans.245 He would later relax his pressure for education benefits somewhat, 
preferring to focus more on veteran healthcare and hospitalization, an area that had 
proved thorny for him during the debate over the 1966 G.I. Bill. In January 1968, 
Johnson, in a special message to Congress, called on legislators to do more for job 
placement and health (didn’t specifically mention increases to GI Bill funding).246 It 
would ultimately be the Nixon Administration that would be tasked with addressing the 
rising disparity between veterans’ education benefits and postsecondary education costs, 
though Johnson’s public support for increased benefits provided veterans’ groups with 
presidential support late in his final term. Upon signing in education extensions to 
widows of service members under HR 16025 (PL 82 Stat. 1331) in October 1968, 
Johnson remarked that it was a “veterans bill – yes. But most important of all, an 
education bill that will not only recognize the veterans’ service, but will enrich the 
Nation that he fought and gave his blood to protect.” In his remarks, he also mentioned 
two key members of the veterans’ benefit coalition – Senator Yarborough and 
Representative Teague – as critical to the cause of veterans’ education benefits writ 
large.247  
Teague and Yarborough would continue to be instrumental to the cause of 
veterans from their positions within Congress, though their experiences negotiating the 
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1966 G.I. Bill had somewhat strained their working relationship. Though the two shared 
in common their experience as veterans and the same constituency groups in Texas, 
Teague’s desire for increased benefits for veterans was tempered somewhat by his fiscal 
conservatism.248 Yarborough, meanwhile, was becoming more openly critical of the 
Vietnam War (of both Johnson and, eventually, Nixon’s handling of the conflict) and 
more willing to back sweeping legislation for service members.249  
 
The Veterans’ Groups Begin to Mobilize for the Vietnam Veteran 
Beginning in 1967, the veterans’ groups began paying increasing attention to the 
issue of returning Vietnam veterans and the applicability of the Cold War G.I. Bill to 
these new veterans’ academic pursuits. The veterans’ groups were unified in their 
concern over the gap between rising education costs and the static payment structure 
offered to veterans for education expenses, but none of the groups had offered a defined 
proposal as to their policy preference. 
In testimony before the House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, American 
Legion National Commander John Davis noted that the benefits paid to veterans through 
the 1966 legislation were not keeping pace with the dramatic increases in college tuition 
that had occurred since the Korea War legislation had been considered. Davis noted the 
figures from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare that suggested that 
postsecondary education expenses had risen 45% in public institutions, and nearly 62% 
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in private schools.250 While he conceded that education alone wouldn’t “do the whole 
job,” in terms of reintegrating veterans back into society, the Legion remained 
committed to the principle of increasing benefits for Vietnam veterans.251 AMVETS 
leaders remarked that the GI Bill had once been perceived as a “giveaway program,” but 
in reality proved the ability of the VA to administer a broad-scale education program 
alongside other veterans’ assistance programs, and as such deserved to be repeated for a 
new cohort of veterans.252  
 The Veterans of Foreign Wars articulated their support in the broader context of 
past victories for veterans through the prior iterations of the G.I. Bill. The VFW’s 
national resolutions of 1969 mentioned that the education allowances were “for years the 
high-water makers of a constructive and progressive society. These programs have 
shown the way. This, they must continue to…The merit of sound, valued, social 
programs for all citizens, that are underway now, should not be permitted to subordinate 
nor submerge the nation’s commitment to its veterans.”253 The VFW’s recognition of the 
inherent national value of the veterans’ education benefit program would not be echoed 
by the rest of the major veterans’ organizations, as they groups pushed to further detach 
veterans from the Great Society programs of the 1960s and retain them in a protected 
class (administered solely by the VA). However, in sharp contrast to the effects of G.I. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Bill reform noted in Chapters 2 and 3, the 1972 G.I. Bill’s legislative process does not 
appear to have created consequences for parallel education programs at the time. The 
veterans’ groups, however, were still guarded about the potential for moving veterans 
into the jurisdiction of other bureaucratic agencies from prior G.I. Bill battles. 
 It was only the Disabled American Veterans who offered specific policy 
proposals in their remarks to Congress concerning veterans’ education benefits. The 
DAV supported an increase in the education assistance allowances by 30%, from $100 
to $130 per month, for all veterans regardless of service-connected disability. Moreover, 
the DAV wanted to amend the education benefit eligibility guidelines – under 1952 
Korea G.I. Bill, a veteran could receive 1.5 days of education per day of service; under 
the 1966 law, the compensation was one month of education per month of service. The 
DAV explicitly recommended in their national guidelines that all Cold War veterans 
(that is, anyone who served after the January 1, 1955 deadline for inclusion under the 
Korea G.I. Bill) should be covered under the 1.5/1 ratio outlined in the 1952 
legislation.254 These early proposals would become the basis of the policy provisions that 
would be debated in 1970, and again in 1972, concerning how best to compensate 
Vietnam veterans. 
The position of the veterans’ benefit coalition heading into 1969 was beginning 
to take shape. Veterans’ groups, increasingly aware of the potential membership swell 
due to returning Vietnam veterans, combined with media acknowledgement of the 
increased pressure of these veterans, were positioned to look for increases in education 
payments. No longer concerned with validating the position of the veteran (as they had !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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been in 1952 and 1966), the groups were now more clearly focused on making the 
existing programs more generous. Likewise, the Johnson Administration had softened its 
position slightly on veteran’s benefits though, in handing over the White House to the 
Nixon Administration, the role of the President in the veterans’ benefit coalition was 
unclear. Would Nixon embrace his campaign promises of fiscal conservatism and try to 
reign in VA spending, or would he be forced to acknowledge the popularity of the G.I. 
Bill as an institution and continue to renew its promises for the newest group of 
veterans? Ultimately, though, the two most important architects of the Cold War G.I. 
Bill remained in Congress, and Teague and Yarborough were now adept at dealing with 
one another and their respective committees. Their respective reputations as champions 
for veterans’ benefit legislation preceded them, and their vested interest in reforming the 
G.I. Bill appeared grounded in their past legislative successes and the perception of both 
as strong advocates for veterans’ benefits.255 The fight for education allowance increases 
in 1970 would be the first test that the veterans’ benefit coalition had faced since the 
1966 G.I. Bill, and one that ultimately paved a notably smoother path for the 1972 
version of the legislation than the coalition had previously enjoyed. 
 
The 1970 Education Benefit Increases and Nixon’s Predicament 
 As the Vietnam veteran cohort grew, the White House would be forced to respond 
to the pressure of the veterans’ benefit coalition to make substantive changes to existing 
policies, especially given the rising unemployment and inflation rates of Nixon’s first 
term in office. Nixon’s response revealed his attempt to mitigate the influence of the 
coalition by attempting to stall them, before turning toward his fellow Republican on the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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House Veterans’ Committee (Teague) to try to salvage the Administration’s stance 
against federal spending. The influence of the veterans’ groups in national policy areas, 
combined with the White House’s knowledge of the importance of veterans in electoral 
contests, ultimately drove the Nixon Administration to bend to the pressure of the 
veterans’ benefit coalition in 1970. Nixon’s predicament over his handling of the 
education allowance increases became the policy window that veterans’ supporters 
needed to make the changes they had been hoping for since the end of the Johnson 
Administration. 
 By the summer of 1969, the Nixon Administration was fielding increasing 
pressure from veterans’ groups for expanded education and healthcare benefits. In 
response to calls by the major national groups (such as the VFW and Legion), Nixon 
appointed a new VA administrator with strong Legion ties to replace William Driver. 
Donald Johnson was the former Legion national commander, and had lobbied before 
Congress for the 1966 G.I. Bill, among other pieces of legislation.256 News media began 
to question the ability of Johnson to actively restrain the requests of the veterans’ groups, 
as requests for expansion of medical services and increased education allowances further 
added to the “bloated veterans budget…among a multitude of new proposals that clearly 
are not related to sacrifices made on behalf of a nation at war.” The New York Times 
suggested that, “the new Administrator’s background as a spokesman for an organization 
that has repeatedly made intemperate demands on the public treasury in the name of 
veterans is not encouraging.”257 One of Nixon’s first actions with Johnson at the helm of 
the VA was to create a special commission to study the veterans’ budget, in the hopes of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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preserving his intention of curbing spending while appeasing veterans’ organizations’ 
interests.258 
In June 1969, Nixon called for the development of the President’s Committee on 
the Vietnam Veteran, claiming in a public address that: 
Veterans benefit programs…have become an investment in the future of 
the veteran and of his country. The time has come for a careful 
reevaluation of this investment. Just as there is a difference between the 
kinds of battles fought in Normandy in 1944 and in South Vietnam in 
1969, so there is also a difference in the kinds of problems faced by the 
returning veterans of these battles. Therefore, we must be certain our 
programs are tailored to meet the needs of today's veterans.259 
 
Nixon’s attempts to moderate the influence of the veterans’ benefit coalition by delaying 
action with an exploratory committee were not sufficient to prevent the veterans’ groups 
and Congress from realizing their own vision for the future of the G.I. Bill program. The 
issue of the education allowance – the payments made to veterans attending 
postsecondary institutions to aid them with expenses – would become the focal point of 
the veterans’ benefit coalition that year. The pressure to increase these assistance 
payments would come from all members of the coalition, leaving the Nixon 
Administration to make difficult decisions about their reactions to the push for increased 
benefits.  
 
The Veterans’ Benefit Coalition and Internal Motivations 
At the helm of the push for increased education assistance payments for veterans, 
much as he was during the fight over the Cold War G.I. Bill, was Texas Senator Ralph 
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Yarborough (a full discussion of his efforts with the legislation can be found in Chapter 
3). Yarborough was galvanized by his success with the 1966 Cold War G.I. Bill and 
what he perceived as a pending victory in the upcoming 1970 elections (for his third 
term as senator). Yarborough was appointed chair of the Senate Committee on Labor 
and Public Welfare, and was widely recognized for championing various causes of 
health and public assistance in the Great Society tradition.260 In testimony concerning 
S338 (the Senate version of the education allowance increase legislation, offering a 46% 
increase in subsidy payments for veterans), Yarborough proclaimed, “It took 8 years to 
pass [the Cold War G.I. Bill]. I have been in the Senate 12 years. It was the longest, 
hardest fight of my service, because in those 8 years I had the opposition of the three 
Presidents with whom I served, of every Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs, and, most 
of all, the Defense Department and the Bureau of the Budget.”261 Yarborough’s impetus 
for championing the cause of the Vietnam veterans was at once based in past success, as 
well as his impending reelection in Texas – a state with an increasingly discontented 
electorate in the wake of Civil Rights legislation, represented by an explicitly liberal 
Democrat (which would ultimately turn away from Yarborough in the 1970 election).262 
Yarborough’s attempts to build a strong coalition in favor of an expanded veteran’s 
education benefit system was as much a function of his bid for reelection and the 
popularity of veterans’ benefits,263 as it was his own personal experience with the Cold 
War G.I. Bill. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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In testimony before the House VAC, the leadership of the various veterans’ 
organizations focused on the alternate legislation (11925) as a more realistic proposition 
than the Teague bill. The DAV was more willing to place its support what it identified as 
a more “liberal” provision in light of the rising costs of higher education;264 similarly, 
the American Veterans’ Commission endorsed HR 11925 because it would bring the 
House version of the legislation more in line with Yarborough’s plans for increased 
provisions in the Senate.265  
The other major veterans’ groups soon followed in step, providing a unified 
veterans’ organization voice in favor of increasing the assistance payments for veterans 
in college. AMVETS offered its support for the bill, though, as in the case of the 1966 G. 
I. Bill, its membership did not stand to reap the same benefits as the newest cohort of 
veterans.266 The American Legion, which had offered tempered support for the Cold 
War G.I. bill initially, also swung its support behind HR 11925.267 The VFW’s 
leadership claimed that the original intent of the 1944 G.I. Bill – to provide college 
educations to returning service members – was not being realized in the current form of 
the Cold War G.I. Bill provisions: “the GI Bill helps, but the veteran is hurting.” 
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Alongside the rest of the veterans’ groups, the VFW offered its endorsement of the more 
generous assistance plan.268  
 Thus, at least at the outset of the negotiations over increased education payments 
for veterans, the major coalition members in the Senate (Yarborough and, to a lesser 
extent, his colleague Alan Cranston) were able to set the agenda for the discussions of 
provisions for increased allowances in the House. Though Teague’s original plan in HR 
11959 was less generous, he would be forced to meet Yarborough on his – and the 
veterans’ groups – new terms. 
 
The Legislative Process and Conflict in Congress 
On June 9, 1969, just days after Nixon’s announcement of his Vietnam Veteran 
task force, Teague and Brown introduced HR 11959 in the House, and it was referred to 
the House VAC.269 The bill offered an increase the rates of education assistance under 
Chapters 31, 34, and 35 of Title 38, United States Code. Ch. 34 is directly related to 
those who have served in the military since January 1, 1955 – or out of the eligible group 
for the Korea War veteran’s benefits.270 Adair noted that the previous GI Bills had made 
the veteran population “better educated, better able to command higher wages.”271 
Just days after being sworn in as Administrator of the VA, Johnson appeared before the 
House VAC on June 25 to testify on several measures relevant to returning veterans, one 
of which being HR 11959. Johnson mentioned the VA’s investigation into the veterans’ 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
268 Statement of Francis Stover, Director, National Legislative Service, Veterans of Foreign Wars of the 
United States. House Subcommittee on Veterans’ Affairs Hearing on 11959 (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 1969), 1922. 
269 Boulton, “A Price on Freedom.” 
270 Congressional Record, United States House of Representatives, August 4, 1969, 22073 
271 Ibid., 22079 
 152! !
education program, citing it as a reason to move slowly in considering any additional 
increases in veterans’ education allowances. The VA “study” was meant to help stall for 
an Administration response to the growing push for HR 11959. Donald Johnson 
expressed hesitation before the House Veterans’ Affairs Committee at moving too 
quickly on the issue of increased funding for education allowances, advocating instead 
that the House wait for the report of the President’s Task Force before moving forward 
with specific provisions.272 
 
Nixon’s Reaction and an Intermediate Veteran Victory 
On August 3, 1969, Olin Teague moved to suspend the rules and pass HR 11959. 
Two thirds voted in favor of the motion to suspend the rules and the bill was passed with 
its amendments, 404-0.273 Numerous representatives took to the floor during debate on 
the measure, citing the need for increasing veterans’ education benefits as a means to 
spur growth in the higher education sector and potentially increase veterans’ 
participation in the G.I. Bill program (to further validate the policy’s usefulness in the 
current era). The House’s measure was clearly more generous than the provisions 
considered by the White House, and the House was, as Boulton argues, “very self-
satisfied.”274 
In early September, Kenneth Cole summed up the White House’s situation 
succinctly for Deputy Assistant to the President Darrell Trent: “The whole problem boils 
down to this. The Administration does not have an offensive program for veterans. The 
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offense has been seized by Olin Teague, and the Veterans Administrator, Don Johnson, 
feels that he has been left at the post.” Cole explained further that the White House was 
unable to bolster any VA claims to legislative development on the education allowance 
issue, because doing so would place Nixon in a difficult position: he would have to 
backpedal on this position regarding reining in expenditures in FY 1970.275 
In the meantime, the rest of the Nixon Administration was beginning to weight in 
on the viability of the veterans’ education allowance increases. In early September 1969, 
the HEW sent a memo to Nixon adviser Stephen Hess that apprised him of the 
comparisons between HR 11959 and the Yarborough legislation, noting that the 
Yarborough plan offered an additional increase of $30 per month (over HR 11959’s 
$165 proposal). The memo cited that Cranston, chairing the subcommittee of the Labor 
and Public Welfare Senate Committee, was “strongly for” the Yarborough bill and 
complementary legislation that would provide additional grants to postsecondary schools 
for disabled veterans.276 At the same time, VFW leadership was meeting with White 
House officials. A memo to Bryce Harlow (Counselor to the President and a trusted 
Nixon adviser) mentioned that the VFW was concerned about veterans being “lumped in 
with ‘welfare’ cases” and with Nixon’s seeming intractability on the issue of increases to 
veterans’ education allowances up for debate in Congress.277 
 By October, the Nixon Administration was beginning to voice more strident 
opposition to the legislation, at least internally. The Bureau of the Budget warned the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
275 Memo from Kenneth Cole to Darell Trent. September 3, 1969. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, 
WHCF Veterans Affairs, Box 7, Folder EX VA 3 Educational Programs [1969-1970]. 
276 Memo from Office of the Secrtary, HEW, to Stephen Hess. September 8, 1969. Richard Nixon 
Presidential Library, WHCF – Subject Files – FG233, Box 1, Veterans Administration 7-1-69-12-31-69, 
folder 2 of 2. 
277 Memo from A. P. Toner to Bryce Harlow, et al. September 5, 1969. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, 
WHCF – Subject Files – FG233, Box 1, Veterans Administration 7-1-69-12-31-69, folder 2 of 2. 
 154! !
White House about the potential for the increased education allowances to “strain further 
the credibility of the President’s commitment” to holding federal outlays firm (at about 
$193 billion) in FY1970. The BOB warned that, “together with other budget overruns, 
these amount simply cannot be accommodated within the budget as presently 
planned…the Veterans Administration is not now in a position [emphasis original]” to 
absorb the costs of the increased allowances by forcing them to cut in other program 
areas.278 Nixon adviser Arthur Burns explicitly warned Nixon of the potential 
developments in Congress. He noted that the President was likely to receive a “costly 
bill” sometime in November, and that he needed to make a decision about how to best 
address the proposed increases in the education allowances. Burns warned, “Continued 
silence may be construed as acquiescence. Our Republican colleagues in Congress will 
then believe that they are free to do whatever they feel is in their own best interests. This 
process has already taken place in the House and may soon take place in the Senate.” He 
further argued that, while holding firm on a position of no increases would increase 
Nixon’s credibility in holding firm against inflation, doing so would not be likely to 
mesh with Congress’ willingness to make increases in line with education costs. 
Attempting to propose an increase that would come in below the Congressional 46% 
level would “be popular with the Congress but it would make a mockery of your fight 
against inflation.”279 
 On October 21, 1969, Nixon sent a letter to Yarborough and appealed to him for 
help reining in the House measure, which he argued would increase benefits beyond the 
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cost of living increases or the increase in education costs since the 1967 measure signed 
in by Johnson.280 After receiving the letter from Nixon, Yarborough called a press 
conference to discuss Nixon’s letter with the press.281 The following week, Johnson 
reported to the White House on the “G.I. Bill Allowance Hassle,” claiming that Teague 
has discussed publicly in the media that Nixon should not be “so naïve as to expect a bill 
with less than the 27-percent voted by the House.”282  
By November, the VA and White House expected that Teague would call up HR 
11959, agree to the Senate amendment, and send it back to the Senate for a vote.283 
Teague, however, was willing to work with the White House on keeping the increase in 
educational allowances as low as possible. In a memo from Deputy Counselor Richard 
Burress to Bryce Harlow, Burress noted that he had met with Teague, who was 
amendable to “holding the line,” provided he had “some assistance.” Teague asked the 
White House to signal disapproval of the Yarborough plan, so that Teague could push 
for acceptance of the House version. Teague conveyed to Burress that doing so would 
mean that Senate would push for a conference, which Teague noted would “not be an 
easy one.”284 The White House was attempting to remain relatively uninvolved in the 
issue, hoping that Teague would be able to hold out in the House and push the measure !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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into the second session, effectively reducing some of its momentum. However, Richard 
Burress noted that, while Republican John Saylor (a committee member) was willing to 
tow the Republican line and resist large increases in education payments, fellow 
Republican Teague would probably allow the measure to pass, carrying the other 
Republican members of the committee along with him.285  
 In December 1969, Nixon reached out the House and Senate leadership, appealing 
to them to curb spending given the increase in veterans’ program spending.286 The 
matter would not be resolved by the end of the year, however, pushing the battle well 
into the following winter. In early 1970, Nixon’s budget address to Congress outlined 
the 1971 FY budget, with over 40% of federal outlays dedicated to “human resources,” 
including the Great Society programs and veterans’ benefits.287 In a memo from Kenneth 
Cole to John Erlichman, Cole positioned the VA to formulate a report for Nixon the 
political cost and benefit analysis of vetoing HR 11959 (in whatever format the 
conference committee would eventually release it). Cole told Erlichman that Teague was 
still attempting to “hold out for his 30.8% increase versus the 46% increase 
recommended by the Senate.”288 In a memo to Richard Burress, Bryce Harlow 
contended that the Republican conferees were unwilling to back the 35% increase, which 
kept the Democrats from moving up from the 30.8% increase offered by the House, and 
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the 46% increase that the Senate was promoting.289  
The White House’s unwillingness to come out with a definitive stance on some 
level of increase to the education assistance payments began to attract negative attention 
from the veterans’ groups. Bryce Harlow warned Darrell Trent that the veterans’ groups 
were becoming agitated with the White House for its resistance to increasing education 
benefits. Harlow ominously warned that a veto would mean, “there will be blood knee 
deep running down Constitution Avenue. I think this problem needs urgent attention. 
The President requires the support of these groups on the ABM fight.”290 
 Ehrlichman (an Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs) knew that the cost 
of vetoing HR 11959 would go far beyond the veterans’ benefit programs. In a memo to 
Nixon after the bill was out of conference, Ehrlichman argued that a veto would risk 
other key Administration agenda items by isolating the middle class (composed of 
veterans and their families), key members of Congress who had thrown their support 
behind the education increases, and the veterans’ organizations whose support, 
Ehrlichman claimed, “is vital in the legislative battle over the ABM system and other 
key legislative proposals.”291  
Further, it would give the White House an “anti-education image,” and with broad 
bipartisan support, any veto would be overridden anyway. Though vetoing the measure 
would “have a moderating effect of Congressional handling of other pending legislation 
that may exceed Administration spending requests,” Ehrlichman and Johnson concurred 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
289 Memo from Richard Burress to Bryce Harlow. February 24, 1970. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, 
WHCF Veterans Affairs, Box 7, Folder EX VA 3 Educational Programs [1969-1970]. 
290 Memo from Darrell Trenth to Bryce Harlow. February 13, 1970. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, 
WHCF Veterans Affairs, Box 7, Folder EX VA 3 Educational Programs [1969-1970]. 
291 Memo from Bryce Harlow to President Nixon. March 24, 1970. Richard Nixon Presidential Library, 
WHCF Veterans Affairs, Box 7, Folder EX VA 3 Educational Programs [1969-1970]. 
 158! !
that the effects would ultimately be disastrous for the Administration.292 While many of 
his advisors were in agreement, Bryce Harlow dissented, arguing that Nixon should 
instead veto it symbolically (expecting it to be overridden). Harlow told the President “I 
am afraid this action will cost the President heavily later this year.”293 
 In early March 1970, VA chief Donald Johnson warned Nixon and his staff that 
Congress was considering further increasing the allowances to veterans under the G.I. 
Bill provisions, warning that their proposals included “increases the President might 
view excessive.” Johnson further noted that the Senate was “on the higher side” with a 
proposed increase of nearly 46% over the existing educational allowances for single 
veterans without dependents.294 The Nixon Administration, faced with increasing 
concerns about the viability of pushing ahead on the ABM without the support of the 
veterans’ groups, was now backed into a corner: moving in favor of increased education 
payments made Nixon backtrack on his promises to rein in federal spending in FY1970, 
and also to stem the growing tide of federal intervention that had been constructed 
within the Great Society. However, taking an opposing stance to the increased benefits 
was increasingly less of a choice for the Administration. The only viable option left in 
mid-March 1970 was a veto – one that would, in all likelihood, anger the same veterans’ 
groups that Nixon was looking to court for support on his ABM legislation. Nixon 
reluctantly signed the bill into law on March 26, 1970, granting the veterans’ benefit 
coalition a major victory, pushing education allowances up nearly three times what the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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White House had originally advocated. 
However, not all of the members of the veterans’ benefit coalition benefitted 
equally from the passage of the legislation. Yarborough in particular was unable to 
leverage the success of the legislation into an election victory in 1970, and was defeated 
in the Democratic primaries by challenger Lloyd Bentsen.295 While the veterans’ 
organizations celebrated their legislative victory, the coalition would lose one of their 
most important allies in the Senate. Additionally, Teague’s inability to hold the 
Administration’s line on the amount of benefit increases was indicative of the broader 
trend of the House VAC. Though the White House had attempted to use Teague as their 
last line of defense against a major increase in payments – and, to an even greater extent, 
maintain a semblance of neutrality while not making it seem as if Congress had a free 
pass from the President – Teague alone was not in a position to keep the other members 
of the veterans’ benefit coalition in line.  
The Nixon Administration’s attempts to stunt the power of the veterans’ benefit 
coalition also cost the White House a certain amount of credibility when it came to his 
ability to negotiate with Congressional leaders and the veterans’ groups. Nixon had 
originally proposed that the allowance be increased by 13%, but signed HR 11959 
accepting the 34.6% increase as “reasonable,” in the words of press secretary Ronald L. 
Ziegler.296 It would be this electoral battle that would set the stage for the 1972 G.I. Bill 
debate – one that would once again move the rising costs of higher education to the 
forefront, though with a decidedly less contentious political fight over how best to 
address the problem. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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The 1972 G.I. Bill: Further Expansions of Veterans’ Education Program Benefits 
 Unlike the political contest over the 1970 allowance increases, the impetus behind 
the 1972 G.I. Bill was actually ensuring that the program was reaching its maximum 
eligible population. A newfound focus on the utilization rates of the G.I. Bill pushed 
members of the veterans’ benefit coalition into action, to protect the popular approval of 
their program and to continue pacing increases in veterans’ benefits with rising inflation. 
Also unlike the 1970 legislative process, the White House had learned its lessons from 
its battles with veterans’ supporters. Rather than direct opposition or looming threats of a 
veto, the White House endorsed increases more in line with the Congressional requests 
(and those of the veterans’ groups), making negotiations proceed at a much quicker pace. 
The negotiations concerning education increases drew attention to the difference 
in education benefit utilization rates among Vietnam veterans. Only approximately 25% 
of those veterans who were eligible for the new G.I. Bill benefits were utilizing the 
program, a statistic that dismayed many in the VA and the public. Especially 
troublesome was the fact that the veterans most disproportionately affected were racial 
minorities and those from lower socioeconomic brackets; additionally, an increasing 
number of under-education veterans had not completed high school and were ineligible 
for postsecondary tuition assistance.297 In his 1972 State of the Union address, Nixon 
mentioned the G.I. Bill increases, but spent more time discussing the role of employment 
programs and the necessity to assist veterans’ in finding suitable occupations following 
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military service.298 It was clear that the Nixon Administration’s answer to the problem of 
rising costs was a focus on improving employment options for returning veterans and 
not, necessarily, a renewed interest in education allowances. However, the victory of 
1970 had given the veterans’ benefit coalition an important lesson in how to interact 
with the Nixon Administration, and it would serve the coalition well as they considered 
their plan for a renovated G.I. Bill in 1972. 
The Push for Increased Allowances 
The writing was on the wall, in a sense, when it came to the veterans’ benefit 
coalition’s move to increase education allowance payments even further than they had in 
1970. The lessons of the previous legislation had been difficult, but they primed the 
Nixon Administration to be prepared to not place all of their reliance on Teague’s ability 
to rein in veterans’ supporters in the House. In June 1971, VA Chief Donald Johnson 
warned Domestic Affairs Assistant John Ehrlichman about the important role that 
Teague was likely to play on veterans’ benefit policies in the 1972 Congress. With 
proposals on a new G.I. Bill and VA medical care expansion heading toward markups, 
Johnson was concerned that Teague was not going to act in defense of the Nixon 
Administration’s interests when it came time to negotiate upcoming veterans’ 
legislation. Johnson noted that Teague, while “a conservative at heart” who had been 
“very effective in past years in standing pat…to avoid undue spending or other unwise 
measures in the field of veterans affairs,” might still feel slighted after Nixon refused a 
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private meeting with him in late 1969.299 The stage was set for the White House to place 
less faith in Teague this time around, and instead to attempt to negotiate as best it could 
with the veterans’ benefit coalition as a whole. 
 
The White House Response and a Second Victory 
As Congress opened in 1972, the issue of increased education payments was on 
the agenda, as well as the focus of the Administration. The VA, which had remained 
relatively silent on the 1970 allowance increases, was in the midst of an investigation 
into the education benefits offered to veterans (prompted by outcries over the low 
utilization rates of the 1966 G.I. Bill among returning Vietnam veterans). 
The OMB reported on its observations of the VA’s National Task Force on 
Education and the Vietnam Veteran to the White House, and realized the impending 
increase in benefit levels (and thus federal outlays) if some of the recommendations of 
the Task Force were to be made public. Notably, the Task Force’s preliminary proposals 
indicated a willingness on the part of two newest veterans’ benefit coalition senators – 
Hartke and Cranston – to return to the WWII system of direct tuition payments to 
postsecondary institutions. The OMB Assistant Director, Paul O’Neill, revealed that the 
VA would prevent the public release of the Task Force’s initial reports so as to not add 
fuel to the fire of the veteran’s benefit coalition’s efforts.300  
In the weeks that followed, The White House read public opinion as turning 
somewhat away from the promise of higher education for veterans. Advisors in the 
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Nixon Administration claimed that the president was willing to invest more in vocational 
training programs for veterans than to throw its weight behind a traditional G.I. Bill 
design (which would privilege postsecondary education in theory, though pay out the 
same amounts in benefits to those in vocational education programs).301 Although 
moving the discussion about how to best assist veterans would have placed the White 
House back on the familiar ground that Nixon had laid out in his prior public addresses, 
the coalition – led by Congress – would ultimately push the Nixon Administration back 
into a discussion about higher education. 
The White House endorsed a $200/month allowance due to the increase in the 
Consumer Price Index from 1971 to 1972. The White House went into conference with a 
low number, expecting to be forced slightly higher (though not as high as the Senate’s 
proposed $225/month). Though Teague was told to hold the line against Hartke’s 
increase, he took his own initiative and, White House advisors note, “without our 
prompting, delivered the 48 hour ultimatum to Hartke.” Evans warned the President of 
appearing to side with the Senate, when Teague had been “loyal and valiant,” and it 
simultaneously risked selling out the Republicans on the newly-formed Senate Veterans’ 
Affairs Committee. Evans recommended inaction on the part of the White House to give 
the semblance of Congressional gridlock – and, in particular, what Evans suggested 
could be framed as “the insensitive Senate.”302 Ken Cole noted ominously in his 
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comments, “We’re headed for trouble here.”303  
The role of the new Veterans’ Affairs Committee in the Senate – created in 1970 
– was as yet untested, and remained a point of uncertainty for White House advisors. 
Evans pointed out that the Senate Veterans’ Affairs Committee was a “new animal” with 
a new staff that was not yet accustomed to engaging in conference deliberations with the 
House Committee’s staff.304 A new committee –though headed by senators who were 
amenable to increasing education payments for veterans – was unpredictable in 
conference negotiations, and placed even more weight behind Teague’s willingness to 
support the line of the Administration. 
Meanwhile, Congressional pressure for higher allowances was building from 
inside and outside the VACs. Twelve Republicans and six Democrats signed onto a 
letter to Teague and Hartke, urging them to agree on a $250 allowance deal in 
conference. The White House immediately went on the offensive, contacting the 
Congressional Republicans and reaching out to veterans’ group lobbyists to contact the 
Democrats on the letter, telling them “that the Senate version is the wrong place to be.” 
John Evans, in a memo to Bill Rhatican (who worked under Colson in the Office of 
Special Counsel), argued that those who signed onto the letter were not necessarily 
apprised on the importance of the issue, let alone the official position of the White 
House.305 
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After coming out of conference – and under the threat that the house Rules 
Committee would not put legislation without clear consensus (coming out of conference) 
up for a vote – the White House was prepared to accept the $220 offer. Nixon’s advisors 
contended that there was “no particular need to kick Hartke, the Senate or Congress on 
the eve of a compromise.”306 On October 24, Nixon signed the bill into law, ushering in 
another victory for the powerful veterans’ benefit coalition. 
Conclusion 
During Nixon's first term, Congress increased GI education benefits for a single 
veteran with no disabilities enrolled in college by 34.6 per cent. In 1969 a single veteran 
enrolled in a VA-supported college program received $130 per month. Beginning 
October 1, 1972, he received $220 per month.307 The sharp increase in benefits for 
Vietnam veterans was not at the direct action of the White House, however. Rather, it 
was a concerted effort on the part of Congressional leaders – members of the veterans’ 
benefit coalition – to realize personal agendas in a particular policy area that held 
potential electoral benefits for them. 
While earlier versions of the veterans’ benefit coalition had been large and 
diverse, the newest iteration of the coalition was small, and distilled down to a few key 
categories of members: veterans’ organizations, members of Congress, and the Veterans’ 
Administration. While this arrangement of the coalition exemplifies the “iron triangle” 
in its purest sense, the coalition politics inherent in the debate over veterans’ education 
benefits highlights a powerful feedback dynamic as well as inequalities in the levels of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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influence that each member enjoyed. Though veterans’ groups supported the education 
allowance increases of 1970, they were led toward this goal largely by Congressional 
leaders who, acting with the tacit consent of the Johnson Administration, were willing to 
consider further increasing the scope of the veterans’ benefit program.  
Moreover, the 1972 G.I. Bill highlights the changing role of the White House in 
the veterans’ benefit coalition. Though rhetorically on the side of the veterans, the Nixon 
Administration was, like Republican and Democrat administrations before it, hesitant to 
provide veterans with a blank check for postsecondary education. Despite Nixon’s 
endorsement of changes to higher education funding, he remained resistant to the idea of 
granting major increases to Vietnam veterans for education alone (especially when both 
public and private statements revealed that his Administration would have been more 
comfortable focusing on the importance of job growth amidst rising unemployment). 
Additionally, the 1972 G.I. Bill process sheds light on the temporal element of 
policy development, specially how feedback processes can generate new political 
contexts for similar policies moving forward. The victory of the veterans’ benefit 
coalition in 1970 established that strong Congressional leadership – with or without a 
major show of force by the veterans’ organizations – could effectively set the agenda for 
changes to veterans’ benefit policy.  
What is absent from the process of the 1972 G.I. Bill is its affects on related social 
policies. While some veterans’ groups (like the American Veterans’ Committee) noted 
that the expanding role of the veterans’ benefit system might be best integrated with 
broader welfare policies – there was no major effects on parallel social policy efforts 
during this timeframe. The veterans’ benefit coalition, in reducing down to a small but 
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powerful group of members, appeared to have lost its interest in affecting parallel social 
policies alongside veterans’ benefits. While an expansion in veteran’s education 
allowances was, at least rhetorically, tied to the broader budget (and social welfare 
policies in particular), there were no attempts by veterans’ benefit coalition members to 
actually engage parallel welfare state policies in the legislative battles of 1970 or 1972. 
Instead, coalition members focused almost exclusively on negotiating within their own 
terms, and pushing the White House toward their desired course of action. 
Overall, the 1972 G.I. Bill case highlights the evolving abilities of the veterans’ 
benefit coalition in maximizing their leverage against countervailing forces. The 
coalition maintained its power throughout its struggle for increased education benefits, 
and actually improved its chances for its version of the 1972 G.I. Bill due to its success 
in 1970.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The G.I. Bill enjoys a prominent role in American political history, due to the 
scope and magnitude of its effects on the economy, society, and politics. The Greatest 
Generation’s existence is attributed to the legislation’s ability to help ease readjustment 
for returning veterans, and ultimately relax some of the class barriers that had existed 
prior to the start of World War II. Moreover, the legislation is used as a prime case study 
for explanations of policy feedback theory, suggesting that the policy generated positive 
effects in the civic engagement of a growing American middle class.308 Despite an 
understanding of the positive effects that the original G.I. Bill had on those who utilized 
its benefits, political scientists are left with two separate, but interrelated questions: how 
did the 1944 G.I. Bill establish a potential policy feedback loop for the other iterations of 
the legislation (and under whose direction); and, how did these moments of policy 
development in the field of veterans’ benefits affect parallel processes occurring in social 
policy aimed at the civilian American population? 
  In analyzing the four iterations of the G.I. Bill’s education provisions between 
1943 and 1973, I contend that the architect of these bills is in fact a fractured coalition of 
diverging political interests and sharply contrasted members. Moreover, despite the 
veterans’ benefit coalition’s membership including major veterans’ interest groups 
(which were credited with the mobilization behind the passage of the 1944 legislation), 
largely individual legislators championed the subsequent versions of the tuition assistance !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
308 Suzanne Mettler, Soldiers to Citizens: The G.I. Bill and the Making of the Greatest Generation (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005). 
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programs within the G.I. Bill. The inability of the coalition to agree completely on policy 
provisions – combined with individual member interests in opposition with one another – 
created a loose organization that was only thinly connected under a common goal of 
increased educational assistance provisions for veterans. 
 Additionally, I argue that the divided membership of the coalition led to 
demonstrable effects for the development of several parallel social policies during the 
time periods in which the G.I. Bill revisions were being debated. More specifically, G.I. 
Bill politics were able to constrain broad-based reintegration programs in the immediate 
post-war era, replacing other policy proposals for large scale training and unemployment 
compensation programs. Moreover, G.I. Bills reforms in the 1950s, 60s, and 70s 
maintained the student-veteran within a privileged class, minimizing the potential of the 
Higher Education Act of 1965, while at the same time imposing accreditation 
requirements for federal education funding (via the 1952 G.I. Bill). Taken together, the 
heterogeneous coalition was able to effectively shape American welfare state 
development (via education and training policies), presenting and foreclosing particular 
options depending upon the coalition’s attempts to maintain VA jurisdiction over the 
veterans’ benefit regime. Interestingly, these effects did not extend into the case of the 
1972 G.I. Bill, although concurrent higher education policies were also being formulated 
alongside the veterans’ benefit legislation. This case study presents important findings 
not only in the substantive realm of policy studies, but also makes an important 
theoretical contribution to the policy feedback approach long used to explain G.I. Bill 
development. 
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 The case study of the G.I. Bill lends support to existing policy feedback models, 
suggesting that the political process for future reforms of a policy can be shaped by the 
previous legislative battles that have occurred. The original G.I. Bill did affect the 
subsequent iterations of veterans’ education benefits, and not only by establishing a 
precedent for a system of tuition assistance; the 1944 G.I. Bill defined the way in which 
supporters of veterans’ benefits would approach the extension of those programs, and 
how these advocates would interact with each other, Congress, and the White House. The 
G.I. Bill case presents two important refinements to many of the existing policy feedback 
models, however: (1) that interests may not be reified by a policy, but rather broken down 
by it; and (2) that the feedback effects may not be limited solely to the same policy area. 
 
The Veterans’ Benefit Coalition: Fracture and Imbalance 
 The first important addition to the policy feedback model (via the case study of 
veterans’ education benefits) is the incorporation of the literature on coalition politics. 
Rather than presupposing a united or homogenous interest group behind a particular 
policy – and which is strengthened through the successful adoption of its proposed 
legislation – a coalition-politics approach allows scholars to better understand the internal 
dynamics of the interest groups within the feedback process. Opening up the “black box” 
of these vested interests within the model affords researchers the ability to make fine-
grained observations on intra-group dynamics, leading to more substantiated claims 
concerning group strategies and (following policy adoption), the true effects of the policy 
process on these organized interests. 
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In the case of the G.I. Bill reforms, the coalition’s politics showed an interesting 
pattern between the 1944 G.I. Bill and its later iterations. The original legislation was the 
product of intense veterans’ organization lobbying, so much so that the American Legion 
was able to essentially write the final version of the Bill on its own. While there may 
exist an assumption that further G.I. Bills were the result of a similar process, I argue that 
the historical analysis does not bear out such an argument; rather, the veterans’ benefit 
coalition distilled down into a loose arrangement between veterans’ organizations, the 
VA, the White House (infrequently), and, most important of all, individual legislators 
willing to take up the cause of veterans’ education benefits in the absence of coalition 
accord. These members of Congress – concentrated within the House Committee on 
Veterans’ Affairs and, in the Senate, the disparate committees of Labor and Public 
Welfare and Finance which predated the standing committee – were motivated, I argue, 
by electoral incentives as well as personal agendas concerning New Deal era social 
policies to advance veterans’ education benefits. These legislators were able to gain 
legislative momentum in this arena due to the extant social construction of veterans’ 
benefits in the country as entitlements for the “deserving,” and with broad public support. 
 
Heterogeneity in Interest Groups Surrounding Policy Development 
 In highlighting the complex composition of the veterans’ benefit coalition, I argue 
for the inclusion of heterogeneous groups within extant policy feedback models. In each 
instance of G.I. Bill development following WWII (and to the end of conscription in 
1973), veterans’ benefits were supported by a loosely-tethered group of individual 
members of Congress, veterans’ organizations, the Veterans’ Administration, and (at 
 172! !
times) presidents themselves. The ability and willingness of individual legislators to 
advance the cause of G.I. Bill reform within the framework of the broader coalition 
suggests that individual actors within a political alliance may shift responsibilities and 
cause power imbalances. These shifting group arrangements could aid scholars in 
identifying reasons for particular coalition strategies, as well as the source of particular 
policy proposals or legislative initiatives from coalitions that have a semblance of unity 
or homogeneity.   
Moreover, the case study of the veterans’ benefit coalition may help explain the 
composition, strategies, and legislative successes (as well as failures) of similarly-situated 
groups that are united behind common policy goals. Understanding the ways in which 
political actors with little else in common beyond a singular legislative preference 
interact with one another – and what can cause them to stop working together 
harmoniously – provides both academics and policy analysts with new lenses to 
appreciate particular strategic choices within those coalitions.  
A more recent example of a political coalition with contrasting interests is found 
in recent work on the American homeschooling movement. Behind the push for federal 
and state regulations that are more amendable to families educating children within their 
homes (and not through school attendance), a deeply divided coalition has found a 
common ground. Ideologically, supporters of homeschooling are more likely to be either 
libertarian-conservatives (members of the Tea Party, for example), or extremely 
progressive liberals. Despite their political differences in a host of other social, economic, 
and political issues, this divided constituency has found a common (and tenuous) 
connection in their shared policy preferences regarding education children at home. Such 
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a coalition, though addressing policy on a smaller scale than that of veterans’ benefits, 
still presents an important case study of an evolving political debate concerning the limits 
of government intervention.309 
 
The Influence of the Coalition on Social Policy Development 
 The second major observation that can be drawn from the case study of veterans’ 
education benefits is centered on the effects of policy reform on parallel policy spheres. 
The investigation into the G.I. Bill reform process suggests that concerted efforts on the 
part of political actors – specifically, invested legislators – can affect policies in 
connected areas, either through establishing provisions later used in other policy areas, or 
constraining policymakers’ abilities to broaden existing policies (at the risk of important 
administrative or programmatic powers being annexed by other agencies). The case study 
of the postwar G.I. Bills presents a compelling argument for the inclusion of veterans’ 
benefits in discussions of American social policy development writ large, as well as the 
reasons for the current complexion of the American welfare state. 
The fact that the G.I. Bill was able to have long-term effects on reintegration 
policy – effectively supplanting broad-based unemployment compensation and labor 
policies – following WWII was only the beginning of the program’s influence. The 
establishment of accreditation requirements ushered in by the 1952 G.I. Bill created a 
decentralized system of qualifications for the receipt of federal education funds 
(following disagreement within the veterans’ benefit coalition), a requirement that exists 
to this day in the much-debated issue of student loans for postsecondary education (and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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the increasing rates of student-loan debt in America). With the average college graduate 
owing $16,000 in loan debt (and an average of $40,000 owed by those with graduate 
degrees),310 combined with concerns about for-profit colleges and returns on educational 
investment, the influence of the 1952 G.I. Bill was indeed a significant one. The same 
system of accreditation that was an attempt to inoculate against G.I. Bill corruption is the 
very same one that remains under careful investigation as student loan debt continues to 
rise. 
Later versions of the G.I. Bill – under the careful crafting of select legislators 
within the veterans’ benefit coalition – also left their mark on higher education policy. 
The 1966 and 1972 G.I. Bills continued to exclude veterans’ postsecondary education 
benefits from the realm of Health, Education, and Welfare Department oversight, in line 
with VA demands to maintain all veterans’ benefit programs on its own. Moreover, 
attempts to incorporate veterans into the Higher Education Act of 1965 met with the firm 
resistance of the veterans’ benefit coalition, which preferred to maintain the distinction 
between veterans and civilians (even under conditions of peacetime, as is evidenced in 
the debate concerning the 1966 G.I. Bill).  
Thus, the veterans’ benefit coalition was able to not only continuously reform G.I. 
Bill education benefits, but were also capable of protecting the veterans’ benefit regime 
within the purview of the VA and limit the ability of competing agencies to co-opt the 
veteran population within their policy spheres. By relegating veterans to the sole control 
of the VA, the feedback effects of the G.I. Bill reform process constrained reintegration 
(and, later, higher education) policy, shaping the contours of the American welfare state. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Beyond the observations gleaned from the veterans’ education benefit case, however, the 
current investigation presents an important amendment to the policy feedback model 
concerning the direction and scope of feedback effects. 
 
Spillover and Spillback Effects in the Policy Feedback Model 
 Although extant policy feedback models explicate the connections between the 
politics of policy reform and their effects on changes in political contexts, existing 
research focuses much of its analyses on effects within the same policy spheres.311 
Consequently, investigations into the veterans’ benefit system (and other social policy 
regimes) have not focused sufficient attention on the potential “spillover” or “spillback” 
effects, in which policies may influence (positively, or in the case of veterans’ benefit 
influence on welfare state development, negatively) related policies in parallel issue 
areas. The reform process can generate its own inherent political clashes, as policy 
interests compete in a “zero sum” system of finite resources.312 The “policy windows” 
created by changes to related policies – in the case of the current case study, the 
expansion of veterans’ education benefits to new cohorts of military personnel – may 
allow policymakers to influence not only their own realm of issues, but to establish the 
conditions under which related policies may be examined, debated, and legislated.313 
 The case of veterans’ education benefits suggests that policymakers – motivated 
by electoral interests as well as personal predispositions towards federal intervention in 
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education and labor issues – were able to directly restrict the policy options available to 
proponents of a more generous higher education policies at the federal level. 
Additionally, the provisions built into G.I. Bill education benefits were used as blueprints 
for policies directed at the civilian population, once again establishing veterans’ benefits 
as a prototype of large-scale policy initiatives (as Skocpol argues it had been following 
the Civil War pension system).314 Perhaps most influential for current political analysis, 
the veterans’ benefit coalition members were successful at delineating veterans’ benefits 
as a discrete policy regime that, though it could extend its influence outward, could not 
be the object of influence from other spheres of policy development, being sufficiently 
shielded by the VA’s exclusive administration. 
 As much as the current case study provides critical insights into the historical 
development of G.I. Bill benefits, this research also has important implications for 
current veterans’ benefit politics. The most recent iteration of the veterans’ benefit 
regime is a direct reflection of the legislative processes that created it; therefore, inquiries 
into the rationale behind current policy proposals or administrative configurations should 
begin with an appreciation of the historical context within which the current veterans’ 
benefit system developed.  
 
Current Scandals and Future Research in Veterans’ Education Benefits 
Understanding the way in which the subsequent G.I. Bills were formulated, as 
well as their impact on parallel programs, carries important implications for political 
scientists and policymakers alike. The current composition of the VA (and the most !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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recent version of the veterans’ benefit coalition) is as much a function of current political 
realities as it is the historical foundations of the coalition’s interactions and policy goals. 
The state of veterans’ benefits in America – as well as the broader welfare system – can 
be best understood through a perspective that incorporates the coalition politics and 
feedback effects discussed within the previous chapters. 
 
Current Scandals and Potential Lessons 
Analyzing the veterans’ benefit regime is of critical importance in contemporary 
American politics, as the VA has under increasing scrutiny for mismanagement and poor 
administrative practices beginning in 2012. At the center of the VA scandal has been a 
failing healthcare program, which has allegedly left thousands of veterans waiting for 
appointments (and dozens potentially dying before they could access care), in addition to 
as many as 600,000 veterans with backlogged medical disability claims.315  Former 
Secretary of the Veterans’ Administration Eric Shinseki stepped down in May 2014, as 
allegations of gross waiting times for veterans at VA hospitals gained public (and 
Congressional) attention).316 As the investigations into the VA’s management continue, 
increasing public and political scrutiny will be placed on the VA and how the agency has 
been developed its current administrative practices.  
The medical branch of the VA is not the only part of the agency gaining criticism 
for its administration of veterans’ benefits, however. Recently, the education benefit 
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system has gained attention for delays in the disbursement of tuition payments to 
postsecondary institutions that caused problems for veterans’ enrollment at those schools. 
The VA Inspector General revealed that over $60 billion was delayed in payments for the 
tuition and fees of some 80,000 veterans on campus, causing issues for the students as 
they began the new school semester.317 These concerns come on the heels of the recent 
healthcare and disability payment investigations at the VA, and though the scope of the 
mismanagement is far different, the reports still raise concerns about the VA’s ability to 
manage several policy arenas simultaneously. These critiques echo the overshadowed 
(but present) critiques of the VA following the 1944 G.I. Bill, at which time various 
interest groups and individual legislators questioned the capacity of the VA to direct 
education programs alongside what was already a large-scale healthcare and disability 
pension operation. 
Additional critiques have been leveled at the VA for the widespread use of G.I. 
bill benefits at for-profit colleges and universities; Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA) revealed 
in a recent Senate report that 8 of every 10 G.I. Bill dollars awarded as education benefit 
payments go to for-profit schools.318 This statistic is a far cry from the debates 
surrounding the 1952 and 1966 G.I. Bills, in which veterans’ benefit coalition members 
argued about whether public or private schools would hold the enrollment advantage, 
depending on direct versus indirect tuition payments. Once again, the veterans’ education 
benefit system will be under close review to determine the capability of the VA to 
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administer the program, as well as the extent to which the scale and cost of the education 
program is providing a favorable return on the nation’s investment. 
In all, the recent critiques of the VA reinforce one of the most important areas of 
spillover from the investigation of the 1944-1972 G.I. Bills: the relative insulation of the 
VA from reorganization efforts. Despite large-scale investigations into corruption 
surrounding the 1944 G.I. Bill – and through Health, Education, and Welfare bids to 
incorporate veterans into higher education assistance programs in the 1960s and 1970s – 
the VA has been able to effectively maintain a jurisdictionally-distinct sphere of 
administration and influence. The most recent investigations into VA management should 
call political scientists to question the extent to which the institution’s past management 
of the G.I. Bill education (alongside its other policy spheres) might be one of the reasons 
for its current backlog and issues with benefit management. 
 
Veterans’ Benefits and the American Welfare State 
More broadly, though, the lessons of the earliest iterations of the G.I. Bill – and 
its effects on parallel social programs – invites historians, political scientists, and policy 
analysts alike to revisit the role of the veterans’ benefit regime in the development of the 
American welfare state. The depiction of the “laggard” American welfare state often 
obscures the role that veterans’ benefits play in adding to the country’s outlays for social 
welfare programs.319 However, the earliest forms of American welfare policy was based 
on entitlements to Revolutionary War and Civil War veterans for their service.320 
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Although benefits were distributed across different socioeconomic groups, it was the 
selective apportionment of benefits for the wealthy that had been officers in the military 
that drew the harshest criticisms from opponents. These opponents forecasted that the 
generous entitlements given to the more wealthy citizen-soldiers for their service, as 
officers would effectively establish a precedent for how much particular groups in 
American politics would become entitled to benefits. Jensen writes, “As the original 
opponents of Revolutionary officers’ pensions predicted, selective entitlements fostered 
the concentration and purposeful application of central state capacity to privilege 
particular interest at the expense of more collective concerns.”321 There concern was 
valid: during the early twentieth century, veterans’ benefits were one of the largest 
government expenditures: in 1913, for example, payouts for veterans’ benefits reached a 
staggering 18% of all federal expenditures.322 These first iterations of veterans’ benefits 
would lay the groundwork for the future G.I. Bills, and form a political context in which 
veterans’ benefits were an acceptable, popular, and politically successful element of the 
patchwork American welfare state. 
The G.I. Bill’s creation further instantiated veterans’ benefits within the 
framework of welfare politics in the postwar era. The comprehensive nature of the G.I. 
Bill and the success of its initiatives mean that this single piece of legislation, directed at 
a jurisdictionally distinct subset of the American population, could function as a more 
widely-applied set of benefits than it was intended to be. Addressing the needs of a 
demobilized population of citizen-soldiers meant that the federal government could 
intervene in issues of welfare in a separate sphere from contested New Deal policies, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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while still accomplishing many of the same goals as those policies. Because the G.I. Bill 
was able to accomplish what some parts of the New Deal were not – and because it had a 
broad base of support for its myriad programs – it was able to modify other social 
policies in development, shaping them in contrast to the established veterans’ benefit 
policies that had long been an established part of the American political landscape. That 
later iterations of the same legislation were able to shape and constrain higher education 
policy is a testament not only to the work of the veterans’ benefit coalition, but to the 
embedded nature of veterans’ education policies in the comprehensive system of 
American social policy throughout the 20th century. 
Such a role for the veterans’ benefit regime fundamentally alters the existing 
narrative of American welfare state development. Veterans’ benefits – and their 
advocates – are not accountable for the current construction of American welfare policy; 
there are a myriad of reasons for the country’s position behind its more generous 
industrialized peers. However, the fact that veterans’ education benefit supporters were 
able to advance their agenda for veterans – while at the same time constraining policies 
for the civilian population, especially in the fields of education and training – suggests 
that the absence of veterans’ benefit politics in a full discussion of 20th century welfare 
policy development misses a critical component.  
The ability of the veterans’ benefit coalition to continue to advance the scope and 
magnitude of the veterans’ benefit regime – even in the face of heavy political opposition 
– suggests that not all welfare policies may be subject to ideological contest or efforts at 
retrenchment. Indeed, the American welfare state has used veterans’ benefits as a 
prototype, and the case study of the G.I. Bill proves that the country is in fact able to 
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sustain large-scale social policies aimed at improving income stability, labor force 
participation, and social mobility. America’s most successful version of its welfare state – 
its veteran welfare state – may already be a political reality, and one that will continue to 
direct the politics of social policy development well into the future.
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